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Abstract 
 
The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in Saudi 
Listed Banks 
 
The current thesis explores the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in Saudi-listed banks using an accountability framework and by 
examining the perceptions of key stakeholder groups. In order to achieve the study’s 
aims, two methods were employed: semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey. 
 
The findings show that corporate governance is now seen as one of the most 
important concepts for Saudi banks and the nation’s financial sector in general. 
However, there are different views regarding the sufficiency and effectiveness of 
corporate governance codes. However, and although it is not required by the 
regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia, all listed banks also have their own codes of 
business ethics; the findings show that there is a strong perceived relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics, which has a positive impact on the 
banks’ practices, although any meaningful developments in ethical standards will 
require mandating of the key principles.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
 
The mechanisms and key notions underpinning ‘good’ corporate governance are now 
widely recognised as having global relevance (Almoataz, 2003). In recent years, there 
has been a remarkable worldwide increase in awareness of corporate governance 
principles and the number of published codes that aim to improve corporations’ 
practices and protect stakeholders from possible crises that might be caused by ‘poor’ 
systems (Falgi, 2009). Following the economic collapse and financial crises at 
organisations such as WorldCom and Enron, corporate governance mechanisms have 
been considered as key for restructuring corporations at all levels (Demirag and 
Solomon, 2003). The reason for these collapses was not just the rapid loss of 
investors’ confidence, but also the lack of corporate transparency, reliable disclosures 
and structured corporate governance in general (Ho and Wong, 2001).  
 
In the Saudi Arabian context, as a result of the Saudi exchange collapse at the 
beginning of 2006, regulators took steps to protect the market and investors from 
future crises and so, in November 2006, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) issued 
the first corporate governance code for Saudi corporations (Falgi, 2009)1. Whilst such 
codes are now commonplace, in terms of reforming and enhancing corporate 
governance practices, Smith (1997) declared that there is an awareness of the need for 
reform that goes beyond following formal regulations. A focus on business ethics is a 
key element in this context and Bonn and Fisher (2005) have suggested that an 
organisation’s approach to ethics must be addressed within the framework of 
                                                 
1 This document will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
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corporate governance although they also contend that this is just the first step if an 
organisation is to develop more effective corporate governance practices. Measures 
must be adopted to ensure that the behaviour at all levels of the organisation is 
consistent with the ethical values adopted in the codes of conduct (Bonn and Fisher, 
2005). As a result of this concern, stock exchanges around the globe (and 
transnational institutions such as the OECD) have developed principles of corporate 
governance that include explicit references to business ethics (Sullivan, 2009).   
 
1.2 Research Significance 
 
 
Gives the importance global bodies attribute to the inclusion of ethical matters in 
corporate governance pronouncements it is important to recognise that  the provision 
of corporate governance and its practices is not only significant for internal 
corporations, but is also necessary for attracting foreign investment in order to 
promote economic welfare (Alkahtani, 2013). To date, with some notable exceptions2, 
there are a dearth of studies that attempt to explore the corporate governance system 
in a Saudi context. In addition, based on the researcher’s knowledge, no study has 
been published in the Saudi Arabian financial sector that investigates the relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics now seen as important. These 
factors have motivated the researcher to carry out a study that explores the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in the Saudi banking 
sector in order to take a first step towards reforming and enhancing the practice of 
corporate governance in the Saudi financial sector. Using interviews and a 
questionnaire survey, employees from the top level of Saudi-listed banks and other 
                                                 
2 A number of studies have investigated corporate governance in Saudi Arabia from different 
viewpoints such as: Altwaijry et al., 2002; Almoataz, 2003; Alharkan, 2005; Alajlan, 2005; Falgi, 
2009; and Alkahtani, 2013. 
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key groups of stakeholders have been questioned about their opinions in relation to 
corporate governance and business ethics in general and how these concepts are 
related to each other. These issues are explored via an accountability lens, both from 
an Islamic perspective, although a Western application is also considered.  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Limitations 
 
 
The main objective of the current study is to narrow the gap in the literature in 
relation to reforming and enhancing corporate governance in developing nations by 
exploring the relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi-
listed banks, in an accountability (including Islamic accountability) context. In order 
to achieve these objectives, the following questions have been addressed: 
 
1. What is the relationship between business ethics and corporate governance in 
the Saudi Arabian banking sector?  
 
2. What role does accountability, including Islamic accountability, play in this 
relationship?  
 
The focus of this study is on the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in the Saudi Arabian banking sector using an interpretive paradigm, as 
identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979), and an accountability theoretical framework 
to interpret the participants’ perceptions. Different groups of listed banks’ key 
stakeholders are included, namely: Academics, Board members, Clients, Employees, 
5 
 
Managers and Regulators3. Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey are 
employed to explore perceptions regarding different issues related to corporate 
governance and business ethics in general and the nature of the inter-relationships 
involved. The potential lines of accountability between the stakeholders and banks 
make their perceptions key if a holistic understanding of the corporate governance and 
business ethics relationship in Saudi Arabia is to develop. The study concentrates on 
issues that dominate the extant literature and other debates, such as the importance, 
compliance and achievement of strong corporate governance in Saudi-listed banks, 
including the adequacy of the Saudi Arabian code. The participants are also asked 
about their understanding of business ethics, as well as the importance and impact of 
the notion on banks’ practices, to determine whether a relationship is perceived 
between corporate governance and business ethics and, if so, how the inter-
relationship works in practice. Accountability - including accountability from an 
Islamic perspective - underpins the analysis and views regarding its implications for 
the Saudi banking sector are explored. The impact of Sharia principles is also 
examined in this context.  
 
The research attempts to provide a first step towards enhancing corporate governance 
practices in the Saudi banking sector by exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics therein. However, the findings of the study are 
intended to contribute to debates about corporate governance and business ethics in 
developing countries more generally, particularly Arabian Gulf countries and the 
wider Islamic world. However, the walk is by no means exhaustive and the author 
acknowledges that the topic is replete with possibilities for future research.  
                                                 
3 i.e. the groups most likely to be aware of modern banking practices, see for example, Stodder, 1998; 
Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Falgi, 2009. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
 
 
This thesis has been divided into eight chapters. The current chapter presents an 
introduction to the study, outlining the significance of the research and the thesis’s 
methodology, scope, limitations and main research questions.  
 
Chapter 2 provides background information about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), where this research is set. The most direct relevant issues to the study are 
discussed, including the legal system of the nation and the framework underpinning 
the nation’s financial services sector.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the most relevant literature in relation to corporate governance and 
business ethics, including the relationship between the notions. The chapter covers the 
key issues related to corporate governance, for example, definitions, models and key 
literature in the topic. Moreover, the definition and explanation of ethics in general, 
and ethics in the business context in particular, are also reviewed. In addition, the link 
between ethics/business ethics and religion is discussed, in particular the Islamic 
context. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the accountability theoretical framework employed 
to interpret the study’s results. This chapter consists of two main parts, which focus 
on: (i) the Western notion of accountability; and (ii) accountability from an Islamic 
perspective. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the methodology and methods that have been employed in this 
thesis. In relation to the methodological approach adopted, the main research 
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philosophies adopted, the assumptions made about the nature of both social science 
and society, as well as the study’s research paradigms are highlighted. Semi-
structured interviews and questionnaire survey methods are highlighted as the two 
methods adopted in this study. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the results of the interviews that were conducted with 17 
interviewees from Saudi-listed banks between March and June 2012. The discussion 
focuses on matters such as corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi banks 
using the accountability framework. Accountability in general, accountability and 
dealing ethically, and accountability from an Islamic perspective are specifically 
discussed. 
 
By using the questionnaire survey method, Chapter 7 explores some of the most 
significant issues raised by both the extant literature and the interviews with a large 
sample of stakeholders in Saudi-listed banks. This chapter focuses on issues related to 
corporate governance, business ethics, the Western notion of accountability and 
accountability from an Islamic perspective. The main findings attained from the 
interviews and questionnaire survey, the thesis’s contribution to knowledge and 
suggestions for further research are presented in the concluding chapter, Chapter 8.                                            
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Chapter 2: Saudi Arabian Context 
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Saudi Arabian Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide general information about the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) where this research is set. The discussion focuses on the issues of most 
direct relevance to the study including the nation’s legal system and its framework of 
financial regulation. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 highlights the 
culture and social system of modern Saudi Arabia, while the political and economic 
background are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 then provides an overview of the 
Saudi legal system before the notion’s system of financial supervision and extant 
monitoring bodies are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.    
 
2.2 Culture and Social Background 
 
 
In order to provide a meaningful review of the business environment in the KSA, it is 
necessary to outline some key background factors that have helped shape the 
contextual issues explored later in the chapter. 
 
Culture and social system are important environmental factors that affect societal 
behaviour and the nature of any developments that take place in a specific society 
(Basheikh, 2002). Violet (1983) indicates that cultural norms and social systems help 
determine what is adequate in business transactions because the latter is based on the 
proposition that business transactions are a part of social systems, while technical 
activities including an interaction between both human and non-human resources. 
10 
 
Historically, the social system in the Arabian Peninsula has been based on clans and 
tribes as these have provided long-time protection and stability for individuals; social 
rules of conduct are set down by a small number of families as providers and 
protectors, with each tribe having a Sheikh who acts as the tribal leader (Al-Naqeeb, 
1996; Wynbrandt, 2010). The tribe became the source of regulatory and legal rules for 
individuals, leading to alliances being made at tribe level; as a result tribes were best 
placed to resolve conflicts and preserve peace (El Mallakh, 1982). In harsh living 
conditions, the assurance of survival strengthened peoples’ loyalty to the tribal 
system, providing it with the main political power in the Arabian Peninsula (Peterson, 
1977; Okashah, 2001). Individualism has no part in tribal mentality unless it serves 
the interest of tribes, leading individuals to act according to the expectations of tribal 
and family (Malaika, 1993). These relationships between individuals, families and the 
tribe allowed people to commit strongly to tribal obligations, obligations which are 
distinctive from those found in Western societies (Berger, 1957). These historical 
influences have, however, become weaker since unification of the Arabian Peninsula 
under one flag by King Abdul-Aziz, the point now regarded as the birth of modern Saudi 
Arabia (AL-Turaiqi, 2008). 
 
In terms of religion in the Saudi context, Basheikh (2002) points out that uncertainty 
avoidance will lead members of a culture to perceive threats from uncertain and 
unknown situations. In this context, religion attempts to limit uncertainty and anxiety 
among people (Basheikh, 2002). Religion is seen in this setting as a way of relating to 
transcendental forces that are assumed to control people's future. For these and other 
reasons, religion plays a significant role in the culture of Arab countries particularly in 
Saudi Arabia (Basheikh, 2002). 
11 
 
Basheikh (2002) highlights some particular features of societies in Saudi Arabia that 
are more pronounced than elsewhere in the region: (i) Children grow up not only 
around their parents but also around grandparents, uncles, aunts, servants or other 
housemates; (ii) If a person belonging to a group has breached society’s rules, the 
whole group will be affected; (iii) The state plays a dominant role in the economic 
system. 
 
2.3 Political and Economic Background 
 
 
After great efforts to unite the majority of the Arabian Peninsula under one flag, King 
Abdulaziz Al-Saud (1880-1953) announced the foundation of the KSA on 23 
September 1932 (Al-Angari, 1999; Al-Turaiqi, 2008). As shown in Figure 2.1, the 
country is located in South-West Asia, covering an area of about 2,100,000 square 
kilometers (868,730 square miles), with a population of 27 million; annual population 
growth was 3.2% between 2004 and 2010 (Central Department of Statistics and 
Information, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias (2014) 
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The governance system in KSA is a monarchy, limited to the male descendants of 
King Abdulaziz. It is a centralised system, the King being the head of the Ministers’ 
Council, which is responsible for the management of the internal and external affairs 
of the Kingdom, and also for organising and co-ordinating the various branches of 
government (Fundamental Governance System, 19924). In practice, this means that all 
three pillars of government - executive, legislative and judicial - are vested in the 
King. The Saudi constitution is the Holy Quran and all legislation is subject to Islamic 
law (Fundamental Governance System, 1992). In particular, Chapter 8 of the 
Fundamental Governance System states that: 
“Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, 
consultation and equality in accordance with Islamic law” (p.6). 
 
 
In the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia occupies a special position because it contains the 
holiest Islamic sites, Mecca (the direction of prayer for Muslims) and Medina (the city 
to which the prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) emigrated and where he is 
buried). Moreover, it is the land of divine revelation and the cradle of Islam, which 
spread from there across the world. Each year, about three million Muslims travel to 
these holy lands to take part in the Hajj (pilgrimage). The religion of Islam has a clear 
influence on many aspects of life in Saudi Arabia; this dates back to the establishment 
of the first Saudi state in 1744, when Mohammed Ibn (son of) Saud (the political 
leader) agreed with Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahhab (the religious leader) to set 
up a state occupying most of the Arabian peninsula, governed by the House of Al 
Saud (from which Saudi Arabia takes its name) and adopting Islamic law (Al-
Rumaihi, 1997; Al-Turaiqi, 2008; and Bowen, 2008). Saudi Arabia is a member of 
                                                 
4 The constitution of the KSA. 
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several international organisations including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
League of Arab States (LAS), the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) and the 
United Nations (UN). 
 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country. As of 2014, it held a 25% share of the total 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Arab world and is the world’s 25th largest 
exporter/importer, with foreign trade of US $78 billion (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2014). The Kingdom has displayed “remarkable political and economic 
stability” according to the Ministry of Economy and Planning in recent decades, 
reflecting massive oil exports, which are the main source of national income (90-95% 
of the total). Saudi Arabia is estimated to hold about a quarter of the world's oil 
reserves and is likely to continue as the largest producer of oil for the foreseeable 
future (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2014). In 2013 Saudi Arabia produced 
29% of OPEC’s output (OPEC, 2013)5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2 Outputs of OPEC Countries in 2013 
Note: This figure depicts global oil production proportions greater than 3% in 2013.  
        Source: OPEC (2013) 
 
The first international shipment of oil from Saudi Arabia was in May 1939, from Ras 
Tanura Port on the Eastern coast of Saudi (Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources, (MPMR), 2013). Since then, oil has played a significant role in the life of 
Saudi Arabia with production levels of between 7 and 10 million barrels a day (see 
Figure 2.3). The MPMR predicts that this level of activity will continue well into the 
future, as recoverable reserves of oil in Saudi constitute about 260 billion barrels, with 
undiscovered resources estimated to be around 200 billion barrels. Between 2004 and 
15 
 
mid-2005, six new oil and gas fields were discovered in the Kingdom. Taken together, 
these figures indicate that Saudi Arabia will be able to mass produce oil for more than 
a hundred years (Cordesman, 2003; MPMR, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.3 Saudi Oil Productions between 2002 and 2011 in Millions of Barrels Per Day 
Source: The Market Oracle (2012) 
 
 
Although Saudi Arabia is a large country, it lacks natural resource such as lakes and 
rivers, with desert covering about 80% of the land mass. Life in the Kingdom before 
oil was discovered in 1938 was very simple, and Saudi Arabia was one of the poorest 
countries in the world. However after the remarkable increases in oil prices over the 
last four decades the rate of economic development has been rapid, with the 
government introducing five-year plans targeting development of healthcare and 
education systems and improving infrastructure in many areas. All of this would have 
been impossible without oil (MPMR, 2013). 
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The government recently updated its regulations and systems to fulfill World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) membership requirements. After a round of negotiations lasting 
over 12 years, in December 2006 Saudi Arabia became the 149th member of the 
WTO (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2013). In this regard, the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) was created by the government, with the aim 
of improving the investment environment in Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.4 The Legal System in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
After taking power, King Abdulaziz became interested in the legal system as a key 
tool for reorganising the country; existing practice was very simple and its procedures 
suffered from a lack of construction and organisation, so the establishment of an 
appropriate framework of laws was seen as an urgent priority (Ministry of Justice, 
2013). Therefore, King Abdulaziz issued a series of regulations aimed at 
systematising the workings of the courts and ensuring the independence and 
hegemony of the judiciary (Ministry of Justice, 2013). In particular, the King stressed 
that the fundamental basis of the legal system was Islamic legalisation, adopting more 
specifically the Hanbli doctrine, one of the four doctrines of Sunnism6. The Judiciary 
Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/64 in 1975, described the broad lines of the legal 
system in the KSA. Article No. I stated that: 
“Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they 
shall be subject to no authority other than the provisions of Sharia 
(Islamic law) and laws in force. No one may interfere with the 
Judiciary”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The Islamic Sunni party regulations follow four major schools that belong to their scholars' respective 
philosophies: Hanafi, Malki, Shafeai and Hanbli. 
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According to the Law of the Judiciary (1975), courts in the KSA have four forms: 
 
a) The Supreme Judicial Council, whose role is supervising the courts as well as 
looking into issues stipulated by the Minister of Justice or the King. The Council is 
composed of eleven members: five full-time members (ranked as the Chief of the 
Appellate Court) who are appointed by Royal Order; five part-time members (ranked 
as the Chief of the Appellate Court or his deputy), the Justice Deputy Minister, and 
three individuals who have the longest service as Chief Judges of the General Courts 
in the major cities. This form is presided over by the Chairman of the Council. 
 
b) The Appellate Court, which is composed of a Chief Judge and a number of judges. 
A Court panel examines cases of personal status, while another looks into criminal 
cases and a third oversees all others. The Chief Judge Deputies of the Appellate Court 
are appointed by the Minister of Justice on the suggestion of the Supreme Judicial 
Council. The decisions of Appellate Court become final only when approved by the 
Minister of Justice. 
 
c) General Courts, composed of one or more judge appointed by the Minister of 
Justice on the suggestion of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
 
d) Summary Courts, similarly composed of one or more judges as per the General 
Courts. 
 
Articles No. 53 and 54 state that the appointment, remuneration and promotion of 
judges are effected by a Royal Order based on the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
18 
 
Council, stating that the statutory requirements in every individual case have been 
fulfilled. Alternatively, according to article No. 87, the Ministry of Justice’s role is to: 
“Assume the administrative and financial supervision over the 
courts and other judicial panels, take actions, and submit to the 
appropriate authorities such proposals and projects as may secure 
the proper standard for the justice system in the Kingdom. It shall 
also study the proposals and decisions which it receives from the 
Supreme Judicial Council, and submit to the High Authorities those 
which require issuance of Royal Orders or Decrees”. 
 
 
 
2.5 Financial Supervision and Monitoring Bodies  
 
 
In Saudi Arabia, three main bodies supervise and monitor companies and financial 
institutions: (i) The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI); (ii) The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA); and (iii) The Capital Market Authority (CMA). 
The reminder of this section will focus on the respective roles played by each of these 
bodies in terms of the nation’s corporate governance framework.       
 
2.5.1 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) 
 
 
Since unification, the KSA government has paid considerable attention to the 
operation of the business and finance sector. Business opportunities have been opened 
up for businessmen and women under economic conditions that are aimed formally at 
ensuring freedom of disposition and ownership, enhancing participation in enriching 
the national economy’s resources, and supporting development and growth (MOCI, 
2013).  
 
Since its formation, the MOCI has been involved in efforts to expand and develop 
domestic and foreign trade, adopting initiatives that promote the private sector’s role 
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and allowing it to both: (i) engage in effective participation in various economics; and 
(ii) to supervise commerce and industry chambers, encouraging them to offer the best 
services to the business community. MOCI has sought to strengthen and develop trade 
and partnerships with all KSA’s allied-countries, therefore ensuring the 
implementation of trade and food supply policies. The MOCI has also proposed and 
imposed regulations for trade and business ensuring efficient trade processes that 
connect the KSA business community with those in other countries (MOCI, 2013).  
 
In addition, at a regulatory level, the MOCI is responsible for supervising, regulating 
and monitoring all forms of companies, and is required by law to ensure corporate 
compliance with all relevant regulations. One of the major roles that the MOCI plays 
is in terms of studying and authorising applications for establishing new joint stock 
companies and reviewing the related articles of incorporation. Moreover, the MOCI is 
responsible for registering and ‘monitoring’ firms’ activities and financial reports 
(MOCI, 2013). 
 
2.5.2 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
 
 
2.5.2.1 Role and Purpose 
 
 
The SAMA was founded in 1952 as the KSA’s central bank. The Agency's charter 
requires it to act as the central government bank, to issue currency, support the value 
of the Saudi Riyal (Saudi currency) at home and abroad, and to encourage and 
supervise the development of the KSA’s banking system in both the public and 
commercial sectors. The SAMA is also the KSA’s investment authority; in this role, it 
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is responsible for managing the country's foreign assets, inside and outside the 
country (SAMA, 2013). 
 
During its early years, SAMA's primary task was banking development and the 
implementation of currency reforms. From 1960 to 1972, SAMA focused on banking 
regulations, against the background of the full convertibility of the Riyal7 into other 
currencies. From 1973 to 1982, SAMA's preoccupation was to containment of 
inflationary pressure on the economy and managing the nation’s massive foreign 
exchange reserves. Since the mid-1980s, the priorities of SAMA have been to 
introduce reform of the financial market with a strong, developed banking system and 
a secure, efficient payment system, as well as assisting the government in managing 
public debt (SAMA, 2013). Over the years, with the expansion of the financial 
system, growth in the economy in general and the associated increase in government’s 
fiscal operations, the responsibilities of SAMA have changed dramatically. Its 
monetary policy, conducted in co-ordination with the government’s fiscal policy, has 
promoted domestic price and exchange rate stability, thus contributing significantly to 
the growth of the Saudi economy (SAMA, 2013). As the present study is concentrated 
on the Saudi banking sector, SAMA’s role in regulating the industry is now discussed 
in more detail. 
 
2.5.2.2 Banking Regulations in the KSA 
 
 
According to Iqbal et al. (1998), there are three reasons for regulating banks: (i) to 
ensure the soundness of the financial system; (ii) to increase the information available 
                                                 
7 Saudi currency, 1.00 GBP = 6.32 SAR; 1.00 USD = 3.75 SAR (XE, 2014).  
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to investors; and (iii) to improve monetary policy control. In addition to these, Iqbal et 
al. (1998) argue that in an Islamic context, Sharia supervision is another requirement. 
Aboodah (1990) identifies two distinct periods in banking regulation in Saudi Arabia. 
The first of these started at the beginning of the 20th century, when there was no 
regulation of business activities. This situation lasted from the establishment of the 
KSA until the emergence of SAMA in 1952 at which point the second identifiable 
period began (Aboodah, 1990). Until the mid-twentieth century, Saudi Arabia had no 
formal money and banking system (SAMA, 2013). To the degree that money was 
used, Saudis primarily used coins having a metallic content equal to their value for 
storing value and as a medium exchange for some of transactions in urban areas. A 
few banking functions existed, such as money changing (especially for pilgrims 
visiting Mecca), and informal connections with international currency markets were in 
evidence (SAMA, 2013). In 1926, a foreign bank was established (Dutch Trading 
Company) but its importance was minor (SAMA, 2013). As oil revenues began to 
increase, foreign and domestic banks were formed. Their business initially consisted 
mostly of making short-term loans to commercial trading, financing imports and 
providing senesces to pilgrims (SAMA, 2013). 
 
In 1926, the Dutch Trading Company8 operated the first bank in the KSA. Its 
operations started in Jeddah, serving pilgrims arriving from Indonesia, which was 
under Dutch rule (SHB, 2013). The government recognised that there was a need for 
other banks, especially after the discovery of oil and, consequently, two other banks 
were licensed to work in the country9 (Aboodah, 1990). Currently, twelve private 
                                                 
8 Currently the foreign partner of the Saudi Hollandi Bank (SHB). 
9 Ahli Bank and French Bank.  
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commercial banks10 operate in the kingdom, providing full-service banking to 
individuals, and to private and public enterprises. Eight of the banks were originally 
totally Saudi-owned, whilst four were joint ventures with foreign banks. In 1975 the 
government adopted a program of Saudi participation in ownership of foreign banks 
operating in the kingdom and in December 1982, the last of these merged with a 
Saudi bank (SAMA, 2013). More than 1,000 branches now exist throughout the 
country with a widespread network of automated teller machines in operation 
(SAMA, 2013). The range of bank activities grew remarkably during the 1970s and 
1980s. Beyond providing credit and deposit facilities, they engaged in investment 
banking, foreign exchange services, securities trading, government finance and 
development of a secondary government bond-treasury bill market (SAMA, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Eleven of them are listed and are included in this study, See Table 2.1 for details.   
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Table 2.1: Saudi Listed Banks 
Note: This table shows some information regarding Saudi-listed banks, taken from their 
official websites. 
 Banks Establishment 
Total Assets in 
Thousand (SR) 
Overview 
1 
Saudi Hollandi 
Bank (SHB) 
1926 80,468,261 
SHB, the first operating 
bank in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 
2 
Saudi American 
Bank 
(SAMBA) 
1955 205,036,629 
SAMBA is one of the 
region's largest and most 
acclaimed financial services 
groups 
3 Al Rajhi Bank 1957 279,870,685 
 
Al Rajhi Bank is one of the 
largest Islamic banks in the 
world 
4 Riyad Bank 1957 205,246,479 
one of the largest financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia 
and the Middle East 
5 
Bank AlJazira 
(BAJ) 
1975 59,976408 
BAJ is recognised as one of 
the leading Sharia 
compliant, fast-growing 
financial institutions in 
Saudi Arabia 
6 
The Saudi 
Investment 
Bank (SAIB) 
1976 80,495,413 
SAIB offers a wide range of 
retail and commercial 
banking products and 
services in addition to 
investment banking.  
7 
Banque Saudi 
Fransi (BSF) 
1977 170,056,674 
BSF is a leading provider of 
comprehensive financial 
services and products. 
8 
The Saudi 
British Bank 
(SAAB) 
1978 177,302,000 
SAAB is an Associated 
Company of the HSBC 
Group, one of the world’s 
largest banking and 
financial services 
organisations 
9 
Arab National 
Bank (ANB) 
1979 173,935,424 
ANB is ranked amongst the 
10-15 largest banks in the 
Middle East. 
10 Bank Albilad 2004 36,323,308 
Bank Albilad has, since its 
inception, committed itself 
to the application of the 
Islamic Sharia in all of its 
transactions 
11 Alinma Bank 2006 63,001,232 
Alinma Bank seeks to 
become an integrated 
financial institution that 
operates in complete 
accordance with Sharia 
compliant banking standards 
in all services and 
transactions. 
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The first regulation of currency exchange business, including by the existing banks, 
took place via the commercial court system, which issued the relevant decree in 1932 
(Aboodah, 1990). However, this law was not comprehensive enough to control the 
banks in the way government desired, and this led to SAMA being established. 
Aboodah (1990) argues that the establishment of SAMA, effectively began a new 
banking era in the KSA, because the organisation played such a vital role in 
improving the nation’s financial system. In this context, SAMA paid special attention 
to the need to enhance the growth of the nation’s banking sector including issuance of 
the Banks Control Law (BCL) in 1966; one of the most significant changes to bank 
regulation in KSA history (Almuhanna, 1995).  
 
The BCL represents the framework of supervision under which Saudi banks operate 
and provides SAMA with power over all commercial banks operating in the 
Kingdom. The BCL has 26 articles relating to commercial banks’ operations, from 
establishment procedures through to daily operations and provisions for orderly 
closures. The law identifies the types of business that banks can be involved in, the 
minimum reserve requirement for SAMA and limitations on loans granted 
(Almuhanna, 1995). As Almehmadi (2004) notes, there is also within SAMA a 
Banking Disputes Settlement Committee (BDSC) which is made up of three 
individuals with significant banking experience. This body settles disagreements 
between the bank and customers by arranging for signed agreements between the 
parties. This committee only has the right to look at cases related to banking 
transactions, such as loans, letters of credit and any type of account. When a case falls 
within its remit, one of the following decisions will be made by the committee: 
 Order all agencies of the government to hold any amount due to customers in 
order to pay the bank. 
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 Order a hold on a customer’s wealth in Saudi Arabia, whether cash or 
property. 
 An order to prevent a customer from leaving Saudi Arabia. 
 If the customer does not cooperate with the committee, then it will order 
government agencies and banks not to deal with him/her in the future 
(Almehmadi, 2004, p.36). 
 
Almehmadi (2004) argues that this committee was formed because some customers 
had refused to pay the interest due to the banks; these customers, after benefiting from 
the loan, then claimed that interest is prohibited under Sharia, and they would not 
therefore be able to repay it (Almehmadi, 2004). These individuals were supported by 
the courts in Saudi Arabia who judge cases according to Islamic law only, but the 
SAMA established the BDSC committee in 1987 to deal with this type of problem 
directly (Presley and Wilson, 1991). 
 
2.5.3 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
 
 
The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established in 2004 and reports 
directly to the President of the Council of Ministers. It has a legal personality, 
administrative and financial independence and all authority that might be necessary to 
discharge its functions and responsibilities. The CMA enjoys the facilities and 
exemptions enjoyed by all Saudi Arabian public agencies, but it does not have the 
right to engage in any commercial activities, borrow any funds, take a special interest 
in any project intended for profit, or to own, acquire or issue any securities (Capital 
Market Law, 2014). These regulations are imposed to ensure that the CMA discharges 
its responsibilities objectively and fairly and in so doing, promotes the KSA’s Stock 
Market (Capital Market Law, 2014).  
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To attain these objectives, the CMA is charged with the following: 
 Regulating and improving the Saudi Stock Exchange, by enhancing trading 
systems and developing procedures that will decrease risks related to security 
transactions. 
 Regulating securities’ issuance and trading practices. 
  Regulating and supervising the activities and works of parties subject to the 
control and supervision of the CMA. 
 Protecting investors in securities from unsound and unfair practices, or 
practices involving deceit, cheating, fraud, or manipulation. 
 Seeking to achieve efficiency, equality and transparency in the transactions of 
securities. 
 Regulating and monitoring information disclosures and ensuring that all 
relevant information is disclosed to participants in the market, whether they 
are shareholders or stakeholders. 
 Regulating public offers and purchase requests of shares (Capital Market Law, 
2014). 
 
In pursuing these goals the CMA has powers under the Capital Market Law (2014) 
that include the following: 
1. Set plans and policies, conduct studies and issue necessary rules. 
2. Issue and amend the formal Implementing Rules as necessary to enforce legal 
regulations. 
3. Approve securities’ issues. 
4. Provide advice and recommendations to government authorities in respect of 
matters that will contribute to Exchange development and investor protection. 
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5. Suspend the activities of the Saudi Stock Exchange for a period of not more 
than one day (and longer in cases) where the CMA or the Finance Minister 
deem it necessary.  
6. Approve, cancel or suspend the listing of any Saudi security.  
7. Prohibit or suspend the issuance or trading of any securities on the exchange. 
8. Determine the maximum and minimum commissions to be charged by 
brokers.  
9. Establish the conditions and standards required of auditors. 
10. Determine the contents of the annual financial statement and related 
documents. 
11. Define and explain the provisions and terms set out in the Regulations of 
Capital Market Law. 
12. Issue decisions and instructions, and set out the procedures deemed necessary 
for the implementation of the provisions of the regulations. 
13. Issue instructions, establish internal rule frameworks and set out the 
procedures necessary for the management of the CMA. 
14. Approve the policies, directives and rules of the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
15. Prepare directives and rules relating to the control and supervision of entities 
subject to the regulations. 
16. Approve the establishment, liquidation and merger of investment funds (and 
related operating rules, such as investment fund governance and decision 
making), their organisational structure, accounting system, operating rules, 
liquidity requirements and risk limits. 
17. Appoint a licensed auditor to audit the financial statements of the CMA. 
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18. Grant the necessary licenses to be issued in accordance with the regulations 
and their Implementing Rules (Capital Market Law, 2014). 
 
Importantly, the CMA is expected to work with SAMA in relation to measures that it 
plans to undertake and which might influence the nation’s monetary situation (Capital 
Market Law, 2014). As regards the CMA’s board, it should consist of five members 
all of whom should be Saudi citizens and working on a full-time basis. The members 
of the board are appointed, and their financial benefits and salaries determined, by 
royal order; this provision extends to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. The term 
of board membership is five years, renewable once. The board sets the internal rules 
of the CMA and outlines the conduct expected when auditors, advisors and other 
appointed experts carry out the functions and responsibilities entrusted to the CMA 
(Capital Market Law, 2014)11. Board members and employees of the CMA are not 
allowed to engage in any other job or profession, including occupying a post or a 
position in any public or private institution, nor provide advice to them (Capital 
Market Law, 2014). One of the most significant regulations issued by the CMA in the 
context of the present study is the corporate governance code applying to the KSA, 
which will now be discussed in more details.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Any individual who becomes an employee or a board member of the CMA must immediately 
disclose to the CMA the securities they own or are at any relative’s disposal - and disclose any change 
thereon - within three days of becoming aware of such a change. Any individual who becomes an agent 
for the CMA must also make this declaration in relation to the work entrusted to him/her, in the manner 
specified in the CMA’s rules (Capital Market Law, 2014). 
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2.5.3.1 The Corporate Governance Code in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
After the Saudi market crashed in the beginning of 2006, the CMA was tasked with 
developing a set of good practice rules and the resultant document: “Corporate 
Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” was issued in November 
200612. The CMA states that the code was introduced in an attempt to reduce the 
impact of rumours and fraudulent practices on the nation’s stock exchange, 
particularly insider trading (CMA, 2014). This code aims to ensure that listed 
companies in the Saudi market comply with best governance practices and protect 
the rights of both shareholders and stakeholders. Although a number of these 
regulations are not compulsory, companies are required to disclose in the annual 
report of the board the regulations that are/are not applied, and explain the reasons 
for non-compliance. The CMA does not give listed companies the right to ignore the 
compulsory parts of the code, but they are entitled to waive the non-compulsory 
regulations provided that they clearly state the reason for the non-implementation. 
Thus, when it comes to compulsory articles of the corporate governance code, the 
listed companies have to comply; otherwise, the CMA can either fine the firm or 
bring them before the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes 
(Alkahtani, 2013). The code contains three major topics: (i) the rights of the 
shareholders and the General Assembly; (ii) disclosure and transparency; and (iii) the 
board of directors (CMA, 2014). One of the main purposes of the code is to protect 
the rights of not only shareholders but also stakeholders in general; however, 
business ethics are not mentioned anywhere (CMA, 2014).  
 
 
                                                 
12 See these regulations in Appendices 2.1.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has provided detailed information about the KSA, with a focus on the 
legal system and the bodies that supervise and monitor the operations and 
governance of major companies and financial institutions, i.e. the issues most 
relevant to present study. Having set out the contextual background to the research in 
this chapter, Chapter 3 reviews the literature related to corporate governance and 
business ethics in general and in the Islamic context pertaining to the KSA in 
particular. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
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Literature Review 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The subject matter of this thesis encompasses a wide range of areas in social science, 
including ethics, religion, corporate governance and accountability. This chapter aims 
to discuss elements of these vast literatures in so far as they relate most directly to the 
objectives of this thesis and it was necessary to make a number of decisions regarding 
the scope of the literature review given the volume of material potentially available.  
The chapter therefore concentrates on the literature most directly relevant, for 
example, studies examining corporate governance, business ethics, Islamic teachings 
and the links between them. Section 3.2 outlines the key issues relating to corporate 
governance that are of most relevance to the study.  A brief definition and explanation 
of the broad notion of ethics is provided in Section 3.3 while ethics in a business 
context is explored in detail in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 explores the notion of a link 
between ethics and religion, with this analysis situated in an ethical context in Section 
3.6.  Business ethics in an Islamic context is considered in Section 3.7 before Section 
3.8 explores the links between governance and ethical notions while Section 3.9 
highlights this link in an Islamic context before Section 3.10 concludes. It is 
acknowledged that the studies discussed here are only a partial reflection of the vast 
literature referred to earlier, but should provide the reader with understanding of the 
context within which the present research was conducted.   
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3.2 The Modern Notion of Corporate Governance  
 
 
Before exploring the literature examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics, a range of topics underpinning the modern 
governance concept are highlighted, including defining the notion of ‘corporate 
governance’, corporate governance models and corporate social responsibility as a 
core element of corporate governance. 
 
3.2.1 Defining the Notion and Role of Corporate Governance 
 
 
Recent years, have seen growing public interest in corporate governance as a result of 
the scandals at high profile corporations such as Enron and the associated abuses of 
managerial power13. The rising number of corporate crises and failures has sparked 
discussion about the role of large corporations in society and raised questions about 
their ethical standards, management decisions and corporate governance practices 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; and Sun, et al., 2011). Corporate failures, such as that at 
Enron, have raised concerns over the effectiveness of existing governance and 
corporate accountability practices. Consequently, in academic journals, there has been 
a growth in the number of papers investigating corporate governance (Machold, et al., 
2008).      
 
One of the first detailed reports on modern corporate governance was provided by the 
UK’s Cadbury Committee which defines corporate governance as: 
“… the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
(Cadbury Report, 1992 p. 15)14.                                                                                          
 
                                                 
13 See for example, Chambers (2010).  
14 This definition is still used in UK corporate governance code. 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999. p 11) 
defines and describes corporate governance as follows15: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company's management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that 
are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring” (p. 11). 
 
 
Unlike the definitions used in the relevant UK and US codes, the OECD formulation 
explicitly mentions stakeholders. From a stakeholder perspective, a good corporate 
governance system should determine the accountability of the company towards a 
wide range of stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). Here, Bain and Bland (1996) suggest 
that a robust corporate governance system should add value to as many organisational 
stakeholders as possible. Solomon (2010), who takes a broad accountability 
perspective, defines corporate governance as: 
“The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity”(p. 14). 
 
 
An early definition of corporate governance, by Tricker (1984), has a similar 
emphasis, but is less explicit in terms of the interested parties: 
“The governance role is not concerned with the running of the 
business of the company per se, but with giving overall direction to 
the enterprise with overseeing and controlling the executive actions 
of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations of 
                                                 
15 The OECD definition has been used to underpin corporate governance codes in a number of 
developing nations. See for example, Shikaputo (2013). 
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accountability and regulation of interests beyond the corporate 
boundaries” (Tricker, 1984, p. 61). 
 
 
There are therefore a wide range of definitions of corporate governance reflecting 
various perspectives on the purpose of business. However, accountability is key in 
most versions, with the difference between them often relating to whom that 
accountability is due; in particular, some restrict the accountability duty to 
shareholders, while others have a wider standpoint, comprising all stakeholders 
(Elkelish, 2007). Solomon (2010) argues that, although the narrow shareholders-based 
approach is compatible with the theoretical framework of the stakeholder approach, 
the interests of the shareholders can only be fulfilled by taking account of the interests 
of stakeholders, and corporations can be more successful in the long-term if they are 
accountable to all of their stakeholders. This reasoning suggests that companies can 
maximise their value by extending their accountability to a wide range of parties, with 
improving their corporate governance systems part of the process (Solomon, 2010). 
 
Sullivan (2009) argues that, in order for an effective relationship to be maintained 
between a company’s managers and its capital providers, high levels of trust must 
exist. He adds that, to gain sufficient levels of trust, four principles of corporate 
governance need to be in place: (i) Transparency, i.e. the directors must make clear 
why every material decision was made, to both the capital providers and other 
stakeholders; (ii) Accountability, whereby the directors should be accountable to the 
stakeholders and for their decisions by submitting themselves to appropriate scrutiny; 
(iii) Fairness, with equal consideration given to all stakeholders by the directors and 
management, entailing fairness, justice and the avoidance of biased interests; and (iv) 
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Responsibility, the directors should carry out their responsibilities with honesty, 
integrity and probity (Sullivan, 2009).  
 
Bonn and Fisher (2005) state that corporate governance is concerned with the 
processes by which an organisation is directed, controlled and held accountable. They 
view the notion as dealing primarily with the responsibilities and rights of an 
organisation’s management, its shareholders and other stakeholders with an emphasis 
on balancing these interests with the organisation’s economic goals and society’s 
interests as a whole. Sullivan (2009, p.10) summarises this line of thinking very 
clearly: 
“Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. The corporate governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to 
align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations 
and society”. 
 
 
Bonn and Fisher (2005) claim that Cadbury’s definition suggests that corporate 
governance is a concept with implications for an organisation’s approach to social 
responsibility and business ethics, in addition to ensuring that all regulatory duties and 
responsibilities are fulfilled. Similarly, Andreadakis (2010) contends that corporate 
governance offers a structure through which a company’s objectives can be set, and 
the means of achieving those objectives and monitoring performance determined 
(Andreadakis, 2010). Andreadakis suggests that the three key notions underpinning 
corporate governance are compliance, accountability and ethics. In the majority of 
corporate governance definitions, however, the notion of ethics is omitted and this 
makes the definition of corporate governance appear incomplete according to 
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Andreadakis. Moreover, companies are expected to create and preserve a respectable 
business reputation and to have a positive effect on the whole community as well as 
on their own working environment; this is what constitutes ‘good’ corporate 
governance (Andreadakis, 2010). Andreadakis goes further in this context and argues 
that the role of any strong corporate governance system is to provide companies with 
enough freedom to evolve and grow but, at the same time, to ensure that this freedom 
operates within an effective accountability framework. It is essentially a question of 
finding the right balance between being competitive and remaining accountable, but 
good corporate governance also underpins market confidence, efficiency and 
integrity, thereby promoting financial stability and economic growth (Wanyama et al., 
2009; Andreadakis, 2010). The existence of a robust governance structure adds great 
value to a company and raises the likelihood of significant financial achievement in 
this context. It is not only a matter of putting restrictions on the conduct of the 
company, but is equally about creating a culture and environment that encourages 
high ethical standards (Andreadakis, 2010; Wanyama et al., 2013). The relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics is returned to at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
3.2.2 Corporate Governance Models 
 
 
Two models of corporate governance dominate the literature in the area: the ‘outsider’ 
model, which is used in Anglo-American countries such as the US, UK and Canada, 
and the ‘insider’ model, which has played a major role in countries such as Germany, 
France and Japan. La Porta et al. (2000) and Rosser (2003) point out that the outsider 
model places great importance on: equity finance; the strong legal protection of 
shareholders; dispersed ownership; strong bankruptcy regulations; a lesser role for 
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employees, creditors and other stakeholders in the company management; strong 
disclosure requirements; and significant freedom to merge with other organisations. In 
contrast, the insider model is characterised by: a high reliance on bank finance; the 
weak legal protection of minority shareholders; concentrated ownership; a central role 
for stakeholders in the companies’ ownership and management; weak disclosure; and 
limited freedom to merge (La Porta et al., 2000; Rosser, 2003). Table 2.1 summarises 
the characteristics of the two models. 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of the features of Insider and Outsider Governance systems 
Source: Solomon (2010). 
 
3.2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 
Most debates regarding the link between ethics and corporate governance now point 
to the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a key area for discussion 
(e.g. Solomon, 2010). CSR is commonly identified as the economic, ethical and legal 
activities of a business as adapted to society’s values and expectations (Carroll, 1979; 
 Insider Outsider 
Owners Insider shareholders Outsider shareholders 
Ownership structure Concentrated Dispersed 
Separation of 
ownership and 
control 
Little Separated 
Control over 
management 
Insider shareholders Managers 
Agency problems Rare Exist 
Hostile takeover 
activity 
Rare Frequent 
Protection of 
Investors 
Weak Strong 
Shareholders’ rights 
Potential for abuse of power by 
majority shareholders 
Potential for shareholder 
democracy 
Shareholders voting 
Majority of shareholders tend to 
have more voice in their investee 
companies 
Shareholders 
characterised more by 
exit than by voice 
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Andrews, 1987). Joyner and Payne (2002) argue that the term ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ is used more widely in the management literature than in the business 
ethics literature. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ethical responsibility of 
firm’s executive is to meet the expectations of society regarding proper, conscientious 
behaviour (Joyner and Payne, 2002). 
 
One key concept in CSR theory is the ethical responsibility of the organisation, which 
is influenced by society’s values (Carroll, 1979); however, ethical or unethical 
organisational activities can in turn influence societal evaluations. Today, the demand 
for ethical behaviour and social responsibility by corporations and their management 
is stronger than ever (Joyner and Payne, 2002; Drennan, 2004). Solomon (1997) 
suggests several reasons for this; first, the long term financial success of American 
business has generated much greater attention on the firms’ concerned activity among 
the public. Second, as the new ‘nobility’, corporate business is the privileged class 
and thus society makes high demands of this group. Finally, Solomon points out that 
businesses are now the most powerful institutions in the world; partly as a result, the 
social responsibility remit has enlarged to incorporate areas previously considered the 
government’s domain; e.g. education quality, funding and facilities for basic research, 
support of the arts, world hunger and poverty, urban planning and development as 
well as unemployment issues. In general, the more powerful businesses are in the 
world, the greater responsibility they must bear for the wellbeing of the world 
(Solomon, 1997, p. 204). The CSR concept is an example of where the wide variety of 
social affairs now widely recognised as being impacted by corporations (Drennan, 
2004). 
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Boatright (2003) points to the now wide-spread acceptance of the premise that 
businesses have responsibilities that go beyond the maximisation of profit and that 
they are expected to make a positive contribution to society. Businesses are typically 
expected by society to make a profit, obey the law, behave in certain ways and 
conform to society’s ethical norms (Bonn and Fisher, 2005). Not only do many of 
these behaviours and practices, by definition, go beyond legal requirements, but they 
seem to be continuously expanding (Carroll, 1999). Underpinning the arguments laid 
out in this section is the notion of ethical behaviour as an aspect of firm behaviour that 
cannot be ignored; the discussion now turn to this issue. 
 
3.3 Defining Ethics 
 
 
The term ethics comes from the Greek word ethikos (Sullivan, 2009). Beekun (1997) 
defines ethics as:  
“The set of moral principles that distinguish what is right from what 
is wrong.”(p. 2). 
 
 
 It is a normative field because it prescribes what one should or should not do 
(Bucheery, 2001). Sullivan (2009) provides several related definitions of ethics in this 
context; first, he argues that the notion of ethics relates to the question of what is 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, with moral obligation and duty central to the issue. Second, ethics 
can be shown to encompass a particular set of moral values or principles. Sullivan 
contends that in some regions ethical standards are unique to a specific culture, 
whereas in others they might be part of the common cultural heritage of all nations. 
Third, Sullivan argues that ethics can be seen as the principles of conduct governing 
both an individual and a group, while fourth, and in line with tradition, he suggests 
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that ethics can be viewed as representing a branch of philosophy, and is related to the 
development of market economy thinking (Sullivan, 2009). More generally, 
Pomeranz (1998) states that ethics can be seen as comprising normative judgements 
about social conduct; such judgements might reflect consideration of matters of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ for members of society, but would not necessarily be enforced by 
legal penalties. Here, Pomeranz argues that whilst crimes naturally involve ethical 
violations, not all ethical violations represent crimes. Similarly, Carmichael (1997) 
believes that ethical questions are concerned with the moral judgements involved in 
making decisions about what is morally good and bad, or morally right and wrong. 
This reasoning assumes that the moral standards that affect human well-being are not 
established or changed by authoritative bodies’ decisions, but are based instead on 
impartial considerations that override self-interest (Carmichael, 1997). 
 
This thesis restricts itself to exploring ethics from a business perspective, 
concentrating in particular on the relationship between ethics and corporate 
governance in an accountability context. It is acknowledged that there is a vast 
interdisciplinary literature on ethics, but the focus here is on business ethics from a 
corporate viewpoint. Although some studies (e.g. Wanyama, 2006) have alluded to 
ethical constructs within corporate governance, this study attempts to tease out that 
relationship in greater detail within the Saudi banking environment. To this end, the 
concept of business ethics will now be explored in greater detail.     
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3.4 The Notion of Business Ethics 
 
 
Bucheery (2001) defines business ethics as: 
“… the application of theories of right and wrong to activity within 
and between commercial enterprises, and between commercial 
enterprises and their broader environment.” (p. 9). 
 
 
In a recent study, Knight (2005) asserts that in talking to a stranger about the subject, 
most students of business ethics are faced with jokes about ‘ethics in business’, 
implying that the phrase is an oxymoron and that business has its own behavioural 
rules which may not be considered ‘ethical’ within other frameworks. It is now often 
argued that the notion of business existing to make a profit is uncontroversial (Carr, 
1993; Joyner and Payne, 2002). Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that it pays business 
to divert from ethical best practice if profit is the ultimate goal (Carr, 1993). To clarify 
this point, Burke and Black (1990) argue that the question: “what has ethics to do with 
business or profits?” can usefully be asked. 
 
It is regularly claimed that ethics comprises a set of codes or moral principles that aim 
to inhibit the fulfilment of selfish interest. However, in this context Ghosh et al. 
(2011) argue that profits and ethics do not necessarily work against each other and it 
is possible to identify specific situations where pursuing actions that an individual 
believes to be “proper” (i.e. ethical) leads to financial gains at the corporate level16 
(Burke and Black, 1990; O’Neil and Pienta, 1994). To answer the question of why 
businesses should engage in ethical practices, Friedman (1962) states that a business 
has a fiduciary responsibility to its various stakeholders. This view implies that 
                                                 
16 Dealing ethically is the way to build a trust between corporation and society which leads to maximise 
the financial gains (Ghosh et al., 2011). 
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businesses must contribute to society and the whole community in an ethically 
symbiotic way (Joyner and Payne, 2002), as business cannot survive without societal 
interaction and society cannot progress without engaging with business. Thus, 
business must acknowledge the existence of society, while the growth of society 
requires the implementation of more ethically responsible business practices (Joyner 
and Payne, 2002). 
 
Joyner and Payne (2002) suggest that businesses will engage in ethical practices 
because the motivation to guide a business is related to the desire to do the ‘right’ 
thing. People who work in business recognise their existence in society and therefore 
acknowledge that their corporations must also perform in an ethical manner (Joyner 
and Payne, 2002). Similarly, both Ouchi (1981) and Ghosh et al. (2011) portray 
profits as the reward for firms that continue to help its employees to grow, provide 
true value to customers and behave responsibly as a corporate citizen. 
 
Holme (2008) highlights some specific advantages claimed for the engaging of ethics 
in business, for example, that the satisfaction of employees arises from ‘fair’ 
management decisions. Holme argues that although what is fair could be defined as 
the minimum needed to obey legal requirements, the notion of ethics implies that 
much more is required. Holme notes trust as another advantage, presenting the 
relationship between the supplier and the organisation as an example. In this context, 
the stronger level of trust that the organisation has with its supplier, the better the 
relationship and therefore the better the business. Based on this reasoning, Holme 
concludes that, recognising an organisation or part of a community, market 
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participants will decide to invest or not according to the organisation’s reputation for 
ethical behaviour in society (Holme, 2008). 
 
Bucheery (2001) notes that the term ‘business ethics’ covers a wide range of activity, 
and no concise list can fully reflect the issues it raises. However, Bucheery points to 
the following as being amongst the most relevant:  the safety of working practices; 
financial accounting transparency; making prompt payments to suppliers; recruitment 
fairness; the degree of permissible aggression between competitors; and relations 
between businesses, consumers, local communities and national governments. Many 
of these issues can be understood to have a bearing on distinct, recognised groups, 
with their own stakes in a business; e.g. consumers, employees and shareholders. 
 
Global corporations have the power to shape the climate of the business in which they 
operate; in particular, ‘best practice’ companies can be proactive agents of change by 
agreeing to raise their ethical standards (Kaufmann et al., 2005). In a departure from 
this point of view, Conroy and Emerson (2004) highlight that the business ethics field 
has received increasing attention from academia, the corporate world and the public in 
general over the past few decades. Most recently, the behaviour of Enron, WorldCom 
as well as other high-profile scandals17 involving the falsification of financial data 
have brought the notion of business ethics to the forefront of regulator, academic and 
media attention. These cases show that unethical behaviour is costly to firms, their 
employees, and their investors (Stodder, 1998; Conroy and Emerson, 2004). As a 
result, there is growing acknowledgement that good ethical practices can have a 
positive impact on firms’ economic performance (Joyner and Payne, 2002). 
                                                 
17 For more details about these cases see Mallin (2013).  
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Regarding the issue of how leaders might encourage and enhance ethical behaviour 
within their organisations, Solomon (1997) argues that the network culture of 
corporations - and the enormous power of peer pressure - shapes the culture of the 
corporation, including its ethics, more than individual values. Different businesses 
therefore introduce different cultures, and different cultures define different ethics, 
different values and different lives. However, in small corporations, the culture - and 
thus the ethics and values of the organisation - are strongly shaped by the founders 
(Joyner and Hofer, 1992). 
 
The modern debate on business ethics has highlighted the moral tensions inside 
corporations that are likely to exist between an employee and an employer; the 
relationship between the corporate employer and the individual employee implies the 
obligation of the employee to obey his/her employer’s instructions (Knight, 2005). 
Solomon (1993) emphasises this issue regarding the conflict between the roles of 
individual (or family) and employee or business, arguing that ethics in business 
should ultimately pay more attention to individual responsibility. In addition, 
Solomon proposes that a “contextual” view of business ethics should be adopted, but 
in a holistic way, acknowledging that an employee is also a member of a community. 
Relatedly, Desjardins (1993) suggests that if corporations treat their employees well, 
this will contribute towards breaking down the barrier between one’s employment life 
and one’s personal life. Holme (2008) describes the way in which managers take the 
opinions of their employees into account. He shows how managers can guarantee that 
their staff have all of the information they require in order to do their work, and how 
conflicts of interest are resolved. The notion of ethical business, translated into the 
behaviour of management, can make the difference between satisfaction and 
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frustration amongst the employees, with a consequent effect on the firm’s 
performance. 
 
Regarding the question of how to actually promote ethical behaviour in the business 
field, Conroy and Emerson (2004) note that in survey after survey corporate leaders 
have recognised that students should be encouraged to develop ethical standards, 
prompting bodies such as the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) to include ethical considerations within its body of required knowledge 
(Conroy and Emerson, 2004). Evidently, talk of ethics, integrity, values and 
responsibility in the business community is no longer merely acceptable, but is an 
increasingly practical requirement (Stodder, 1998).  
 
As can be seen from this brief overview of the business ethics literature, much of the 
research has focused on the ethical decisions of students; in contrast, research in the 
corporate context is fairly limited and this research attempts to fill this void. As this 
study is conducted in Saudi Arabia where religion plays a pivotal role in society it 
would be remiss to not discuss the role played by religion in the context of any 
discussion of ethical notions.  
 
3.5 Ethics and Religion  
 
 
Bucheery (2001) argues that rewarding of compliance and punishing of breaches are 
required for enforcement of an ethical code. However, in some markets, very few 
formal contracts exist; there is instead a high degree of trust among regular 
participants (Bucheery, 2001); traders are excluded from the market and loses their 
investments in human capital if they are discovered to have acted unethically. 
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However, this enforcement mechanism typically applies only when the consequences 
of being caught are very great (Bucheery, 2001). 
 
Religion has played a key role in encouraging ethical behaviour via the notion of an 
omniscient being with the power to reward and punish behaviour (Noreen, 1988). 
Noreen (1988) argues that the Catholic Church worked as a civilising force at the 
inception of the Dark Ages. The historic function of Christianity was to re-establish 
the character and moral basis of society by providing a punishment and reward 
framework for social order (Noreen, 1988). Noreen (1988) goes on to assert that this 
civilising function is common to Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The practicability of 
a natural (non-religious) morality is rejected by all three religions.  
 
The role played by religion in affecting debates about ethics is well documented 
(Conroy and Emerson, 2004) and beyond the scope of the present thesis. Both in 
specific and broader studies (including student cheating, insider trading 
environmentalism), religiosity is associated with higher ethical standards (Allmon et 
al., 2000; Conroy and Emerson, 2004). In attempting to explain why religion might 
affect moral attitudes, Kohlberg (1981) argues that religion is a conscious response to 
the quest for the ultimate meaning of moral actions and judgment. As such, the main 
function of religion is not necessarily to provide moral or ethical prescriptions, but is 
instead to emphasise moral action and judgment as meaningful human activities.  
 
Recent research in the ethics context has pointed to the fact that the main monotheistic 
religions have universal moral tenets, reflected in the holy book teachings of 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (Ali et al., 2000), and other Biblical traditions that 
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offer instructive moral direction (Friedman, 2000). Conroy and Emerson (2004) report 
that students who fear failure have a considerably lower willingness to behave 
unethically. The authors extend their findings by postulating that believers in God are 
less willing to behave ‘badly’ because they believe that they will later be questioned 
by God about their unethical thoughts or attitudes. This concept is similar to a view 
outlined much earlier by Smith (1976): 
“Religion gave a sanction to the rules of morality, long before the 
age of artificial reasoning and philosophy. That the terrors of 
religion should thus enforce the natural sense of duty, was of too 
much importance to the happiness of mankind for nature to leave it 
dependent upon the slowness and uncertainty of philosophical 
researches”. (p. 273) 
 
 
Whatever the theoretical foundations, the empirical results linking ethics and religion 
have encouraged the incorporation of the latter traditions into business ethics debates, 
(Calkins, 2000), and the next section focuses on this area directly.   
 
3.6 Business Ethics and Religion 
 
 
Calkins (2000) surveys the recent history of Western business ethics and shows how 
the notion of ethics has neglected its religious traditions and become construed more 
narrowly. Calkins argues that this narrow focus has complicated the understanding of 
ethics in business education and helped to weaken the distinctiveness of higher 
education institutions. 
  
Calkins’ study is divided into three parts. The first part suggests that business ethicists 
are inclined to focus narrowly on purely social scientific and philosophical approaches 
to ethical dilemmas. In failing to recognise the variegated and rich religious histories 
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explored in part two, business ethicists fail to appreciate the operative ethical 
perspectives of business people and the informative legacy of institutional responses 
to change in general (Calkins, 2000). To recover these losses, in part three Calkins 
describes how business ethicists can look to religions to recognise better the large 
institutional mechanisms and the motives that lead people to act morally. Calkins 
concludes that religion enriches moral discussions of business practices. The analysis 
is not intended to suggest that a religious perspective is mutually exclusive with an 
anti-intellectualist stance, nor does it imply a reduction in the usual academic rigor of 
business ethics. Calkins does, however, argue that the faith of religion can work in 
harmony with human reason in the business ethics realm (Calkins, 2000). 
 
The impact of the spirituality and religion power and authority mechanisms 
underpinning business ethics have been studied by Jackson (1999) and Ali et al. 
(2000).  While Jackson (1999) discusses spirituality and its impact in a broad sense, 
Ali et al. (2000) go beyond this to highlight the effect of the Ten Commandments on 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Jackson points out that spirituality can play a key 
role in establishing a foundation for moral imagination in business ethics; it also 
provides a deeper foundation for business ethics principles than does any legalistic 
framework (Jackson, 1999). However, in practice Jackson contends that the business 
ethics notion is in danger of becoming a commodity without a spiritual infusion.  
 
According to both Jackson (1999) and Ali et al. (2000), the global economy’s ultimate 
end is to serve humankind. Ethical behaviour is required to encourage an acceptance 
of the need for firms and the people who work in them to display integrity in a world 
that is full of “illusion and deception” (Jackson, 1999, p.64). It can only do this by 
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modelling a strong integrity of its own, one which is not afraid to embrace a set of 
defining truths (Jackson, 1999). Business ethics cannot be something that the leaders 
of corporations consider from time to time. It cannot have as its central mission an 
attempt to produce organisational mission statements, irrespective of behaviour in the 
ground. Instead, Jackson argues that hard questions must be asked on a regular basis 
and become part of the organisation’s cultural foundation. 
 
While Jackson (1999) admits that it is important to respect different cultural and 
ethical traditions when operating a business in different countries around the world, he 
argues that there are fundamental moral truths which are grounded at a spiritual level. 
However, he suggests, these tend to be difficult to operationalise in terms of ethical 
standard development and implementation at the corporate lead. In fact Jackson 
concludes that, more often than not, coded directives are not enough and a manager, 
in order to act ethically, needs to exercise moral imagination. Being in touch with the 
principles and values of spirituality helps to motivate the moral imagination and can 
introduce a greater depth of understanding of many of the ethical problems that take 
place in international settings (Jackson, 1999). 
 
Ali et al. (2000) go beyond spirituality to discuss the Ten Commandments in 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam and their impact upon business ethics. This analysis 
suggests that both business ethics and management students view the Ten 
Commandments as offering a moral template for individual and group behaviour; the 
Ten Commandments should therefore be regarded as general moral guidelines for 
personal and business conduct (Ali and Gibbs, 1998; Ali et al., 2000). More generally, 
Ali et al. (2000) argue that religion gives power and authority a social justification 
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that is difficult to overlook in many cases. Indeed, ignoring this reality might make 
the search for understanding the workplace and organisation a difficult task. In this 
context, Ali et al. indicate that, as a basis of power, authority has been sanctioned over 
centuries by all religions, although it has manifested itself differently over time. For 
better or worse, religion continues to play a considerable role in understanding and 
clarifying power and authority structures (Ali et al., 2000). 
 
In their study, Ali et al. (2000) emphasise that the utterance of the Ten 
Commandments - or the pronouncement of the specific principles and values of any 
religion - does not always translate into action. The point they make here is that the 
Ten Commandments (or similar principles and values) can lay a general moral 
foundation for the use of power and authority in organisations. Commitment to these 
principles and their views in organisational life is a personal matter and, in modern 
organisations, people tend to act arbitrarily when it comes to their personal 
commitment (Ali et al., 2000). In this regard, Allmon et al. (2000) evaluate the factors 
that impact on the ethical orientation of business students and those that impact on 
students’ perceptions of ethical classroom behaviour using a sample of 227 business 
students from Australia and the United States. In general terms, perceptions of 
classroom behaviour were found to be a surrogate for future business behaviour 
perceptions18; while a number of factors, such as gender, country of origin and 
personality, were related to ethical orientation of the latter, only age and religious 
orientation had much impact on the perceptions of ethical classroom behaviour. 
However, the study suggests that in the business field ethical lapses may be predicted 
by the ethical oversights (i.e. cheating) of students who are planning to make business 
                                                 
18 See also Conroy and Emerson (2004). 
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their career. Allmon et al. (2000) argue that cheating represents a behaviour that can 
significantly impact business, and so ethical models and theories must be developed to 
allow current and future business leaders to enhance their information gathering and 
information processing capabilities in ethical situations. Allmon et al. argue that 
teaching of “principled thought” processes and ethical principles would move 
individuals towards a more idealistic and principled approach to business. However, 
external control and stimulus for ethical behaviour is suggested as being required, 
possibly along the lines of other organisational control systems, without demeaning 
either individuals or human nature in general (Allmon et al., 2000). 
 
Conroy and Emerson (2004) surveyed students at two universities in the southern 
United States to test two hypotheses: (i) whether religiosity affects ethical attitudes 
and (ii) whether courses in ethics, religion or theology affect ethical attitudes. The 
findings indicate that, significantly, religiosity is correlated with ethical perceptions, 
although completion of an ethics or religion course is not (Conroy and Emerson, 
2004). Similarly, religiosity was found to be a stronger predictor of students’ ethics 
than was exposure to an ethics curriculum. Conroy and Emerson conclude that 
promoting active participation in college students’ religion of choice is the best way to 
improve ethical attitudes. 
 
3.7 Business Ethics and Islam 
 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the notion of business ethics from an Islamic 
perspective, the key principles underpinning Islam are discussed. 
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3.7.1 Islamic Principles 
 
 
Islam is an Arabic word that means submission and obedience (Bigger, 1990). The 
religion of Islam thus involves submission to Allah, the (only) creator of the whole 
universe and the contents thereof. According to Islam, Allah has sent messengers 
from time to time in this world to preach the governing principles of a good, peaceful 
life both in this world and hereafter. These governing principles which, since this is 
Allah’s will, should be submitted to by humanity are known as Islam (Bigger, 1990). 
The essential laws and injunctions of Islam, as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed 
(peace be upon him), are accurately preserved in the Holy Quran (Bigger, 1990). The 
Holy Quran deals with various aspects of human life, such as the relationship between 
Allah and human beings, worship, knowledge, moral and spiritual values, social 
justice, trade, commerce, political principles, law and international relationships. The 
Quran reflects the life of the Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) (Bigger, 1990), 
while the sayings of the Prophet are known as Hadith, which are explanations and 
clarifications of the Quran.  
Islam has five pillars, i.e. five basic principles, or specific acts of worship. The pillars 
are as follows19: 
 
1- Iman (declaration of faith);  
“I bear witness that there is no one worthy to be worshipped except 
Allah, and I bear witness that Mohammed is His servant and 
messenger” (Bucheery, 2001, p.13). 
 
 
                                                 
19 The five pillars here are summarised from Bucheery (2001). See Also, Lippman, 1982; Esposito, 
1998; Ali et al., 2004; and Kamal-ud-Din, 2010.  
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2- Salah (prayer): it is a prescribed duty for every Muslim to pray five times a day to 
Allah, from puberty untill death. The designated times are: (i) between dawn and 
sunrise; (ii) after midday (iii); before sunset; (iv) after sunset; and (v) before dawn. 
Islam argues that prayer reminds worshippers of Allah’s presence and his greatness, 
and induces high moral and physical discipline. It also helps ensure that the performer 
avoids evil deeds and inculcates humility towards Allah. 
 
3- Sawm (fasting during Ramadan20): this fast takes place from dawn to sunset during 
the whole month of Ramadan; every Muslim after they reach puberty must refrain 
from food and drink as well as intercourse with their spouse. More generally, 
worshippers are required to refrain from all types of evil, so that a sound conscience 
and strong sense of morality develop. Sawm teaches the worshipper to be kind to the 
needy and poor, and to share willingly the suffering of the have nots. 
 
4- Zakah (welfare contribution): this is an obligatory payment by Muslims from their 
annual savings. Literally, it means purification, and is an annual payment of 2.5% of 
an individual’s cash and jewellery resources. A separate rate applies to animals, 
mineral wealth and crops. Zakah is neither a tax nor a charity donation: the aggregated 
receipts can be used for any of society's needs, while charity is optional. However, 
Zakah can only be spent on helping the poor and needy, the oppressed, debtors, the 
disabled and for other welfare purposes, as defined in the Quran and Sunnah 
(prophet’s teachings). Zakah is one of the fundamental principles of an Islamic 
economy and aims to ensure an equitable society where everybody has a right to share 
                                                 
20 The ninth month of the Islamic calendar. 
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and contribute. According to Islamic teachings, Zakah should be paid on the basis that 
individuals merely act as trustees, with all wealth and property belonging to Allah. 
 
5- Hajj (pilgrimage to the House of Allah): this is an annual event, compulsory for 
Muslims who have the means to perform it at least once in a lifetime. It is a journey to 
the House of Allah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in the month of Dhul al-Hyjah.21 Hajj 
represents the unity of mankind; Muslims from every nationality gather in humility 
and equality to worship Allah. The pilgrim, dressed in the ritual clothing of Ihram22, 
has the unique feeling of being in the presence of Allah, to whom he belongs and to 
whom he must return after death.  
 
Detailed guidelines are provided in Islam via the Quran for all individuals to follow. 
The guidance is comprehensive and covers all aspects of life, including the social, 
political, economic, moral and spiritual realms (Bucheery, 2001). The Quran reminds 
humans of their purpose on earth, and their obligations and duties towards themselves, 
family, fellow human beings, community and the Creator. Humans are given essential 
guidelines about a ‘purposeful’ life and are then left with the challenge of putting 
these high ideals into practice23. The religion of Islam is based upon accountability 
relationships and presents a life code for the individual Muslim and the whole 
community (Ummah). It is concerned with arranging the relationship between humans 
and Allah (Al-Qahtani, 2002).  
 
                                                 
21 The twelfth month of the Islamic calendar. 
22 The unique uniform for the Hajj. 
23 In Islam, the sacred and secular are not separate parts of humans; they are united in human nature 
(Bucheery, 2001). 
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Organising relationships among human beings and their communities receives 
particular attention in Islamic Sharia law (Al-Qahtani, 2002). In this context, there is 
an Islamic statement whereby religion represents ‘treatment’ (Al-Qaradawi, 1973). 
This treatment involves all relationships, including those with family, neighbours, 
society, and the environment, as well as those relating to business, economics, 
politics, ethics and other issues which occur in any human society (Al-Qaradawi, 
1973). Within Sharia, these transactions have gained great recognition. Sharia 
identifies and monitors these relationships and specifies the participants’ rights and 
duties. All Muslims are expected to follow the regulations of Sharia to maintain their 
obligations; a failure to follow Sharia may lead to deviation from Allah’s 
commandments for humans’ welfare during both their life and hereafter (Al-
Qaradawi, 1973). As a result, in light of the framework of Islamic rules, Sharia is 
taken to cover all of the main principles that shape the way in which the interaction 
between people should take place (Al-Qaradawi, 1973). 
 
In Islam, there is no difference between the behaviour that is expected of the firm and 
the behaviour of any other member of society (Ighbal and Mirakhor, 2007). As the 
firm itself does not have a conscience, the managers’ behaviour becomes the firm’s 
behaviour and their dealings are subject to the same high standards of ethical and 
moral commitment expected of a Muslim (Ighbal and Mirakhor, 2007). Asri and 
Fahmi (2003) argue that in human beings’ lives, their worldview plays a paramount 
role; every single human action is affected by it. Different worldviews will shape 
different human qualities; for instance, Islam concentrates upon the practice of justice, 
equality, truthfulness, transparency, the protection of minorities, accountability and 
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adequate disclosure, just as it prohibits all forms of exploitation in all walks of life, 
including business dealings (Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). 
 
3.7.2 Ethics in Islam 
 
 
The principles governing the Islamic ethical system are to be found in the Quran and 
Sunnah24. These principles constitute the Sharia and have to be obeyed in all cases 
(Gambling and Karim, 1991). Many of the teachings of Islam are stated in fairly 
general terms, and every Muslim should exercise discretion (ijtihad) when 
implementing these teachings to the fullest. This is not just a personal matter, 
however; the purpose of, and criteria underpinning individual, behaviours should be 
based on the interests of the whole community (ummah). This flexibility enables 
Muslims to adapt to changing environments and conditions (Gambling and Karim, 
1991). It follows that Islam has always had a scholarly body who are held to be 
experts in Sharia complexities (Gambling and Karim, 1991). 
 
For Muslims, ethics is Sharia and divine law guides all aspects of Muslims’ life, 
including the way of thinking and acting of individuals towards others in everyday life 
(Triyuwono et al, 2000). Beekun (1997) concludes that, within an Islamic context, the 
term most closely related to ethics in the Quran is khuluq which translates into 
English as ethic; the Quran also employs a comprehensive set of terms to describe the 
concept of goodness: khayr (goodness), qist (equity), adl (justice), birr 
(righteousness), tagwa (piety), haqq (right and truth) and maruf (approved). Pious 
actions are described as salihat and impious actions are described as sayyiat (Beekun, 
1997). Beekun suggests that the relationship between man and his Creator is 
                                                 
24 The Prophet’s teachings. 
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emphasised by the moral code embedded in Islamic ethics. The ethical code of Islam 
is enforceable at all times because its Creator and Monitor is closer to humans than 
their jugular vein, according to the Quran, and has perfect and eternal knowledge 
(Beekun, 1997).  
 
In explaining the Islamic ethical code, actions can be categorised according to their 
degree of lawfulness or unlawfulness. Five such classes are indicated by Beekun 
(1997) as follows25: 
 
1- Fard: representing actions that are mandatory for every Muslim. For example, 
praying (salah) five times a day, fasting during Ramadan, and Zakah are among the 
compulsory actions for all Muslims. 
2- Mustahabb: indicating actions that are not compulsory but highly recommended for 
Muslims, such as supererogatory fasting beyond Ramadan. 
 
3- Mubah: relating to actions permissible in the sense that they are specified neither as 
mandatory nor as forbidden, such as travelling, gardening and so on. 
 
4- Makruh: i.e. actions that are not absolutely forbidden, but are strongly discouraged. 
The makruh are less objectionable than haram (forbidden), for example with regard to 
some kinds of food. 
 
                                                 
25 Summarised from Beekun (1997). For details, see for example, Hamidullah and Allāh (1974); Denny 
(1985); Endress and Hillenbrand (1988); David (2003); and Brown (2009).    
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5- Haram: these are actions that are prohibited and unlawful. Such acts are likely to 
incur legal punishment in this world as well as the punishment of Allah in the 
Hereafter. 
 
Bucheery (2001) notes the five key axioms of ethics in Islam which are unity, 
equilibrium, free will, responsibility, and benevolence; he expands on these as 
follows: 
 
1- The Unity of Allah: this is reflected in the concept of tawhid. Unity has these 
lasting effects on Muslims: 
a) Since a Muslim views everything in the world as belonging to Allah, the same Lord 
to whom they themselves belong, they cannot be biased in their thinking and 
behaviour.  
b) Since Muslims are persuaded that only Allah can assist them and only Allah has the 
power to take away their life, they will act bravely in doing what is ethical and 
Islamic. 
c) The most significant effect of la ilah illa Allah (there is no god except Allah) is that 
Muslims believe that Allah knows everything, open or hidden, and that nothing can be 
hidden from the Lord. As a result, Muslims avoid what is bad, and engage in what is 
good. 
 
2- Equilibrium: The property of equilibrium is more than a natural characteristic. It is 
a dynamic concept which every Muslim must strive towards in his or her life. To 
maintain a sense of balance between those who have and those who have not, Allah 
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stresses in the Quran the importance of giving and condemns the practice of 
conspicuous consumption; for example:                                                                               
“And spend in the Cause of Allah and do not throw yourselves into 
destruction and do well. Truly, Allah loves the good-doers” 
(Quran: 2: 195). 
 
 
Simultaneously, Allah describes those who will be rewarded with the highest place in 
heaven as:                                                          
 “Those who, when they spend, are neither extravagant nor 
niggardly, but hold a medium way between those extremes. And 
those who invoke not any other god along with Allah, nor kill such 
person as Allah has forbidden, except for just cause, nor commit 
illegal sexual intercourse and whoever does this shall receive the 
punishment. The torment will be doubled to him on the Day of 
Resurrection, and he will abide therein in disgrace. Except those 
who repent and believe in Islamic Monotheism, and do righteous 
deeds; for those, Allah will change their sins into good deeds, and 
Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. And whoever repents and 
does righteous good deeds; then verily, he repents towards Allah 
with true repentance”.  
(Quran: 25: 67-71). 
 
3- Free Will: humans have been granted the free will to steer their own lives as the 
trustees of Allah on earth. Despite the fact that individuals are completely regulated 
by the law governing Allah's creation, they have the ability to think and judge, to 
adopt whatever course of life they wish and, most importantly, to act in accordance 
with whatever code of conduct they choose. Here Allah says:  
“And say: the truth is from your Lord. Then whosoever wills, let 
him believe; and whosoever wills, let him disbelieve” 
(Quran: 18: 29).  
 
 
Once someone chooses to become a Muslim, they agree to behave according to the 
code that Allah has revealed for their individual and social life.  
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4- Responsibility and Accountability: unlimited freedom implies an absence of 
responsibility or accountability. Humans need to be accountable for their actions in 
order to meet the dictates of adl (justice) and unity that is seen in Allah's creation. 
Allah stresses this concept of moral responsibility for one's actions in the following 
terms:  
“Whosoever works evil, will have the recompense thereof, and he 
will not find any protector or helper besides Allah. And whoever 
does righteous good deeds, male or female, and is a true believer 
will enter Paradise” (Quran: 4: 123 – 124). 
 
 
Bucheery (2001) described the fairness of Islam by clarifying that a person is not 
responsible for his/her actions: (i) if he/she has not reached puberty; (ii) if he/she is 
insane; or (iii) if he/she is acting while asleep. Responsibility in Islam focuses on both 
the individual level and the organisational and societal level.  
 
5- Benevolence or kindness (ihsan): is defined as:  
“An act which benefits persons other than those from whom the act 
precedes without any obligation” (Bucheery, 2001, p.18). 
 
Kindness is encouraged in Islam, and the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 
 “The inmates of Paradise are of three types: one who wields 
authority and is just and fair; one who is truthful and has been 
endowed with power to do good deeds; and the person who is 
merciful and kind-hearted towards his relatives and to every pious 
Muslim, and who does not stretch out his hand in spite of having a 
large family to support” (Sahih Muslim, 845, p.72). 
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3.7.3 Business Principles and Ethics in Islam 
 
 
Within an Islamic law framework, each person is given freedom of action, subject to 
the requirement that the actions of individuals do not violate others’ rights (Pomeranz, 
1997). 
 
Gambling and Karim (1991, p. 28) stress that:  
“Islam rejects the possibility of a separation between religious and 
temporal affairs. However, this does not mean that Islam calls for a 
theocratic state, at least in the sense of one that is dominated by a 
priestly caste. Priests, as understood in other religions, do not exist 
in Islam. All people are equal in the sight of Allah, and have direct 
access to him”. 
 
 
As stated above, in Islam there is no separation of cultural, political, business and 
social life. Muslim scientists, leaders, innovators, engineers, teachers and 
businesspeople must pay attention to ethical matters in their work (Saleem, 2009). For 
example, businessmen/women are required to behave in accordance with the 
principles of Islam in their business dealings. In this context, Allah says in the Quran: 
 “And whatever matter you may be engaged with and whatever 
portion you may be reciting from the Quran, and whatever deed you 
may be doing, We are Witness of it, when you are deeply engrossed 
in it, and not so much as the weight of an atom in earth or heaven is 
hidden from your Lord, neither anything smaller than that or greater, 
is in a manifest book” (Quran: 10: 61). 
 
The Islamic religion therefore relates directly to all aspects of life, including how to 
conduct commerce and trade. Critically in the context of this thesis’s research focus, 
business in Islam must be operated in accordance with Sharia values and rules, e.g., 
on the basis of honesty, fairness and justice towards others (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; and 
Branine and Pollard, 2010). Islam is therefore much more than a faith; it is an 
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indivisible unit, a legal system, a political system, an economic system and a way of 
life in general (Wilson, 2006; Rizk, 2008; and Branine and Pollard, 2010). Like other 
activities, the economy is governed by moral mechanisms and rules implemented in 
order to achieve progress through the optimal use of resources and the protection of 
human values (Rizk, 2008). Rules are included in the Quran not only about manners 
and hygiene, marriage and divorce, but also concerning politics and commerce, 
interest and debts, and contracts and wills (Rizk, 2008). Significantly, Sharia 
represents the duties required by Allah of human beings with respect to Allah and 
other human beings (Kennedy, 1993 and Rizk, 2008).  
 
As business has to be conducted in a social context, clearly there have to be rules 
governing behaviour, and a divinely inspired code is provided by Sharia law for 
devout Muslims to follow (Yusoff, 2002). In this context, Chapra (1992) argues that 
business success should not be viewed in material terms, but rather judged by the 
level to which the believer has been able to achieve Islamic goals.  
 
Hussain (1999) suggests that the paramount rule governing business under Islam is 
honesty and fair dealing as the absolute owner of everything both on earth and in 
heaven is Allah, and human beings are just His agents. Muslims are supposed to 
conduct their business activities in accordance with Sharia law, which encourages 
being fair, just and honest to everyone involved in the business; business people are 
hence required to adopt ‘elevated’ moral conduct, in order not to deceive, betray or 
exploit their fellow believers. Also, Muslims should not undertake business activities 
for profit-making purposes only (Hussain, 1999). Simultaneously, Muslims are 
encouraged to work productively rather than be lazy. Underpinning these ideas is the 
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notion that any system without a moral underpinning and appropriate ethical 
foundation will not promote strong governance (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). The 
development of human character for the Moslem has to be seen in terms of gaining 
experience in carrying out the will of Allah, and through that achieving a deeper 
understanding of His intent in the business sphere (Shehu, 1998; and Branine and 
Pollard, 2010).  
 
More generally, in Islam all aspects of life are governed by ethics. The conditions for 
everlasting success or falah are the same for all Muslims whether in conducting their 
affairs of business or in carrying out their activities in general (Beekun, 1996). The 
tawhid is the key principle governing business philosophy; here Allah is considered to 
be the sole creator of the world and in Islam the people should co-operate in carrying 
out His will (Rice, 1999; and Branine and Pollard, 2010). In business, this concept 
implies trust and honesty and a relationship between employers and employees that 
reflects the fact that - even if not materially equal on earth - both groups are part of 
the same brotherhood and spiritually equal before Allah (Bassiouni, 1993). In Islam 
faith, or iman, is the fundamental motivating factor for believers. Hence, decisions in 
business transactions are guided by iman, which in practice means following the law 
of Sharia, and engaging in what is permitted (halal) and avoiding that which is 
forbidden (haram) (Alawneh, 1998). Thus, the maker of business decisions has free 
choice, but the principles of Sharia provide a framework for the proper exercise of 
that choice (Ali and Gibbs, 1998). 
 
Rahman (1994) argues that business activities generally must be inspired and guided 
by the tawhid, as well as the concepts of tawakkal (trust in Allah) and ihsan 
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(goodness), while being regulated within those boundaries by a legal framework 
committed to values - some of them mentioned earlier - such as the ban on riba 
(interest), the prohibition of ihtikaar (hoarding) and other malpractices. In fact, a large 
number of concepts and values in Islam define the extent and nature of business 
activities. There are many positive values, such as iqtisad (moderation), amanah 
(honesty), infaq (spending to meet social obligations), adl (justice), ihsan (kindness 
par excellence), sabr (patience) and istislah (public interest). In contrast, there are 
values which are negative, and thus to be avoided: zulm (tyranny), iktinaz (the 
hoarding of wealth), israf (extravagance), bukhl (miserliness) and hirs (greed) 
(Rahman, 1994). Similarly, halal (permitted) is an economic activity within the 
positive parameters whereas haram (forbidden) is negative and must therefore be 
moderated. Production and distribution actives regulated by the code of halal-haram 
must adhere to the notion of adalah (justice). Collectively, these concepts and values, 
along with the main Sharia injunctions, provide a framework for a just commercial 
and business system (Lewis, 2006). 
 
From this point of view, there are two unique features that guide Islamic business. 
First, it is governed by Islamic law which relates to all aspects of an individual’s life. 
Therefore, every Muslim’s action must conform to Sharia and Muslims must observe 
the ethical standards as set by Islam (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). Second, one should 
consider the effect that Sharia and certain Islamic economic and financial principles 
have on corporate practices and policies; for example, the institution of Zakah, the ban 
on riba, prohibitions on speculation, and an economic system based on profit and loss 
sharing all have an important role to play in the governance and operation of 
corporations (Lewis, 2005).  
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Given the principles outlined above, Beekun (1996, p.34) attempts to outline some 
key guidelines for business people; these include: loving Allah more than your trade; 
honouring one’s word, being truthful; being consultative; being honest; being fair and 
just; being patient; being trustful; being friendly; being equitable; being generous; not 
offering bribes and avoiding fraud. Lewis (2006) argues that a Muslim business 
person should have high moral values and not set out to mislead or exploit others. 
Price fixing and monopolies are prohibited and the market should be free of 
manipulation, so that in business transactions people will not be exploited by the elite 
(Lewis, 2006). Lewis suggests further that Muslims engaging in commerce and trade 
should behave equitably; for example, vendors should not hide any flaws in the 
products they are selling, nor lie about the weight or quality of the goods. Dealing in 
stolen goods is prohibited and hoarding is forbidden when the purpose is to force up 
the price in scarce times and so profit at the expense of others. Equally, products 
should not be harmful, with investment and trade only being undertaken via activities 
which are not prohibited under Islam; such prohibitions relate to gambling, 
pornography, alcohol and anything that is harmful to society (Lewis, 2006). On the 
other hand, agriculture and employment are specifically encouraged due to the 
perceived dignity of labour, as is the prompt payment of a fair wage (Lewis, 2006). 
 
A number of recent studies have examined the direct theoretical relationship between 
Islam and business ethics. For example, Rizk (2008) explores an Islamic perspective 
on business ethics by comparing a range of relevant published works with Islamic 
teachings. Rizk (2008) also argues that the Sharia perspective provides the basis for a 
reliable Islamic approach to business ethics. Rizk (2008) clarified that the teachings of 
ethics should lead individuals to obtain the capacity to formulate a process that assists 
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them in arriving at their own decisions. With the divine aspect as a guideline, 
individuals will be assisted to take consecutive steps toward higher moral reasoning. It 
is widely argued that ethics based on the principles of Islam will determine the 
choices of individuals, focusing not only upon profit maximisation, but also upon 
social welfare maximisation (Pramanaik, 1994; and Rizk, 2008). 
 
Wilson (2006) examines the implications of Muslim beliefs for corporate governance, 
business organisation and business ethics. Similarities are drawn between the 
Christian concept of stewardship and Muslim responsibilities in terms of their 
guardianship of resources and divine responsibility. Wilson reports that multinational 
businesses are more likely to operate successfully in the Islamic world if they pay 
attention to the beliefs of their Muslim employees, clients and suppliers rather than 
ignoring religious and cultural issues. In Islam, as in the other divine religions, there 
are ethical concerns over wealth distribution, and recognition that material wealth can 
distract believers from the achievement of falah, which means success both in this life 
and the next (Beekun, 1996; and Wilson, 2006). Regarding the wealth issue from an 
Islamic perspective, Saeed (1996, p. 20) explains that: 
 “Wealth is considered a trust and a test, where failure to use it 
wisely, especially to alleviate the hardship of the poor is detrimental 
to the person who holds that wealth”.  
 
The teachings of Islam do not oppose the accumulation of family wealth and, indeed, 
view inequalities in the socioeconomic system as inevitable, but those who are 
entrusted with plentiful resources have a responsibility to Allah to manage them well 
for society’s benefit as a whole (Wilson, 2006). For this type of outcome to occur, 
managers need to appreciate the ethical norms of different cultures in order to gain an 
understanding of the cultural environment in which the firm must operate (Al-Khatib 
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et al., 1995). This idea has been discussed by Rice (1999) who focused on the ethical 
principles which relate to business and which are involved in the Islamic religion. The 
main purposes of Rice’s study are: (i) sharing the Islamic perspective on business 
ethics, which, he argues, is not well known in the West and may motivate further 
thinking and discussion on the relationships between business and ethics; and (ii) 
providing some knowledge of Islamic philosophy in order to assist managers in 
dealing with cultural differences (Rice, 1999). 
 
Islamic goals are not primarily materialistic in nature, but are based instead on human 
wellbeing concepts and a ‘good’ life, and stress brotherhood/sisterhood, 
socioeconomic justice, and a balanced satisfaction of both material and spiritual needs 
(Chapra, 1992; Rice, 1999). Rice (1999) also emphasises that business activity in 
Islam is considered to be a socially useful function; great importance is attached to 
views relating to the goals of a business enterprise, as well as consumption, ownership 
and the conduct code of various business agents. Because Islam provides a practical 
program for life, scholars note that an Islamic socio-economic system should contain 
detailed goals for specific economic variables such as the circulation of wealth, fair 
trading, interest, taxation, and consumption (Chapra, 1992). The Sharia notion also 
relates to business relationships between employers and employees, buyers and 
sellers, and lenders and borrowers (Rice, 1999). Notably, there is no difference 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Sharia rules concerning commercial 
dealings. For example, it is unlawful to undercut another’s price whether offered by a 
Muslim or non-Muslim during a stipulated option to cancel period (Rice, 1999). 
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Abuznaid (2009) highlights the merits of business ethics from an Islamic perspective 
by using descriptive, analytical and comparative investigation. The study’s findings 
reveal several factors that affect the ethical behaviour of Muslims, including at the 
legal, organisational, and individual levels. However, there are certain factors that 
affect the unethical behaviour of managers; for example, the stage of formal 
development, family influence, peer influence, personal values and personality, life 
experiences, situational factors, and societal factors (Beekun, 1996; and Abuznaid, 
2009). Also, Abuznaid (2009) suggests that the most significant ethical qualities that 
should be manifested in a Muslim manager are honesty, trustfulness and a 
consultative nature, although he also highlights some of the common moral issues in 
Islam and other religions, such as no theft, fraud, lying, or deceit. However, as 
mentioned above, in Islam, ethical concerns are not limited to business dealings and 
practices; the business person has free choice, but Islamic principles provide a 
framework for the appropriate exercise of that choice (Ali and Gibbs, 1998). 
 
Abuznaid (2009) contends that, unlike other religious ethical systems that emphasise 
the transience of this life, and value mediation, Islam stresses that piety is not 
achieved by disregarding the life of this world, but through active participation in all 
affairs of the latter. A Muslim is expected to participate in life with the proviso that 
any material growth and enhancement must lead to social justice and the spiritual 
elevation of both the nation and himself (Beekun, 1997). Beekun (1996) and 
Abuznaid (2009) outline some factors that influence ethical behaviour in Islam, such 
as: (i) Legal interpretations; in secular societies, legal interpretations are based upon 
contemporary and often transient standards and values, whereas these values and 
standards in Islamic societies are guided by Sharia. Beekun (1996) highlights one 
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result of these different approaches whereby while at one time it was both legal and 
ethical to discriminate against minorities and women in hiring in the United States, 
discriminating against these groups has been made illegal. On the other hand, Islamic 
principles give women inalienable and permanent rights, and on any basis have never 
discriminated against minorities (Beekun, 1996). (ii) Organisational factors; ethical 
codes are gaining in popularity in many institutions (Abuznaid, 2009). Although such 
codes can enhance the ethical behaviour of participants in organisations, their use is 
sometimes inappropriate (Beekun, 1996). (iii) Individual factors; individuals have 
different values and there are factors affecting one’s ethical behaviour such as the 
stages of moral development, family influence, peer influence, personal values and 
morals, and life experiences (Beekun, 1996 and Abuznaid, 2009). (iv) Situational 
factors; since indebtedness is likely to lead to unethical performance, debtors are 
urged to repay their debts promptly, and Muslim lenders are encouraged to show 
leniency towards debtors (Beekun, 1996).  
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Beekun (1997) suggested a sample of ethical code for Islamic businesses26:   
We will behave Islamically towards: 
Our Customers: 
Our primary responsibility is to provide the best quality product to 
those who make use of our products and services. We must work to 
decrease our costs in order to charge reasonable prices. Orders will be 
processed speedily and without errors. We will neither misrepresent nor 
deny our products or services to any customer on the basis of race, 
religion or national origin. 
Our Suppliers 
and Distributors: 
We will work with our suppliers and distributors to maintain 
consistency in quality and service. We will ensure that they make a fair 
profit. We shall neither offer nor accept any premium, prize or un-
Islamic inducement in our transactions with our suppliers and 
distributors, or any other stakeholder. 
Our Employees: 
Every employee will work in safe and clean conditions. They will 
receive fair and adequate compensation. They will have ample 
opportunities to develop their skills. They must feel free to make 
suggestions, criticize or complain. We will safeguard their rights to 
privacy, protect them from any type of harassment and respect their 
dignity at all times. The company will clearly communicate to all 
employees what is expected of them. In all negotiations we will act in 
good faith. Every employee shall take responsibility to ensure that their 
actions are in agreement with Islamic values and the Code of ethics of 
his company. 
Our Competitors: 
We will not engage in monopolistic behaviour and preclude others from 
competing with us. We will complete fairly without engaging in un-
Islamic tactics. 
Our 
Stockholders: 
We must work to ensure a fair return to our stockholders. We will only 
engage in what is halal and stay away from the haram. We will manage 
our research and development projects wisely. We will compensate our 
employees equitably. We will maintain appropriate reserves for difficult 
times We will not waste company resources on false needs. When we 
behave according to our code of ethics, we should be able to provide 
our stockholders with an Islamically acceptable rate of return. 
Our Community: 
We support the community we live in as well as the world ummah. We 
will be good citizens, paying our fair share of taxes and contributing to 
the welfare of the needy and the destitute. We will protect our 
environment and natural resources. 
 
 
According to Beekun, managers should identify the key stakeholders of the company, 
and the organisation's responsibility to each in accordance with the Islamic moral 
code. In addition, formulate a management policy for responding to unethical 
behaviour and for encouraging ethical conduct. Finally, annual evaluation of the code 
                                                 
26 See p.32. 
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should take place to see if gaps still exist or any ethical issues have emerged (Beekun, 
1997). 
 
3.7.4 Corporate Social Responsibility in Islam  
 
 
In a recent paper, Almoharby (2011) gives an account of how the processes and 
interactions in trade and the economic affairs are regulated by Islam. The author 
provides insights on business ethics and social responsibility from an Islamic 
perspective by surveying the literature on these two issues. Almoharby explains that, 
in Islamic teaching, business and money-making activities must have social, 
economic and religious functions. While they recognise business and commerce as 
making an improvement to human wellbeing, Islam does not advance this support if 
the activity negatively affects business persons and societies (Almoharby, 2011). 
Almoharby further suggests that the ongoing worldwide financial crisis shows that 
business ethics practices are in desperate need of overhauling, he argues that while it 
is widely acknowledged that business rests on the platforms of enterprise, expertise 
and hard work, the crisis proved beyond any doubt that it is also widely - and 
increasingly - premised on greed. Almoharby Therefore concludes that ethical 
elements from an Islamic perspective are fundamental for modern organisations in 
order to achieve their business objectives relating to social responsibility.  
 
Specifically regarding social justice, Wilson (2006) emphasises that central to Allah’s 
will is the adalah or justice concept and this has an impact on business activity. 
Injustice may involve employee exploitation by company management or a monopoly 
overcharging consumers or abusing market power to short change suppliers (Tayeb, 
1997). In this context, a relevant message in the Quran is that:  
73 
 
“No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another; that man can 
have nothing but what he strives for” (53:38–39).  
 
 
Kamla and Rammal (2013) explain that Islam enjoins justice in all walks of society 
and human life, while Kamali (2001, p.xi) maintains that examining the evidence of 
the Quran on justice:  
“Leaves one in no doubt that justice is integral to the basic outlook 
and philosophy of Islam, within or beyond the Sharia itself”. 
 
 
Justice is at the core of Sharia and its success depends upon its ability in achieving 
this (Kamali, 2001). These notions have led many Islamic economists to conclude 
that:  
“The Islamic paradigm gives primary importance to moral values, 
human brotherhood, and socio-economic justice” (Chapra and 
Ahmed, 2002, p. 57).  
 
 
Social justice is perceived as a core aspect of the Islamic faith, with major income and 
wealth inequalities widely seen as, contrary to Sharia principles (Kamla and Rammal, 
2013). The Quran, in a number of verses, emphasises peoples’ fraternity, their unity of 
origin and equality in the Creator’s eyes (Kamali, 2001). Kamla and Rammal (2013) 
explain that the issue of poverty in communities has been addressed through 
encouraging charity and enabling poor people to become self-supporting. They add 
that one of the most significant tools for Muslims for ensuring the redistribution of 
wealth and transfer from the rich to the poor is Zakah, as outlined earlier. 
 
This section has focused on discussing business ethics together with insights from 
Islam documenting and illustrating some of the key overlap between Islamic teachings 
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and the western concept of ethics. The next section will focus on corporate 
governance and links with ethics.  
 
3.8 Corporate Governance and Business Ethics 
 
 
This thesis is primarily focused on corporate governance and the role of business 
ethics in an Islamic context. Thus it is imperative that the literature on corporate 
governance and business ethics is reviewed. The discussion in this section focuses 
first on the role played by codes and standards. Before turning to the literature that has 
explored the topic in a developing market context.  
 
3.8.1 The Role of Codes and Standards   
 
 
Although Bonn and Fisher (2005) argue that corporate governance has obvious CSR 
dimensions, it is the way that ethics matters are dealt with at the governance level that 
is the general focus of their work and other related analysis. In other words, the 
emphasis is on organisational approaches to ethics at the corporate governance level. 
The need for an organisation to make clear the behaviour expected of its board 
members is widely recognised. In this regard, Bonn and Fisher (2005) provide 
examples such as the Corporate Governance Council of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), which advises organisations to explain the ethical behaviour 
standards required of company directors and key executives and encourages 
adherence to these standards. The ASX proposes the establishment of a code of 
conduct that identifies the necessary directorial and executive practices that are 
necessary to protect the ethical integrity and reputation of the company; this includes 
the need to outline individuals’ responsibility to report unethical practices (Bonn and 
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Fisher, 2005). There are some specific areas where the ASX requires the conduct code 
to pronounce: for example, conflicts of interest, fair dealing, corporate opportunities, 
confidentiality, compliance with laws and regulations, and encouraging the reporting 
of unethical behaviour. Indeed, the ASX (2003) has identified ten principles of 
corporate governance, two of which refer to ethics. The first promotes ‘ethical’ and 
‘responsible’ decision-making and the second recognises ‘legitimate’ stakeholders’ 
interests. 
 
The UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC)27 has developed many sets of 
guidelines for corporate governance that impact on individuals’ ethical behaviour; for 
example, the Higgs Report on non-executives of 2003 states that the board should set 
the values and standards for a company and ensure that its responsibilities to its 
shareholders and other stakeholders are understood and met. The report outlines that 
integrity, probity and high standards of ethics are a prerequisite for all directors (Bonn 
and Fisher, 2005). Cleek and Leonard (1998) argue that one obvious way for a board 
to make broad principles more workable in practice is to produce an ethical code of 
conduct for all employees in addition to the board and top executives. This type of 
approach suggests that the attitude of organisations towards ethics must have its 
foundation in a robust framework of corporate governance. However, Cleek and 
Leonard (1998) argue that this is just the first step; specifically, these authors identify 
the objectives of an ethics code as: (i) raising social responsibility; (ii) improving 
management; (iii) introducing guidelines for the acceptable behaviour of employees; 
(iv) helping organisations to obey the government’s guidelines; and (v) improving the 
corporate culture. This discussion highlights the need to ensure that an ethical code of 
                                                 
27 The Council of the Stock Exchange, the Accountancy Profession and the Financial Reporting 
Council created a Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, which introduced its 
Code of the Best Practice in 1992 (Alkahtani, 2013). 
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conduct encourages ethical behaviour within an organisation, instead of existing on 
paper only (Wanyama et al. 2009; 2013). The implementation of an ethical code of 
conduct to protect business performance necessitates the establishment of proper 
structures and processes for the monitoring of ethical behaviour; this includes 
identifying the indicators of performance which can be employed to present reliable 
information about the ethical performance of the organisation (Kitson and Campbell, 
1996). The indicators of performance should not simply be extensions of the financial 
reporting system of the organisation; non-financial measures, such as the 
organisation’s reputation and community perception, should also be included (Kitson 
and Campbell, 1996). 
 
3.8.2 Reform and Development 
 
 
The last two decades have seen the development of awareness of the need for reform 
in many areas of business activity, especially in the sphere of corporate governance 
(Mallin, 2013). Although most directors now recognise that ethics are a priority issue, 
they often have problems in conceiving how they should deal with it in their day-to-
day decision-making (Smith, 1997). In fact, there is a widely shared view that the 
leaders of corporations should actually lead by speaking out more often on ethical 
matters and making appropriate ethical pronouncements that take current community 
priorities into account (Smith, 1997). In addition, directors should set an example to 
others by upholding the highest standards of personal conduct and giving priority to 
human values (Smith, 1997). 
 
Shah (1996) notes that much of the business ethics literature concentrates upon 
transforming individual ethics at the corporate level. Shah suggests that such 
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transformation was much easier in the days when businesses were relatively small and 
contracting structures allowed them to operate more “humanely” than is the case with 
today’s monolithic corporations (Shah, 1996). Obviously, in a small business 
scenario, there is greater transparency, making individual unethical actions and their 
adverse impact much more visible; in modern public corporations, where the average 
number of employees is in the thousands and ownership and management are 
divorced, the situation is very different (Shah, 1996). Shah’s study focuses on 
analysing institutional characteristics and the extent to which these limit our ability to 
develop the ethics of corporate business from simple considerations of individual 
morality. Shah finds that institutional morality cannot exist independently of 
individual morality and suggests that attempts should be made to reform the 
institutional structure and environment of corporations in order to instill an ethical 
conscience. In particular, Shah (1996) suggests that there are real limitations to the 
applicability of the ethical norms of individuals to large corporations. The main 
problem is that rather than being a community of individuals, a corporation is an 
institution with unique, but complex, responsibilities and legal rights, governed by 
stakeholders and markets in general (Shah, 1996). This environment reduces the 
impact ethical behaviour can have as there is little way in which individuals can see 
their own personal actions impact on the totality of the corporate enterprise (Shah, 
1996). Shah concludes that some radical institutional reforms are necessary in order to 
correct this lack of corporate conscience, such as creating more personal identity for 
employees and increasing the transparency of individuals’ actions.  
 
Developing this theme, Bonn and Fisher (2005) argue that the implementation of 
ethical conduct codes to drive the performance of business requires the establishment 
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of appropriate structures and processes for improving and monitoring ethical 
behaviour. This, they argue, would entail identifying the key performance indicators 
needed to supply reliable information about the ethical performance of organisations. 
These indicators should not just be extensions of the financial reporting system of the 
organisation, but must include non-financial measures such as community perception 
and the reputation of the organisation (Bonn and Fisher, 2005). Bonn and Fisher 
identify a number of considerations that need to be addressed by boards of directors if 
they want to integrate ethical concerns successfully into the corporate governance 
structures of their organisations. First, boards need to identify their current attitudes, 
values and beliefs and evaluate whether they are appropriate for their organisation. 
Second, boards should carefully examine their behaviour towards ethical issues. 
Finally, boards need to evaluate the policies, current strategies and procedures of the 
organisation and investigate whether they encourage ethical behaviour and reflect the 
ethical values of the organisation (Bonn and Fisher, 2005).  
 
In this context, bodies such as the stock exchanges and the OECD have developed 
principles of corporate governance that include reference to business ethics (Sullivan, 
2009). Bonn and Fisher (2005) suggest that an organisation’s approach to ethics must 
be addressed within the framework of corporate governance. However, this is viewed 
as just the first step if the organisation is interested in developing more effective 
corporate governance principles; measures taken must ensure that the behaviour of the 
organisation is consistent with the ethical values adopted in the codes of conduct for 
all levels of the organisation (Bonn and Fisher, 2005). According to Sullivan (2009), 
this type of integrated approach towards corporate governance and business ethics 
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should assist with implementing high standards of ethical behaviour throughout the 
organisation. 
 
Nordberg (2007) explores how ethical frameworks underpin conventional corporate 
governance models in an attempt to provide guidance to directors, especially to those 
independent, non-executives who, he argues, increasingly act as the (moral compass) 
of the corporation. Nordberg suggests that an ethical system based on shareholder 
value is impracticable as well as having deep theoretical flaws. For different reasons, 
he argues that stakeholder theory is flawed as well; for example, he claims that it fails 
at the theoretical level because it struggles with determining the difference between 
means and ends (Nordberg, 2007). In contrast, he suggests that agency theory can 
assist the director in finding solutions to major corporate governance problems such 
as how to keep managers from diverting the funds of the corporation for private 
purposes (Nordberg, 2007).  
 
In terms of corruption and its relationship with corporate governance, Potts and 
Matuszewski (2004) note that the Ethics Resource Center (ERC), a long-standing 
non-profit organisation in the United States, has usefully addressed the organisational 
ethics issue and considered it to be a core concept within the corporate governance 
notion and the struggle against corruption. The ERC takes a broad view of corporate 
governance and business ethics issues by advising companies to go beyond the 
legislative and regulatory requirements in order by building effective programmes 
through which the ethical values of companies can be communicated. Companies 
must ensure that those values are understood and applied in difficult situations; 
however, the ERC acknowledges that this will not occur without the active support of 
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the company’s leadership (Potts and Matuszewski, 2004). Sullivan (2009) emphasises 
that companies are increasingly recognised as victims, and anti-corruption efforts are 
seen as integral to good corporate governance; he argues that fair economic 
environments, free of corruption, are central to the sustainable growth of business, 
economic and national development28. Many global collective action initiatives and 
international conventions now exist that set high standards of accountability and 
transparency in corporate and public governance (Sullivan, 2009). Significantly, such 
standards are supported by growing convergence in ethical values that sets the terms 
for doing the ‘right’ thing in both the public and private sectors (Potts and 
Matuszewski, 2004). Notwithstanding this trend, Sullivan (2009) argues that, for 
corporations, differences in institutional quality across countries make the challenge 
of dealing with corruption more complicated. Businesses operating worldwide find 
themselves working with supply chains that have different governance structures, so 
they face varying legal requirements as well as different experiences of corruption and 
the approaches to dealing with it (Sullivan, 2009); this thereby creates particular 
problems for those companies that are willing to remain transparent and accountable 
in environments with weak rule of law (Sullivan, 2009). 
 
Sullivan (2009) argues that corporate governance is a central mechanism in 
accounting for the sustainability and quality of a free and fair business environment as 
well as a proven anti-corruption tool. Clearly, strong corporate governance requires a 
system of institutions that govern and control the relationship between creditors, 
owners, investors, and managers, but also operates as an incentive for reform aimed 
towards the recognition of best practice in legal and regulatory frameworks (Potts and 
                                                 
28 See also Shikapotu (2013) who focused on corporate governance practices in Zambia. 
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Matuszewski, 2004). Corporate governance, as an anti-corruption tool, introduces 
standards and mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and compliance with 
regulations and laws (Potts and Matuszewski, 2004; Sullivan, 2009). The ethical 
behaviour of company leaders and decision-makers underlies much of what 
companies do (and fail to do) in establishing ‘good’ mechanisms of governance and 
combating corruption (Sullivan, 2009). In this regard, ethics has to be considered as a 
set of values and principles by which a company identifies the nature of its mission 
and operations, leading the behaviour of its board of directors, management and 
employees at all levels (Sullivan, 2009). This includes leadership’s commitment to 
adapt and embody the ethical values of the company in all decisions and operations; 
companies need working solutions that are built around the ethics idea and which tie 
together the reforms of corporate governance and anti-corruption initiatives (Sullivan, 
2009). More radically, recent studies by Wanyama et al. (2013) and Shikaputo (2013) 
both explicitly suggest that in developing countries the issue of corruption is critical 
and any attempts to build ‘better’ governance systems in such environments will fail 
unless this issue is addressed first.  
 
Some researchers, such as Joyner and Payne (2002) and Ghosh et al. (2011), 
concentrate upon the CSR issue (discussed earlier in a broader governance context) 
and its relationship with ethics. Joyner and Payne (2002) evaluate the concepts of 
business ethics and CSR to illustrate the increased emphasis on both these issues in 
recent years. The study examines, using interviews and content analysis, two 
organisations that have successfully dealt with these issues and finds a link with the 
firm’s financial performance that can be either direct or indirect. However, these 
linkages may not cause the changes in the financial performance noted; on one hand, 
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it appeared possible to assign an exact dollar value to “socially responsible” action, 
but on the other, the contacts made through the behaviour of social responsibility 
resulted in contracts being awarded at a later date (Joyner and Payne, 2002). Ghosh et 
al. (2011) concentrate on the relationship between ethics and corporate social 
responsibility in a different way. They point out that ‘ethics versus profit’ is an old 
debate that resurfaces from time to time, but it does involve social welfare and 
individual gain. The authors suggest that, contrary to conventional thinking, profit and 
social responsibility can work together, and ethics and profits are not inimical to each 
other. At times, it may appear that individual optimum choice conflicts with social 
optima, and at times these ends can seem mutually complementary. In the case of 
conflict between these two objectives, one has to be picked up in preference to the 
other. If the maximum good of the many is considered better than the maximum good 
of the one, the former must be the superior choice (Ghosh et al., 2011). 
 
3.9 Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in the Islamic Context 
 
 
Despite the increasing Islamic banking presence in the global financial market and the 
rapid growth of Islamic banks and windows since the mid-1970s, little has been 
written on governance structures and processes from an Islamic perspective (Alnasser 
and Muhammed, 2012). Alnasser and Muhammed (2012) argue that the financial 
conditions in Islamic banks and windows require additional items to be included in 
the financial reports, such as Zakah. More generally, the need for investment and 
financing undertaking by Islamic banks and windows to be in line with Sharia and the 
expectations of the Muslim community is often portrayed as an ethical issue (Hassan, 
2009). In this regard, the banks involved have an obligation towards all of their 
stakeholders and related parties, which may extend beyond the financial interest to 
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embrace ethical, religious and other values when good corporate governance is 
required (Hassan, 2009). In addition, the staff should act in accordance with Islamic 
principles and adhere to the teachings of Islam. The accounting standards used by 
banks in an Islamic context should emphasise the need for interest free operations, a 
principle which is generally seen as the most important ethical issue in this context 
(Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012).  
 
According to Chapra and Ahmed (2002), the objective of corporate governance in the 
Islamic context is to ensure ethical behaviour towards all stakeholders, thus ensuring 
fairness, and greater transparency and increased accountability. Also, by incorporating 
higher standards of minorities’ protection against expropriation, the increased 
transparency, disclosure and effective accountability within Sharia-based corporate 
governance bodies will promote compliance with Sharia injunctions and business 
ethics (Khaliffa, 2003; Ibrahim, 2006). More specifically, Ibrahim (2006) argues that, 
corporate governance in an Islamic context requires, the absence of: market 
manipulation; transactional opaqueness; short selling; and excessive financial 
exposure is essential, because such practises have been considered by Islamic scholars 
to be immoral and unethical.  
 
Two specific notions shape the nature of corporate governance from an Islamic 
perspective. The first one is Sharia. As noted earlier, every action of Muslim life must 
conform to Sharia and observed ethical standards must be derived from Islamic 
principles. These principles - as explained earlier - define what is true, fair and just, 
the priorities of society, the nature of corporate responsibility and certain specific 
governance standards. Second, certain Islamic financial principles and business ethics 
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have a direct impact upon corporate policies and practices (Lewis, 2005). 
Significantly, Nasr (2002) points out that there no governance system can influence 
organisational behaviour unless it is embedded in an appropriate ethical or moral 
climate.  
 
This concern about the integration of business ethics into the corporate governance 
debate in the Islamic context is clearly stated in the guiding principles on corporate 
governance for institutions offering only Islamic financial services, published in 2006 
by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). In this document, the IFSB (2006) 
state that good ethics, strong morals, unshakable integrity and honesty of the highest 
order have been strongly promoted by Islam.  
 
If a broad definition of corporate governance, such as “a set of organisational 
arrangements whereby the actions of the management of a corporation are aligned as 
far as possible with the interests of its stakeholders” (IFSB, 2006., p. 16) can be 
agreed upon, then it may transpire that there are more similarities than differences 
between the ‘conventional’ and Islamic approaches to good corporate governance, 
particularly in ensuring fairness, transparency and accountability (Hasan, 2009). A 
major difference would be that the Islamic approach has religious values and 
requirements related to Sharia entrenched within it (IFSB, 2006). 
 
Finally, in considering an Islamic view of the broad definition of corporate 
governance, it is often perceived to promote an interpretation beyond those who 
participate in the governance of the corporation to the religion of Islam itself (Hasan, 
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2009). Therefore, the corporate governance model from a Sharia viewpoint considers 
Islam to be the supreme stakeholder. The concept of Islam as the main stakeholder 
affects the corporate governance structure where it identifies Sharia and its ethical 
purposes as the governing law of all corporate affairs, requiring the establishment of 
the Sharia Supervisory Board29 as part of any firm’s corporate governance system 
(Hasan, 2009). 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has reviewed the key elements of the prior literature examining the issues 
central to this thesis, namely corporate governance, business ethics and Islam. Rather 
than try and describe every study in each field, the discussion has focussed on those 
most relevant to a study such as this which brings elements of these fields together as 
the basis for a detailed empirical study. Having presented the most relevant contextual 
literature, the thesis continues by detailing the theoretical framework underpinning 
this work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 For further details, see chapter 4. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Having reviewed the literature relating to business ethics and corporate governance, it 
is clearly evident that accountability is as an important part of the modern corporate 
governance debate (Shikabuto, 2013). This chapter provides an overview of the 
accountability theoretical framework which is the lens employed in the current study 
in order to explore the relationship between corporate governance and business ethics 
in Saudi-listed banks. The chapter identifies a number of basic themes in the previous 
discussions that relate to corporate governance and business ethics, and explores these 
notions’ relations with accountability in an Islamic context and more broadly. The 
remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 focuses on the issues of 
accountability in general terms, before the relationship between accountability and: (i) 
corporate governance; and (ii) business ethics is explored in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively. Section 4.5 then discusses accountability from an Islamic perspective, 
highlighting three key elements: (i) Shura (consultation); (ii) Hisba (verification); and 
(iii) the Sharia Supervisory Board. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Accountability 
 
 
The accountability concept has been recognised by human beings since ancient times. 
For example, legal documents have been found showing that around 2000 BC, the 
Babylonian king, Hammurabi, was concerned with the accountability of those 
working on behalf of others (Gray and Jenkins, 1993).  
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Currently, as a result of the complexities of business, and in addition to the general 
trend of separation between ownership and control, agency theory has emerged to 
clarify the relationships involved where an owner delegates authority to management 
(Gray and Jenkins, 1993). In such cases, the management should operate the resources 
of the organisation in a way that fosters the interests of the former, and thereby 
discharge their accountability to the owners of organisations. However, the modern 
accountability notion is usually seen in wider terms, with explicit acknowledgement 
of firms’ impact on society and the community as a whole. Stakeholders such as 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, society, the government, the environment 
and others are affected by the decisions and performance of the firm, so management 
should: (i) be accountable to such parties; and (ii) have a responsibility to provide 
them with detailed information regarding orgnisational behaviour and performance 
(Gray and Jenkins, 1993). Dealing ethically is increasingly seen as part of being 
accountable to all stakeholders (Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha, 2010), and the detailed 
discussions in the literature chapter indicate the importance of business ethics for 
corporations included in modern debates on the issue.   
 
Gray and Jenkins (1993) define accountability as: 
“An obligation to present an account of and answer for the 
execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those 
responsibilities” (p. 55). 
 
 
An alternative definition is provided by Gray et al. (1996) who describe accountability 
as: 
“The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a 
financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is 
held responsible” (p. 38). 
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Perks (1993) states that any theoretical framework for accountability must be 
concerned with questions such as who is accountable, to whom, how and for what. 
The central premise of accountability according to the above definitions, is that the 
responsible party is required to provide an account to the interested parties, so this 
duty become key (Perks, 1993). The actions which are taken to serve the stakeholders’ 
interests should be justified and explained in this account. This reasoning indicates 
that, for an accountability relationship to exist, there are two parties: the accountee, 
who represents the principal (such as the board of directors, shareholders or other 
stakeholders) who entrusts a task to the accountor, who is responsible for notifying 
the accountee of the current status of the accountability mission in order to discharge 
that accountability30. In some situations, accountors can act as accountees and vice-
versa, depending on the precise nature of the relationship involved. For instance, 
while employees are accountable to their managers to perform their obligations 
satisfactorily, management is accountable to their employees in terms of providing 
them with a safe workplace environment (Gray et al., 1996). According to Robinson 
(1971), there are three accountability bases. The first is programme accountability, 
concerned with how the corporation’s activities are carried on and whether it meets 
the goals set for it or not; second is process accountability, which examines whether 
the procedures used to perform a firm’s operations were sufficient and whether the 
latter were carried out as promised; finally, fiscal accountability aims to establish 
whether items purchased were used for their intended purpose and whether the funds 
were expended as stated.  
 
                                                 
30 These parties to an accountability relationship might be individuals, groups or organisations (Gray et 
al., 1996) 
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Most formulations of corporate governance are seen to imply the need for a clear 
statement about working conditions to both shareholders and stakeholders (Solomon, 
2010). The accountability outcomes might take a diversity of forms according to the 
purpose of the report and the identity of the beneficiary because the required 
information is likely to differ according to the needs of these different accountees 
(Solomon, 2010)31. Such reports aim to meet the requirements of the shareholders and 
stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). Certainly, they may play a vital role in any 
communication processes in the company; therefore, reliable reports offer important 
reassurance to all parties who deal with the company, concerning matters of interest to 
them. For instance, the board of directors will want to know whether the performance 
of the company has been enhanced and to what extent its goals have been attained. In 
contrast, from the owners’ point of view, the focus is on profitability maximisation 
and the attendant rises in share price. The company’s overall financial situation will 
typically concern creditors and suppliers while employees take into account the 
strength of the company and its ability to offer them financial security and a safe 
working environment. The community will look at the services provided to it by the 
company (and how seriously the company cares about its operations’ social aspects), 
while environmental bodies will ensure that the company is considering 
environmental issues (Gray and Bebington, 2000). Gray and Bebington (2000) argue 
that while a corporation has the right to use communication channels such as annual 
reports to assist in disseminating information, the receiver has the right not to believe 
its conclusions. 
 
                                                 
31 Financial reports, environmental reports, corporate social reports, sustainability reports and others are 
obvious illustrations of accountability products (Solomon, 2010). 
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The accountability relationship can be seen as a bond linking parties, whether such 
parties are persons or institutions and, in order to produce a disciplined accountability 
relationship, it is important for the bond to be clearly defined (Stewart, 1984). Stewart 
(1984) suggests that although this view of accountability has been constructed for the 
purposes of public accountability analysis, it can be employed for all forms of 
accountability, including commercial and managerial.  In this regard, Stewart (1984) 
argues that: 
 
“To define a bond of accountability it is not sufficient to define the 
person or institution which accounts and the person or institution 
which holds to account; the activities covered by the bond of 
accountability, which we will call the ‘field of accountability’, must 
also be defined. A person who accounts may be subject to different 
bonds for different activities”.  
 
 
Monks and Minow (2004) contend that accountability is not just a choice for the 
company, but is instead a commitment by a company to fulfil its responsibility 
towards the society in which it operates. Accountability can therefore be seen as a 
contract between the corporation and interested parties, enforced by rules such as 
company law, civil law, regulations, internal procedures, professional standards, 
conventions, ethical and corporate governance codes and customs (Monks and 
Minow, 2004). Such contracts should work effectively as a framework for the current 
study, where the focus is on the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in Saudi-listed banks. Monks and Minow (2004) specify two classes 
of laws organising the relationship between a corporation and the interested parties: 
the first is public law, imposed by legislative bodies and offering minimum standards. 
Maximum flexibility is permitted when organising the relationships between the 
corporation and interested groups. The second class is private law which emerges 
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from agreements between the corporation and others. Gray and Jenkins (1993) 
differentiate between two accountability codes by stating that while internal codes are 
formulated to deal with a particular relationship, external codes have been established 
for general relationship categories and are imported in specific relationships; internal 
codes are therefore usually explicit, whereas external codes tend to appear as 
primarily implicit in nature. 
 
Monks and Minow (2004) argue that, in order to preserve legitimacy and credibility, 
each company should design effective systems to ensure their mechanisms for 
discharging accountability are competent, reliable and independent. The authors 
suggest further that it is best for a corporation to develop its own accountability in 
ways that satisfy all interested groups in order to avoid the requirement for external 
interference (see also Gray and Bebington, 2000). In the absence of such measures, 
stakeholders - and the company itself - could face severe losses as a direct result of 
the defects in accountability systems (Keasey et al., 1997). 
 
‘Proper’ accountability intends to ensure that there is no misuse of organisational 
resources, in addition to preventing mismanagement that may harm the interests of 
others (Stewart, 1984). Therefore, in order to attract global capital, it is essential for 
both companies and countries to meet transparency and accountability demands 
(Monks and Minow, 2004). A stronger concentration on the accountability and 
transparency of the corporation can be a sufficient mechanism for enhancing the 
confidence of investors (Gray and Bebington, 2000).  
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Gray and Bebington (2000) claim that, despite the fact that a major corporate concern 
with respect to accountability is likely to be the economic activities that most interest 
the providers of finance, there are other stakeholders who have the right to 
information which extends beyond the financial affairs of the corporation; therefore, 
reports on matters such as the social and environmental impact may have importance 
here. In this context, voluntary initiatives can be significant in practice, with some 
notable advances evident but, given that accountability is often now viewed as dealing 
with complex environmental and social matters, there is bound to be a need for 
legislation regarding accountability. From the corporate side, there should be no 
unwillingness to adhere to such regulations as these represent the mechanisms 
supporting the discharge of their accountability (Gray and Bebington, 2000). 
 
Beetham (1994) argues that accountability depends on public knowledge of what 
activities a corporation or a government is engaged in. Significantly, such 
perspectives may gain more awareness within a democratic society where the rights of 
all groups are protected. 
 
Here, Keasey et al. (1997) suggest a note of caution that: 
“Despite the greatly increased financial reporting regulations and/or 
the supposed independence of the auditors of financial statements, 
the system is able to prevent effectively a determined board of 
executives from adopting reporting practices which greatly hinder 
accountability.” (p. 55). 
 
 
The approach a firm is likely to adopt when attempting to increase accountability will 
depend upon the agency relationships at work (Perks, 1993). As a result, those who 
work as a representative of the principals would be in favour of enhancing 
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accountability in ways that make the agents more accountable to them, while 
representatives of the agents would prefer less accountability, since accountability 
tends to increase their responsibility to others and restrict their freedom (Perks, 1993).  
The next two sections focus on the relationship between accountability and both 
corporate governance and ethics. 
 
4.3 Accountability and Corporate Governance 
 
 
Solomon (2010) notes that there has been a huge upsurge in the amount of research 
focused on corporate governance in a wide variety of disciplines and contexts; indeed, 
research is now focusing on accountability to a broad constituent group (Dunne, 
2003). As a result of the growing inter-connectedness amongst these approaches, 
corporate governance has been turned into an interdisciplinary subject which might 
require an anti-traditionalist and interdisciplinary reasoning (Gilson, 1996).   
 
In traditional thinking, agency relationships are the root of corporate governance; i.e. 
the focus is on ensuring that the owner’s assets are employed efficiently in their 
interest by entrusted controllers. This relationship between management and finance 
providers underpins agency theory and the need for accountability which many 
scholars perceive as a starting point for debates about corporate governance (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Byrd, et al., 1998). According to Brennan and Solomon (2008), a 
significant role has been played by agency theory in the choice of a theoretical 
framework, especially in the corporate governance field. Agency theory principles can 
provide the basis for strong corporate governance if the suppliers of finance are 
rewarded accordingly and appropriately (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
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Similarly, Gamble and Kelly (2001) contend that the debate on corporate governance 
has been marked by an argument about the rights of shareholders versus the rights of 
stakeholders. The supporters of the stakeholder perspective argue that the 
accountability of the firm might legitimately be extended to constituencies such as 
employees or local communities. However, although some important references are 
made to the issue of accountability within the contemporary literature, the debate has 
tended to concentrate on the issue of what governance systems best enhance economic 
efficiency and produce returns for the owners (Gamble and Kelly, 2001). The UK’s 
Hampel Report of 1998 states that the balance between shareholders and stakeholders 
needed to be redressed in favour of the former. The report (1998) argues that: 
“The importance of corporate governance lies in its contribution 
both to business prosperity and to accountability. In the UK the 
latter has preoccupied much public debate over the past few years. 
We would wish to see the balance corrected. Public companies are 
now among the most accountable organisations in society. They 
publish trading results and audited accounts; and they are required 
to disclose much information about their operations, relationships, 
remuneration and governance arrangements. We strongly endorse 
this accountability and we recognise the contribution made by the 
Cadbury and Greenbury committees. But the emphasis on 
accountability has tended to obscure a board's first responsibility to 
enhance the prosperity of the business over time” (p. 7). 
 
 
Regarding the broad notion of corporate governance and accountability, Gray et al. 
(1996) suggest that the broader governance notions identify rights and responsibilities. 
The corporation is seen from such a framework not as an economic aggregation of 
individuals but as an entity, related as an organic system to the political and social 
world. Burton (2000) argues that managerial focus in this context is on the 
responsibility notion, where corporations are responsive to all stakeholders. 
Significantly, Burton argues that trust and participation are more important and 
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effective than control (Burton, 2000). Furthermore, according to Keasey and Wright 
(1993), accountability is required to allow the principal to monitor, evaluate and 
control agents’ behaviour within organisations; responsibility for corporate 
governance practices rests with the board of directors, who control the company on 
behalf of shareholders and are in turn expected to account for the actions and use of 
resources. In this regard, the theory has been recognised as clarifying controversies 
surrounding the relationship between directors and shareholders in the modern 
corporation. Conventionally, corporate governance has been perceived as a 
mechanism for resolving the principal-agent conflict (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). 
This approach influenced early authors on corporate governance, who advocated it as 
a cure for the tension between company owners and management; most reforms of 
corporate governance, particularly in developed countries, are constructed with a view 
to defusing this tension (Vinten, 2001). Thus, agency theory is relevant to any debates 
on corporate governance as it influences the composition of boards and, in general, 
the balance of power between management and capital providers (Cadbury, 2002).  
 
Bovens (2006) argues that accountability is now perceived as a ‘good’ governance 
element in the public and private sectors also and has become the focus of much 
attention. Likewise, accountability is widely viewed as a sub-set of governance 
(Keasey and Wright, 1993). The Audit Commission (2009) defines good governance 
and accountability as: 
 “Ensuring the organisation is doing the right things, in the right 
way, for the right people in a timely, inclusive, open, honest and 
accountable manner” (p.3).  
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Thus, accountability is seen as a vital for strong governance and in this sense, it has 
widely been suggested that accountability underpins economic development (Pope, 
2000; and Sun, et al., 2011). In an Islamic context, Falgi (2009) was the first author to 
explore corporate governance within an accountability framework following the 
issuance of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code in 2006. Falgi found that 
stakeholders view corporate governance from a very narrow agency perspective, and 
that such a narrow view reduces the amount of accountability employed by companies 
towards all stakeholders including society. The author reports that the only recognised 
accountability relationship that exists is that between management and the board of 
directors. However, the relationship between accountability and ethics is not explored 
in detail in the earlier study. It is to this issue that the current study now turns. 
 
4.4 Accountability and Ethics 
 
 
Accountability can be viewed as an ethical order that includes a system of reciprocal 
obligations and rights (Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha, 2010). This means that the groups 
are bound up not only in calculable and narrow ways, but must meet the ethical and 
spiritual goals of the organisation and take a broader view than is commonly 
understood (Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha, 2010).  
 
Zadek (1998) claims that ethical accounting provides one of the few mechanisms for 
corporations to fully understand and integrate the new accountability and governance 
patterns, with a model of business success centred on deepening stakeholder 
relationships and recognition of financial and non-financial interests. However, 
corporations need to know the ethical views of stakeholders and trends therein in 
order to be fully accountable to them (Zadek, 1998). 
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Shearer (2002) stresses that we urgently need to reconsider the ethical dimensions of 
economic life to explore anew the sufficiency of financial accountability. Shearer 
addresses prior ethical considerations on which the theories and practices of financial 
accountability must rest. Such consideration is vital, for any moral responsibility 
theory must eventually rest on ethical considerations regarding the financial entity’s 
nature, including its relationship to the human community within which it operates. 
Ultimately, it is a moral responsibility notion that grounds the accountability of the 
entity with respect to the community, and therefore the practices of accounting that 
are undertaken to discharge this accountability (Shearer, 2002).  
 
Corporations become moral community members through providing an account of an 
activity which is essential if these entities are to act other than in their own interests. 
However, according to Shearer (2002) if businesses succeed in discharging 
accountability to broad human and environmental groups, then they must have a way 
of distinguishing these purposes from their self-interests. In sum, to attain a broader 
obligation to accountability on the part of agents, what is needed is an ethic that is 
incapable of incorporation into the logic of economics (Shearer, 2002).  
 
Greenfield (1996) presents accountability as an ethical issue by suggesting that 
organisations can succeed if they consider the following ethical values in their daily 
operations and decisions: (i) commitment beyond the self; (ii) commitment to the 
public good; (iii) tolerance; (iv) diversity; (v) social justice; (vi) respect for 
individuals’ worth and dignity; (vii) prudent resource application; (ix) law obedience; 
(x) commitment beyond the law; (xi) honesty and openness; and (xii) accountability 
to the public. Greenfield (1996) adds that, to be accountable for all actions, acting 
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always in the public good and observing the highest ethical behaviour principles are 
more than lofty aspirations. 
 
Regarding individuals and employees, Beu and Buckley (2001) argued that there are 
times when individuals face an ethical dilemma in that they may want to do the right 
thing based upon their own values, but are overwhelmed by the forces of society to 
comply with the values of their prevailing culture (Beu and Buckley, 2001). This 
would lead to the belief that, by developing high quality relationships and raising the 
understanding of normatively acceptable behaviour, accountability would lead to 
more ethical actions. Beu and Buckley argue that ethical behaviour by employees is 
significant to all corporations’ viability, indeed, one way to ensure that employees 
perform ‘properly’ is for the organisation to require that the employees be held 
accountable for all of their actions (Beu and Buckley, 2001). 
 
In an accountability framework, employees are seen in a social context and their 
behaviour is evaluated and observed by an audience and compared to some standard 
or expectation. Thus, accountability and ethics fit well together as both are social 
control methods and should be studied together (Beu and Buckley, 2001). 
Consequently, when the organisation members facing an ethical dilemma view 
unethical actions as something that must be done in order to assist those who are close 
to them, they will be more likely to engage in that behaviour if they are not held 
accountable for it (Beu and Buckley, 2001). 
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Whilst this thesis is situated in this broad accountability context, the study is 
conducted in an Islamic setting; Islam itself incorporates specific notions of 
accountability and so the next section explores this perspective in detail. 
 
4.5 Accountability from an Islamic Perspective 
 
 
One of the most significant issues considered in economic systems is the motivation 
for undertaking economic activities; that is, what is the person’s purpose in carrying 
out particular economic activities? (Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). Is he/she trying to 
receive materialistic and physical benefits or is his/her attitude a non-materialistic 
one? With respect to the body of literature on people’s economic behaviour in Islamic 
society, one may certainly say that the materialistic motivation to share in economic 
activities is given low priority and the role of non-materialism is primary (Malekian 
and Daryaei, 2010). 
 
Lewis (2006) states that one of the fundamental objectives of an accounting system is 
to assist accountability. Those in charge of the economic resources must provide an 
account of their stewardship, irrespective of whether the sources and transactions in 
question are those of a private sector entity or a government organisation. This 
stewardship function has been a key feature of organised human activity from the 
earliest recorded times (Whittington, 1992). Originally specified at the individual 
property owner level, currently accountability is usually illustrated in terms of 
accounting by management, either public or private, to aid efficient resource 
allocation by providing information, for the ex-post monitoring of performance or ex-
ante decision-making (Whittington, 1992). 
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Yet, accountability also has broader economic objectives and social purposes, and no 
more so than under Islam, where religion, economics, politics and social affairs, 
including accounting, fall under the divine legal jurisdiction of Islam, Sharia. As 
noted earlier the literal meaning of Sharia is ‘the way to the life source’ and, in a 
technical sense, it is now employed to refer to a legal system that is in keeping with 
the code of behaviour laid down in the Holy Quran and the Hadith (prophet’s saying 
(peace be upon him)), which are the authentic tradition (Lewis, 2006). Calder (2002, 
p.458) defines Islamic law as: 
“A hermeneutic discipline which explores and interprets revelation 
through tradition”. 
 
 
The Holy Quran and Sunnah (the Prophet’s teachings) clearly define: (i) what is 
considered true, fair and just; (ii) the preferences and priorities of society; (iii) the 
roles and responsibilities of corporations; and (iv) in certain senses, specific 
accounting standards for accounting practices. In the Holy Quran, for instance, in 
different verses, the word Hesab is repeated more than eight times (Askary and 
Clarke, 1997). Hesab or account is the accounting root, and the references in the Holy 
Quran mean to ‘account’ in its generic sense, relating to an obligation to account to 
Allah for all aspects of human endeavor, for which every Muslim is accountable. All 
of the resources available to individuals are made in the form of a trust, where 
individuals are the trustees of what they have received from Allah in the form of 
goods, property and even less tangible assets. The extent to which individuals must 
use what is being entrusted to them is specified in the Sharia, and the individuals’ 
success in the hereafter depends upon their performance in life. In this sense, every 
Muslim has an account with Allah, in which all actions, either good or bad, are 
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recorded and this account will continue until death; on their judgment day, Allah then 
shows everyone their account (Lewis, 2006; Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). Thus, the 
basic similarity between accounting and hesab in Islam lies in every Muslim’s 
responsibility to carry out his/her obligations as described in the Holy Quran. 
Similarly, in a business enterprise, both the management and the capital providers are 
accountable for their actions within and outside their firm. Accountability in this 
context means accountability to the umma (community) or society at large. In good 
faith, Muslims cannot compartmentalise their behaviour into secular and religious 
dimensions, and their actions are always bound by Sharia. Accordingly Islamic law 
embodies an all-encompassing set of practices and duties, including worship, prayer, 
morals and manners, along with implicit individual moral tenets that need to be 
incorporated into business practices and commercial transactions in general (Al-Jirari, 
1996). 
 
In Islam, overarching guidelines should be implicit in the implementation and 
monitoring of any framework (Askary and Clarke, 1997). If the political authority 
does not attend to the task seriously the moral norms, which in a Muslim society are 
derived from Sharia, may not be reflected in statute, and the laws might not be 
implemented effectively. It is the responsibility of the political authority to check 
morally objectionable behaviour, such as dishonesty, fraud and unfairness which is 
harmful to the development of the socio-economy (Askary and Clarke, 1997).  
 
As discussed above, Muslims believe that they will be held to account for whatever 
they do in their lives in the hereafter. In Islam, in order to seek the promised rewards 
in the hereafter, Muslims must fulfill the will of Allah. Thus, it requires every deed 
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and word in life to be in line with the teachings of Islam (Malekian and Daryaei, 
2010). Generally, the Islamic economic system aims to allow people to earn their 
living in a profitable and fair way without exploiting others, so that the whole of 
society will benefit. Islam also emphasises community welfare over individual rights 
(Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). According to the rules of Sharia, the accountor is 
accountable for all his/her actions and can be questioned if there is any depravation or 
negligence (Al-Jirari, 1996). Sharia requires agents such as managers to ensure that 
all their performances and actions are in favour of the various groups who are affected 
by their business. In order to activate the accountability mechanisms within Islamic 
society, three significant concepts must be adopted: Shura (consultation); Hisba 
(verification); and Sharia via a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) (Abdul Rahman, 
1998); these three concepts provide a legal framework to monitor and hold the agent 
to account and are now discussed in more detail. 
 
 
4.5.1 Shura (Consultation) 
 
 
Shura means consultation. The holy Quran mentions Shura as a significant concept 
thus:  
“And consult them on affairs of moment. Then, when thou have 
taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah.”(3:159) 
 
“Those who respond to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who 
conduct their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what 
We bestow on them for sustenance.” (42:38) 
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The Shura group or Consultative Council had its origins in the earliest times of Islam, 
where it comprised a council of tribal elders (Branine and Pollard, 2010). Originally, 
it constituted an informal deliberation forum where decisions were arrived at through 
discussing new problems. Throughout these deliberations, the problems in question 
were opened up for general discussion. The Council Members were invited to 
articulate their personal opinions, and these were sifted through until a consensus was 
reached. In accordance with the moral principles, Islam introduced improvements 
(Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). And so, the basic message of Surat (part of the Quran) Ash-
Shura, to live truly in forbearance and mutual consultation, and rely on Allah, 
contains governance’s essence from an Islamic perspective. Those who wish to serve 
Allah must ensure that their behaviour is open and determined by mutual consultation 
between those entitled to a voice; in business affairs, this relates most obviously to the 
relationship between the interested parties or partners and in state affairs, between 
ruled and rulers (Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). Since the Quran clearly mandates that 
any decision including more than one party requires consultation on the basis of Shura 
principles, the participants are encouraged in Islam to work together frankly and 
freely when arriving at decisions (Baydoun, et al., 1999). The institution of a Shuratic 
decision-making process clarifies how choices in business and other activities can 
comply with Islamic moral values. Decision-making is based on significant trust from 
Allah, and Islam requires from those holding this trust truthfulness, consultation, 
justice and a consensus-seeking spirit among the participants during group decision-
making. On the Shura basis, others must be encouraged by their leaders to participate 
in decision-making. An employee would be expected to contribute his or her 
knowledge to the organisational formulation and implementation vision, and the 
procedures of consultation should be applied to all affected including the 
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shareholders, workers, suppliers, customers and the community (Baydoun, et al., 
1999). 
 
4.5.2 Hisba (Verification) 
 
 
The universality of Islamic teachings engendered the early establishment of 
institutions whose role was to maintain Islamic societal cohesion as a whole and 
ensure trade and business accountability (Kamla, 2009). In Islam, ultimate business 
and economic ends are for Allah, and the means employed should not diverge in any 
way from Sharia or Islamic law (Falgi, 2009; Kamla, 2009). An approved social 
behaviour code was introduced by the Prophet Muhammad, and his companions were 
later appointed, when the umma, or Islamic community, expanded in the early days of 
the Islamic state to institutionalise and perpetuate the codes, and preserve and ensure 
compliance with Sharia principles (Falgi, 2009). One of most significant institutions 
in this regard was the Hisba, whereby societies and the whole community were to be 
protected from fraud and exploitation (Wilson, 2002).  During the early Abbasids 
period (between the seventh and eleventh centuries), the Hisba was established to 
ensure compliance with the Sharia requirements, with its holder called the muhtasib32 
(Lewis, 2006). Hisba seeks to enhance essential Islamic elements including the 
outlawing of discrimination on the basis of class, race or gender, which ensures 
equality for all Muslims. This includes obligations which ensure the prevention of 
monopolies, price controls, the protecting of the natural environment and the 
maintenance of public utilities and government resources (Gambling and Karim, 
1991). Abdul Rahman (1998) explains that the functions of Hisba were Islamisised by 
entrusting its holder with obligations in the Holy Quran to encourage good behaviour 
                                                 
32 The one who is on top of the Hisba institution. 
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and discourage bad behaviour; the muhtasib was therefore responsible and 
accountable for enforcing Islamic behaviour in terms of activities in the market and 
community affairs in general, including honesty and accuracy in business dealings. 
Traditionally, duties carried out by the muhtasib include: the use of correct measures 
and weights; fair trading rules; auditing illegal contracts; checking business frauds; 
keeping the market free and preventing the hoarding of necessities (Abdul Rahman, 
1998). In Islamic society Hisba, like the institution of Shura, is a long-standing 
tradition that can be seen to represent a core Islamic corporate governance element. 
The institution’s role became significant during the religion’s expansion, as the 
number of commercial and business activities increased, exemplifying the nature and 
extent of the acceptance of an ideal system of sacred law in early Islam. Nevertheless, 
the Hisba institution survives in terms of every Muslim’s right, irrespective of the 
presence or absence of an officially appointed muhtasib, to come forth as a private 
prosecutor or enforcer of Islamic governance standards (Abdul Rahman, 1998). For 
Gambling and Karim (1991), the role of the Hisba and muhtasib concepts in 
governance models in early Islam provides encouragement for accounting today, 
contributing to discussions surrounding a social accounting form where accountability 
in business and transparent reporting on financial, social and environmental impacts 
of business are called for. The Hisba concept can also contribute to discussions 
surrounding the role of accounting regulatory bodies, whose purpose should be to 
ensure that the operations of business organisations are in line with the public interest 
(Gambling and Karim, 1991). 
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4.5.3 The Sharia Supervisory Board 
 
 
The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) and the internal controls which support it 
comprise the central tenet of the corporate governance framework from an Islamic 
perspective (Safieddine, 2009). The SSB is seen as vital for two key reasons. First, 
those who deal with an Islamic bank need assurance that it is transacting in 
compliance with Sharia. Should the SSB report that the bank management has failed 
to follow Sharia law, it will quickly lose the confidence of the majority of its 
investors and clients (Suleiman, 1998). Second, several Islamic scholars argue that 
strict adherence to the principles of the Islamic religion will act as a counter to the 
motivation problems outlined above (Suleiman, 1998). In effect, Islamic religious 
ideology acts as its own incentive mechanism for decreasing the inefficiency that 
arises from moral hazard and asymmetric information (Suleiman, 1998).  
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued Governance Standard No. 1 on the SSB: Composition, 
Appointment and Report. According to this standard, every Islamic financial 
institution will have an SSB which:  
A. “is an independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh almua’malat 
(Islamic commercial jurisprudence). 
B. is entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising 
the activities of the Islamic financial institution in order to ensure 
that they are in compliance with Islamic Sharia rules and principles.  
C. can issue fatwas and rulings which shall be binding on the 
Islamic financial institution. 
D. shall consist of at least three members who are appointed by the 
shareholders upon the recommendation of the board of directors (not 
including directors or significant shareholders of the Islamic 
financial institution), 
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E. shall prepare a report on the compliance of all contracts, 
transactions and dealings with the Sharia rules and principles,  
F. shall state that the allocation of profit and charging of losses 
related to investment accounts conform to the basis that has been 
approved by the SSB.  
G. shareholders may authorise the board of directors to fix the 
remuneration of the Sharia Supervisory Board” (AAOIFI, 1998, 
p.76).  
 
The management of an Islamic financial institution is responsible for ensuring that it 
conducts its business according to Islamic Sharia law and principles. The 
responsibility of the SSB is to form an independent opinion on Sharia compliance 
(AAOIFI, 1998, p.76). 
 
Remarkably, the AAOIFI standard does not contain any information about the 
duration of the membership of SSB nor the procedures and possibilities for dismissal 
and reappointment (Safieddine, 2009). Despite the AAOIFI standard, the specific 
criteria and rules for the selection and appointment of SSB members (regarding, for 
instance, the relative weight of their Islamic and secular qualifications, their scholarly 
reputation and general popularity, their main income occupation and source, the 
duration of their SSB membership, their doctrinal strictness or intellectual flexibility, 
the criteria for reappointment etc) as well as the qualitative and quantitative 
dimension of their financial and non-financial rewards are not well documented in 
sources available to the general public (Bakar, 2002). Empirical research on the 
selection procedure of SSB members and their qualifications (before, during and after 
the membership) is still lacking. Moreover, there are no case studies on the reasons 
for and consequences of multiple SSB memberships by individual scholars (Nienhaus, 
2007). Following the AAOIFI guidelines, the board of directors proposes the 
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candidates for the SSB and determines their remuneration. Frequently, the 
management has a strong influence on the board of directors’ decisions. Therefore, it 
is plausible to assume that the top executives will have a strong influence on the SSB 
composition and on the financial and non-financial rewards for SSB members 
(Nienhaus, 2007). 
 
Nienhaus (2007) also argues that as an independent body the SSB is not subject to 
instructions by the board of directors, the shareholders or even the management. SSB 
members are free to state their opinions and to sanction or reject banking practices, 
techniques, dealings, contracts and transactions. This, however, does not mean that 
they are totally unaffected by social, political, economic and intellectual trends and 
developments. Additionally, it has to be taken in account that the appointment of SSB 
members had an initial motivation to be accepted (whatever that motivation was, 
whether scholarly reputation, financial reward, the sake of Islam or public visibility) 
(Safieddine, 2009; Bakar, 2002). If SSB membership does enhance the achievement 
of individual goals, it is a plausible statement that the members of the SSB are 
interested in a continuing membership leading to a reappointment. This creates a 
factual dependence on the shareholders who appoint SSB members and on the board 
of directors which nominates them (Safieddine, 2009). Furthermore, if managerial 
interests are represented by the board of directors, the members of the SSB have to 
take these into consideration. As long as management is encouraged by the board of 
directors and the shareholders, it is unlikely that the SSB members will ignore 
management’s interests when they apply their interpretation of Sharia principles to 
the contracts, transactions and activities of their Islamic bank (Bakar, 2002). This does 
not mean that the SSB members will always find ways to accept any new financial 
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product or transaction that is presented by the management. It must be a prime 
concern of the SSB that the Islamic institution character is recognised by the general 
public, but the SSB must also bear in mind the institution’s survival and commercial 
success (Nienhaus, 2007). A changing external environment can motivate changes in 
SSBs’ attitudes towards financial innovations which imply new governance issues. 
Indeed, the SSBs’ attitude has changed over the years, from being rather restrictive to 
becoming quite permissive (Nienhaus, 2007). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the key literature on accountability, the 
study’s theoretical underpinning. The focus was on three strands of the literature; 
firstly, the relationship between accountability and corporate governance. Secondly, 
how accountability relates to ethics and moral responsibilities. Finally, since the 
current research is set in an Islamic context, accountability from an Islamic 
perspective was discussed. Having explored the theoretical underpinning of the thesis 
the next chapter outlines and discusses the methodological and method-related issues and 
choices that flow from this.    
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Research Methodology and Methods 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
After clarifying the Saudi context in chapter 2, reviewing the key literature in relation 
to the focus of this study in chapter 3, and outlining the theoretical framework of the 
research in chapter 4, this chapter addresses the methodology underpinning this study 
as well as providing a discussion of the methods employed for collecting the primary 
research data. Regarding the methodological approach of this study, section 5.2.1 
introduces the main research philosophies, while the assumptions about the nature of 
social science will be identified in section 5.2.2, and the last section explains the 
assumptions about the nature of society and the research paradigms. Research 
methodology and paradigm will be presented in section 5.3. Both methods employed 
in this thesis - semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys - will be clarified 
in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Research Methodology 
 
 
Research is a method of investigation which is widely considered to be a 
scientifically-valid approach to academic enquiry. In a business context, research has 
been defined by Lewis and Thornhill (2003) as:  
“...something that people undertake in order to find out things in a 
systematic way, thereby increasing their knowledge.”(p.3)  
 
 
According to this definition, a research project should combine two core elements, the 
first being the desire to add to knowledge and the second relating to a systematic 
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research plan (Saunders et al., 2007). Research includes multiple stages, which might 
vary depending on the discipline concerned, but in all cases is likely to be conducted 
through the processes of reviewing the literature, collecting and analysing data by 
using appropriate methods and then presenting the results (Saunders et al., 2007). This 
chapter discusses the details of these processes in so far as they are relevant to the 
present study. The next section begins the discussion by outlining the philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of social science that underpin the thesis. 
 
5.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) determine four assumptions that are related to the nature 
of social science: ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. Each 
assumption represents two philosophical positions regarding its subjective or 
objective dimension. While the subjective dimension includes perspectives such as 
nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic, the objective contains realism, 
positivism, determinism and the nomothetic approaches. These assumptions and their 
current academic status will be specified in this subsection (See Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3). 
 
5.2.1.1 The Subjective and Objective Dimensions 
 
 
According to the subjective approach, social phenomena are nothing but the results of 
the actions of social actors and are in a constant state of revision (Saunders et al., 
2007). The subjectivists believe in free will whereby people are free to make 
decisions that change their life course (May, 2005). 
 
By contrast, the objective dimension reflects the perspective whereby social entities 
exist in a reality that is external to the social actors (Saunders et al, 2007). This 
meaning is clarified by Bryman (2004), who stated that: 
“Objectivism is an ontological position that asserts that social 
phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is 
independent of social actors. It implies that social phenomena and 
the categories that we use in everyday discourse have an existence 
that is independent or separate from actors” (p. 16). 
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The subjectivist sees social entities as social constructions built on the perceptions and 
actions of the social actors, while objectivists look at them as an objective entity, 
having a reality that is external to the social actors (Bryman, 2004). 
 
According to Maedche (2002), ontology can be defined as:  
“A philosophical discipline, a branch of philosophy that deals with 
the nature and the organisation of being” (p. 11). 
 
 
Ontology is concerned with research assumptions about the world, its operation and 
the commitments leading to such views (Saunders et al., 2007). In addition, it assists 
in choosing processes that can establish what kinds of knowledge are legitimate and 
adequate (Gray, 2004), and questions whether a social phenomenon is a ‘thing’ in its 
own right or just a representation (Corbetta, 2003). Accordingly, ontology can be 
classified into two positions, realism and nominalism. 
 
Saunders et al. (2007) clarified that realism is the ontological site that postulates that 
what the senses show us as reality is the truth. Additionally, objects exist 
independently of the human mind. Realism can be seen as similar to positivism in two 
respects: (i) realism as positivism holds that there is an external reality on which 
researchers place their attention (Bryman, 2004); and (ii) both realism and positivism 
adopt a scientific approach to develop knowledge, which supports the collection and 
understanding of the data (Bryman, 2004; Saunders et al., 2007). Two types of realism 
have been considered: empirical or direct realism and critical realism.33 
                                                 
33 Direct realism can be illustrated as what you see is what you get. Critical realists assert that there are 
two significant steps in experiencing the world: the first is the thing itself and the sensations it delivers, 
whereas the second step is the mental processing which goes on to join with the senses after the 
sensation. In the direct view of realists, the first step is enough (Saunders et al., 2007).  
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In contrast, the nominalist perspective assumes that the social world is not real and 
has no real structure; it is no more than labels, concepts and names which are 
employed to structure reality, because what is known about reality is generated from 
consciousness and the cognition of individuals (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  
 
Nominalism incorporates the view that reality is a subjective construction of one’s 
mind, thereby denying the notion of there being a ‘real’ structure to the world 
(Husserl, 1970). The current study presumes that reality is constructed through the 
perceptions of those involved in Saudi-listed banks, and so, the nominalist position 
underpins this work.  
 
Epistemological assumptions are linked to knowledge. Also, epistemology demands 
an understanding of what it means to know, whereas ontology concentrates upon 
understanding (Gray, 2004). Epistemology is particularly concerned with recognising 
the constituents of knowledge (Saunders et al., 2007), and also with raising the 
question about what is or what should be known (Bryman, 2004). In addition, 
epistemology is concerned with the ways of attaining and collecting knowledge. 
Therefore, epistemology has been described by Ryan et al. (2002) as a justified true 
belief or the study of the nature of belief, the problem of justification and the truth’s 
basis. Cooper (1999) presented the aims of epistemology, which are: 
 
a) Understanding concepts, such as belief, certainty, doubt, justification, memory, 
evidence and knowledge; 
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b) Enquiring into the criteria for such terms’ application, particularly the criteria for 
identifying the limits and scope of human knowledge. 
 
 
Moreover, Cooper (1999) argues that: 
“Many people have the impression that epistemology is the most 
central area of philosophy, or even that philosophy should really be 
identified with epistemology. Certainly there is a popular image of 
philosophers as people obsessively and almost solely concerned 
with determining whether we really know the things we ordinarily 
think we do” (p. 3). 
 
 
Positivism reflects the philosophical position of the natural scientist that deals with 
social reality observation, whose final product might be law-like generalisations, 
similar to the products of the natural and physical sciences (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Positivism has been defined by Bryman (2004) as: 
 “An epistemological position that advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and 
beyond” (p. 11). 
 
 
In a positivist perspective, a true belief is dependent on our perception, which is a 
result of a value free and independent reality (Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
From the perspective of an anti-positivist, the social world is relativistic and there is 
only one way for individuals to understand it, which is to become involved in the 
activities that are to be studied (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In addition, researchers 
who adopt an anti-positivist perspective are not looking for underlying regularities or 
laws of social affairs as in science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). While positivism 
typically employs methods such as experiments, anti-positivism typically uses other 
methods, such as interviews and observations of participants. A questionnaire survey 
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of perceptions will be employed in this research but, arguably, such a survey and its 
analysis is not incompatible with an antipositivist approach. The current work does 
not intend to create law-like generalisations or predict what occurs in the social world; 
nor is it looking for regularities or causal relationships among the component 
elements of the social world. Consequently, this thesis adopts an anti-positivist 
approach.  
 
The third assumption about the nature of social sciences concerns the nature of human 
beings, which considers the relationship between humans and their environment. It is 
essential for the social sciences to aim to understand that the activities of human 
beings are predicated upon an assumption about human nature, given the fact that the 
life of human beings is essentially the object and subject of the enquiry (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). There are two extreme standpoints concerning human beings’ roles in 
social life, which are determinism and voluntarism. From a determinist viewpoint, 
human beings and their experiences are a product of their environment and are thus 
conditioned by their external circumstances. In contrast, voluntarism asserts that man 
is entirely autonomous and free willed (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
This research aspires to explore the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics within Saudi-listed banks. These banks are a key sector within the 
Saudi business environment and are undoubtedly influenced by this environment and 
by its activities and experiences. As a result, this thesis will eliminate the extreme 
positions of voluntarism and determinism and adopt a moderate viewpoint between 
the two perspectives of human nature. According to a strict interpretation of Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), such a position might not be possible, but Chua (1986) argues 
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that determinism and voluntarism represent extremes on a continuum and so adopting 
an intermediate position might be helpful. This approach allows for consideration of 
the influence of both voluntary and situational factors in accounting for human 
beings’ activities (Chua, 1986). 
 
In term of methodology, Saunders et al., (2007) claim that methodology is used to 
refer to the way of undertaking and conducting research, including its philosophical 
and theoretical assumptions and their implications for the methods of research. The 
viewpoints considered above on ontology, epistemology and human nature have a 
direct influence on the research methodology, since they have an impact on the ways 
of investigating and attaining knowledge within the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). Ideographic methodology rests on the principle that the social world can be 
understood only by attaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation, 
whereas a nomothetic methodology means conducting research depending on 
systematic techniques and protocols. The ideographic approach utilises subjective 
accounts analysis by investigating cases and involving oneself in everyday life 
actions. In contrast, the nomothetic approach adopts scientifically rigorous standards 
to test research hypotheses, and employs quantitative techniques of data analysis to 
reach its goals (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This research leans towards an 
ideographic methodology. In order to understand the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks, this study investigates the 
perceptions of the participants concerning the status quo, in a relatively open fashion, 
to allow previously unexplored viewpoints to emerge.   
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5.2.2 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
 
 
Dahrendorf (1959) distinguished between two kinds of approach to sociology; while 
the first concentrates on explaining the nature of equilibrium and social order, the 
other approach is more concerned with issues of conflict, change and coercion in 
social structures. This distinction is best described as the order conflict debate and is 
illustrated by Burrell and Morgan (1979) in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: The Order Conflict Theories  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.13) 
 
 
However, Cohen (1968) argued that it is a mistake to treat order and conflict as 
entirely separate. Cohen (1968) suggested that theories could include order and 
conflict elements in their models and that one need not essentially incline towards one 
or the other. Furthermore, the subjectivist movements (e.g. ethnomethodology, 
phenomenology and action theory) became much more attractive; consequently, the 
order conflict debate has subsided under the impact of issues relating to the methods 
and philosophy of social science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Thus, Burrell and Morgan (1979) discussed how the distinction of order conflict is a 
complicated one and propose regulation and radical change as replacement concepts. 
The order or integrationist view of 
society emphasises: 
The conflict or coercion view of society 
emphasises: 
Stability Change 
Integration Conflict 
Functional co ordination Disintegration 
Consensus coercion 
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The regulation radical change model (as shown in Table 5.2) has two dimensions. The 
sociology of regulation is concerned with emphasising society’s underlying 
cohesiveness and unity. Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that: 
“Sociology of regulation is a sociology which is essentially 
concerned with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic 
questions which it asks tend to focus upon the need to understand 
why society is maintained as an entity. It attempts to explain why 
society tends to hold together rather than fall apart” (p. 17). 
 
 
Table 5.2: The Regulation Radical Change Dimension 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.18) 
 
On the other hand, radical change sociology looks for explanations of radical change, 
modes of domination, deep-seated structural conflict and structural contradiction. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) defined it as: 
“A sociology which is essentially concerned with man's 
emancipation from the structures which limit and stunt his potential 
for development. The basic questions which it asks focus upon the 
deprivation of man, both material and psychic” (p. 17). 
 
 
In the current research, regulatory assumptions regarding the nature of society have been 
adopted as this thesis does not attempt to challenge or change the status quo, but is 
The sociology of regulation 
is concerned with: 
The sociology of radical change 
is concerned with: 
The status quo Radical change 
Social order Structural conflict 
Consensus Modes of domination 
Social integration and cohesion Contradiction 
Solidarity Emancipation 
Need satisfaction Deprivation 
Actuality Potentiality 
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concerned instead with exploring the previously wider-researched issue of the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks. 
 
5.2.3 Research Paradigms 
 
 
The term ‘paradigm’ has been employed in the social sciences since the 1960s and 
refers to the perspective which is adopted by researchers to motivate and direct a 
given science (Corbetta, 2003). Saunders et al. (2007) offered the following 
definition: 
 “A paradigm is a way of examining social phenomena from which 
a particular understanding of these phenomena can be gained and 
explanations attempted.” (P. 118).  
 
 
Corbetta (2003) emphasised the significance of paradigms for the sciences and 
stressed that any science without a paradigm requires criteria and orientation of 
choice, so that all issues, techniques and methods are equally legitimate. 
 
Jackson and Carter (1991) admitted that there is no doubt that the four paradigm 
model provided by Burrell and Morgan (1979) makes a significant contribution to 
social science research. Their book was considered to be a substantial instrumental 
guide, clarifying and summarising key ontological and epistemological positions 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Burrell and Morgan (1979) affirm that a paradigm assists in 
clarifying the assumptions underpinning consistency in research regarding the 
researchers’ views of science and the nature of society to provide a good 
understanding of how other researchers achieve their goals. It also helps to assist in 
planning and designing the research in order to aid researchers to consider where they 
stand and to plan further guidelines in relation to their conceptions and attitudes. 
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Bryman (1988) asserts that a paradigm is: 
 “A cluster of beliefs and dictates which for scientists in a particular 
discipline influence what should be studied, how research should be 
done, how results should be interpreted, and so on.” (p. 4). 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, according to Burrell and Morgan, paradigms have four 
dimensions, which are subjectivist and objectivist (horizontal axis), and radical 
change and regulation (vertical axis). The regulation dimension is intended to 
illustrate current practice and how the affairs of organisations are regulated; it also 
offers suggestions for enhancement consistent with the current situation. In contrast, 
the perspective of radical change concerns critical attitudes when investigating an 
organisation; radical change is also concerned with providing an opinion about the 
transactions that should be undertaken in the organisation's dealings and gives 
suggestions about making a considerable change to the extant situation. Obviously, 
the radical change viewpoint is much more critical and judgmental than the regulation 
stance (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 5.2 Social Research Paradigms 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p.22) 
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As a result of this division by Burrell and Morgan (1979), four paradigms emerge 
which are radical humanist, radical structuralist, functionalist and interpretive. The 
subjectivist and radical change perspectives are represented by the radical humanist 
paradigm; it seeks to change, potentiate and emancipate the status quo and to defeat 
all barriers facing this emancipation (such as ideology, psychological compulsions, 
power and social constraints) (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). 
 
An opposing ontological position is represented by the radical structuralist paradigm 
which is objectivist in its stance. It aims to attain fundamental change by 
concentrating on organisational structure and it analyses organisational phenomena as 
patterns of conflict and power relationships (Saunders et at, 2007). 
 
Functionalism is the other objectivist dimension and it adopts a regulation 
perspective. The functionalist paradigm offers a clarification of why a particular 
organisational issue arises and provides recommendations set within the structure of 
the organisational situation (Saunders et al., 2007). The clarification reflects the 
individual elements’ interaction with the social system to form an integrated whole 
(Goles and Hirschheim, 2000).  
 
The interpretive paradigm represents the subjectivist and regulation dimensions. It 
seeks to understand and explain the essential meanings of the social world. Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) state that:  
“The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand 
the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social 
world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation 
within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within 
the frame of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer 
of action” (p. 28). 
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According to the interpretive concept, the differences between human beings in their 
roles as social actors should be well understood by researchers. This highlights the 
differences between studying objects and people; the researcher not only interprets 
their own social roles in accordance with the meanings provided by them to these 
roles, but also interprets others’ social roles in accordance with their own set of 
meanings (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
Two intellectual traditions in particular raise Interpretivism, the first being 
phenomenology, which is defined by Bryman (2004) as: 
 “A philosophy that is concerned with the question of how 
individuals make sense of the world around them and how in 
particular the philosopher should bracket out preconceptions in his 
or her grasp of that world” (p.18).  
 
 
Symbolic interactionism is the second intellectual tradition that makes use of 
interpretivism; Saunders et al. (2007) assert that this involves a continual 
interpretation process of the social world around us in that we interpret others’ actions 
with whom we interact and these interpretations lead to the adjustment of our own 
actions and meaning. Saunders et al. (2007) clarify that an interpretivist researcher has 
to adopt an empathetic approach, additionally; the researcher will face serious 
challenges when seeking to enter the social world of the research subjects, and also to 
understand this world from their perspective. 
 
Although the framework of Burrell and Morgan has gained general acceptance among 
social science researchers, there has been some criticism. For instance, Chua (1986) 
suggests that a weakness of Burrell and Morgan's framework occurs due to their 
employment of mutually exclusive dichotomies. She also points to: (i) their 
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misreading of Kuhn as advocating the choice of the irrational paradigm; (ii) the latent 
relativism of reason and truth which their framework supports; and (iii) the dubious 
nature of the differences between the humanist and radical structuralist paradigms. 
 
5.3 Research Methodology and Paradigm  
 
 
The objective of this research is to explore and provide a general understanding of the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks. 
An accountability theory perspective is employed to explore this relationship. 
Nominalism is the ontological position underpinning this research, as reality is treated 
as being constructed through the perceptions of those involved in Saudi-listed banks, 
with interviews and questionnaire survey the methods explored to attain this 
information.  
 
In terms of epistemology, an anti-positivist position is adopted as the research 
assumes that knowledge is based on personal experiences; corporate governance and 
business ethics concepts in Saudi-listed banks are therefore explored by gaining 
insights directly from the individuals involved. As a result, the current study does not 
examine, or attempt to predict, relationships between different variables to understand 
the social phenomena concerned, but attempts instead to achieve direct insights from 
individuals who are involved with banking practices. Consequently, an ideographic 
methodology that emphasises qualitative tools such as interviewing relevant 
participants is adopted. However, questionnaire surveys are also employed in order to 
gain and analyse data from a larger sample of key stakeholder groups that can in turn 
be employed to interpret any similarities or differences in practices that emerge. The 
use of mixed methods such as semi-structured interviews and questionnaire survey 
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can assist in reducing potential bias and enhance the reliability and validity of 
empirical results (Patton, 1990; Denzin, 2009).  
 
As regards human nature, this study explores the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics in banking practices as perceived by real people. 
Accordingly, the current thesis adopts a moderate viewpoint between the voluntarism 
and determinism perspectives of human nature. Finally regarding the nature of 
society, the research adopts regulatory assumptions as this thesis does not attempt to 
challenge or change the status quo, but is concerned instead with understanding the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics. Having outlined the 
methodological positioning of this study, the chapter continues by discussing the 
specific research methods adopted. 
 
5.4 Research Methods 
 
 
In the light of the study’s methodological standpoint and in order to achieve the 
objectives of this research, a mixed methods approach is adopted, making use of both 
qualitative (semi-structured interviews) and quantitative (a questionnaire survey) 
methods for collecting the primary research data. The next subsection will discuss the 
rationale for a mixed-method approach while the following sections discuss the two 
methods in greater detail. 
 
5.4.1 Mixed-Methods Research 
 
 
Beiske (2002) points out that in any modern research of an interpretive nature a large 
number of data collection methods are available. These methods range from 
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observations, interviews and questionnaires through to case studies. Given this thesis 
interpretive approach, it emphasises two data collection methods, semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaires (Beiske, 2002). Although a mixed methods approach in 
a single research study might lead to conflicts between the techniques adopted (Arnon 
and Reichel, 2009), the overall benefit of employing more than one method of data 
collection in the same study is no longer a matter of dispute, but is instead often 
suggested as best practice (Creswell and Clark, 2007). In this context, Gillham (2000) 
argues that the mixed-method approach to research is essential as it provides greater 
authority to the findings, particularly if the results of different methods fit together. 
The combining of different methods has the obvious advantage of technique 
complementation; for instance, the potential depth limitations of questionnaires can be 
addressed appropriately by structured interviews (Beiske, 2002; Saunders et al., 
2007). Additionally, Bryman (1988) claims that a multiple methods approach has the 
propensity to provide a more complete picture of a phenomenon. Semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaires surveys are often employed together to produce 
corroborative results irrespective of differences in data collection methods, analysis 
and interpretation (Harris and Brown, 2010). These benefits have motivated the use of 
mixed methods in prior literature on corporate governance in Saudi Arabia (e.g. Falgi, 
2009) and so a mixed methods approach appears appropriate for this thesis. Having 
outlined the case for the use of more than one research tool, the focus now turns to the 
specifics of those adopted here. 
 
5.4.2 Semi Structured Interviews 
 
 
The current study employs semi-structured interviews as one of the methods of 
gathering empirical evidence on the corporate governance and business ethics 
129 
 
practices of Saudi-listed banks. This method has been employed in order to 
understand the perceptions, knowledge, beliefs and experiences of top level 
employees of Saudi-listed banks. The use of interviews has been argued to be a 
valuable method in gathering relevant and reliable evidence related to research 
questions (Saunders et al., 2007) and is in line with the methodological assumptions 
of this research set out in earlier. Using a qualitative tool such as semi-structured 
interviews is argued to be an effective approach in order to understand complex 
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989) such as the relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks. Other interview methods are structured, 
unstructured and focus group interviews. Interviews, in general, are considered to be a 
useful method to enable the researcher to attain a rich insight into interviewees' 
opinions, biographies, experiences, values, attitudes, aspirations and feelings (May, 
2005). The differences between structured and unstructured types of interviews were 
distilled by May (2005): 
“In moving from the structured interview to the unstructured 
interview, researchers shift from a situation in which they attempt to 
control the interview through predetermining questions and thus 
‘teach’ the respondent to reply in accordance with the interview 
schedule (standardisation), to one in which the respondent is 
encouraged to answer a question in their own terms”. (p. 121). 
 
 
Bryman (2004) described the process of semi-structured interview as: 
“The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee 
has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not 
follow on exactly in the way outlined on schedule. Questions that 
are not included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks 
up on things said by interviewees. But, by and large, all of the 
questions will be asked and a similar wording will be used from 
interviewee to interviewee.” (p. 321). 
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The most appropriate method in keeping with the purpose of this research is semi-
structured interviews. One of the major reasons for choosing semi-structured 
interviews as the primary method in gathering data in this thesis related to the 
method’s flexibility. The flexibility of the interview depends on the extent of freedom 
that the interviewers have to raise questions that are created from the issues being 
considered through the interview, whereas the interview might be inflexible if the 
interviewer strictly had to adhere to an ordered questions format (Kumar, 2005). What 
is more, such style of interview allows the interviewee to answer the questions more 
on his/her own terms than a standardised interview permits, but simultaneously it 
sustains a structure which allows the possibility for comparing and analysing 
interviews (May, 2005). In a semi-structured interview there are a number of specific 
topics and predetermined questions, and all of the interviewees are asked all 
questions, but they have the freedom to go beyond them (Berg, 2007). With semi-
structured interviews the interviewer is allowed to ask new questions which occur 
through the interview and allow the interviewee to digress, providing the interviewees 
with an opportunity to freely express their experience, knowledge and opinions in 
particular topics and offer the opportunity to the interviewer to investigate uncovered 
issues in prearranged questions or to collate rich information in a specific field. 
 
Semi-structured interviews can thus be both comparable and flexible. However, it is 
vital that the method does not lead to a loss of concentration on the core interview 
objective so the interviewer must ensure that all the questions are being covered. 
Consequently, semi-structured interviews are one of the most popular methods for 
qualitative research when looking for detailed, flexible and rich answers, and at the 
same time comparable data (Bryman, 2004). 
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5.4.3 Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
The second method of collecting the primary data was to distribute a questionnaire 
survey. A questionnaire survey is one of the most popular tools for gathering 
information in accounting research (Oppenheim, 1992). Compared with other 
methods, such as interviews, the questionnaire survey method is inexpensive, and can 
provide a wide geographical coverage for the sample of the research (Oppenheim, 
1992). Furthermore, the anonymity allows the respondents to express their opinions 
freely, without feeling concerned about their identity. The questionnaire in this thesis 
employs almost all closed-ended questions in order to avoid some difficulties that are 
related to open-ended questions (Oppenheim, 1992). Kumar (2005) discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of employing closed-ended questions, and mentioned 
that close-ended questions allow the researcher to attain the required information 
since the participants answer specific questions, in addition to the ease of analysis, as 
the responses have already been categorised (Bryman, 2004). The disadvantage of this 
method is that the collected information lacks variety and depth; the findings might 
reflect a research bias by concentrating upon the result in which the researcher is 
interested. What is more, the answers of the respondents may not reflect their true 
opinions since they follow specific choices by ticking answers that might lead to them 
ticking categories without considering the issues in any great depth (Bryman, 2004). 
 
In contrast, open-ended questionnaires have disadvantages including being more 
difficult to answer and analyse, therefore reducing the response rate and consuming 
researcher time (Oppenheim, 1992). Using open-ended questionnaires may therefore 
negatively affect the desire to explore the views of a wide sample, in this case of key 
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stakeholders in Saudi-listed banks. Given these issues and the benefits of closed-
ended questionnaires discussed above the present study employs the latter.  
 
According to Bryman (2004) there are four ways of applying questionnaires: (i) a self-
completion questionnaire survey that allows the participants to answer the questions 
by themselves; (ii) a questionnaire survey by telephone whereby the participants are 
asked to provide their answers over the telephone; (iii) a face-to-face questionnaire 
which requires the researcher to be with the respondents when they answer the 
questionnaire to assist them with any explanations about the questions; and, (iv) 
finally, online questionnaire surveys (Bryman, 2004; Wright, 2005). For the purpose 
of this study, an online questionnaire survey has been adopted. This type of 
questionnaire has many advantages, such as the ability of the Internet to provide 
access to individuals and groups who would be difficult, if not impossible, to reach 
via other methods (Wellman, 1997). Also, these individuals and groups can often be 
reached on the Internet in larger numbers than would be possible if using face-to-face 
research methods (Wright, 2005). A second advantage is that online surveys might 
save the researcher some time. As noted above, online surveys allow researchers to 
reach a large number of people with common characteristics in a short amount of 
time, despite being separated in all probability by a large geographical distance 
(Garton et al., 1999). Applying an online questionnaire survey method allows 
researchers to quickly gain access to large numbers of individuals by posting 
invitations to participate in chat rooms, newsgroups, and message board communities 
(Wright, 2005). Using a face-to-face research method would take far longer - if it was 
possible at all - to reach a sufficient number of people with specific attitudes, 
interests, and attributes in the same location (Wright, 2005). Furthermore, online 
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surveys may also save time by allowing researchers to gather data while the 
participants work on other tasks (Llieva et al., 2002). Once an invitation to participate 
in a survey has been mailed to the community website of interest, emailed to 
individuals through a listserv service, or distributed through an online survey research 
service, the researcher might gather data while working on other projects (Andrews et 
al., 2003). Responses to online surveys can be referred to the researcher directly 
through an email, or posted to a database file or HTML document. This allows the 
researcher to conduct primary analyses on the gathered data while waiting for the 
intended number of responses to accumulate (Llieva et al., 2002). Previously, online 
survey researchers often employed email-based surveys, which required the creation 
of online survey forms using Word software, and later used software such as 
Macromedia's Dreamweaver. Researchers had to transfer the responses from the email 
or Word software into statistical software programs, such as SPSS and SAS. 
Currently, online survey creation software packages provide a variety of templates to 
implement online surveys more easily, and also to export data into statistical software 
packages (Llieva et al., 2002). In addition to the previous advantages, online survey 
researchers can save money by moving from a paper format to an electronic medium 
(Couper, 2000; and Llieva et al., 2002). Paper surveys tend to be costly, even when 
using a small sample, and the cost of traditional large-scale surveys using mailed 
questionnaires can be huge. Employing online surveys circumvents this issue by 
eliminating the need for different costs, such as paper, printing, postage and data entry 
costs (Llieva et al., 2002). The costs of the newer online survey software and web 
services can vary from very little to thousands of dollars depending on the features’ 
types and services selected; however, this is relatively inexpensive compared to the 
traditional paper surveys (Wright, 2005). 
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As discussed above, online surveys offer many advantages over traditional ones. 
However, there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged by researchers who 
use an online survey methodology. For instance, some researchers access potential 
participants by posting invitations to participate in a survey on discussion groups and 
chat rooms. However, members of online communities often find this behaviour 
offensive (Andrews et al., 2003). Researchers sending invitations by email to 
participate might face a similar reaction. An unwanted email advertisement is often 
considered an invasion of privacy, so, the invitation might be deleted, or the 
researcher may receive email from participants complaining about it. In this case, 
researchers might apologise in advance for the potentially unwanted posting, with an 
explanation of the importance of conducting the research and possible benefits to 
participants (Andrews et al., 2003). It is important for researchers to include contact 
information, information about the study, and something about their credentials when 
creating an invitation to participate in a survey; this helps to enhance the credibility of 
the survey and can create opportunities for email interaction between the researcher 
and participants (Wright, 2005). 
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the researcher decided to employ an online survey as 
well as using broader social networks as this permits reaching as wide a sample as 
possible and facilitates the dissemination of questionnaires to the participants. 
    
5.5 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodological assumptions guiding this research. 
While there are several methodological approaches available to social science 
research, the current study adopts an interpretive paradigm and considers the basic 
135 
 
assumptions related to that choice. The interpretive paradigm builds a conceptual 
framework including specific ontological, epistemological, human nature and 
methodological assumptions that, in the present case, allow corporate governance and 
business ethics to be explored in a meaningful way; this approach directly reflects the 
theoretical framework of the current study outlined in the chapter 4. As the study 
explores the perceptions of key stakeholders regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks, semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaires surveys are the data collection methods used to address 
the research question. Having discussed the context of the research in terms of the 
extant literature, theory and methodology, the empirical work is now presented, 
starting in the next chapter with the interview results, followed by the questionnaire 
findings in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 6: Interviews 
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Interviews 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 
The first five chapters of this thesis provided some context for the research. They 
focused on providing an overview of the banking environment in Saudi Arabia, 
explored the extant literature on the issues explored here and summarised the 
theoretical and methodological underpinning of this thesis.  
   
In order to collect primary data, semi-structured interviews have been adopted in this 
thesis as the first research method. This method seeks to investigate the views of 
Saudi-listed banks regarding corporate governance and business ethics in the context 
of accountability both in general and in an Islamic context. The chapter summarises 
the key matters discussed and presents the results generated from 17 interviews that 
were conducted with Saudi banks between March and June 2012. The remainder of 
the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the interview 
method adopted and describes the data collection process. The results are discussed in 
Section 6.3 and after. This discussion will concentrate upon the most relevant issues 
relating to corporate governance and business ethics in the modern Saudi banking 
sector. Accountability will provide the theoretical lens to frame this discussion. 
 
6.2. Interview Survey Method 
 
 
In order to study the relationship between corporate governance and business ethics 
within Saudi Arabian banks, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with key bank employees such as board members, managers and compliance officers. 
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Since this method is expected to allow these interviewees to freely express their 
opinions, experiences, and attitudes with regard to the topic under discussion, an 
interview guide was created to underpin the conversations, but which still allowed 
interviewees to discuss pertinent matters not explicitly covered in the guide. 
Employing this type of semi-structured approach therefore provides flexibility in 
terms of allowing the interviewees to emphasise points of specific interest. For the 
purpose of this study, the researcher developed an interview guide which addressed a 
list of key topics; each of these contained specific questions to be covered during the 
interviews. The topics and questions were primarily generated from the literature on 
corporate governance and business ethics, as well as studies of accountability and 
accountability from an Islamic perspective. This approach reflects the aim of covering 
the most significant issues related to corporate governance and business ethics in 
Saudi Arabian banks, using accountability as a theoretical framework since there is a 
lack of resources in this field both in the published academic literature and official 
reports. The interview guide covers four main areas: (i) corporate governance; (ii) 
business ethics; (iii) accountability; and (iv) accountability from an Islamic 
perspective, as well as the inter-relationships amongst these notions. As a result of the 
similarities between the interviewees’ roles, one interview guide was designed and 
used for all discussions.   
 
6.2.1 Sample Selection 
 
 
In order to explore the relationship between corporate governance and business ethics 
in Saudi Arabian Banks, interviews have conducted with 17 employees from the 11 
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banks listed on the Saudi Stock Market. Table 6.1 summarises the interviewees’ 
details34. 
 
Table 6.1: Categories of Interviews     
Note: This table provides an overview of the interviewees. All of them were male. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 All of the interviewees were male. There are a few women working in roles that would have 
suggested knowledge of corporate governance issues, but the researcher had no access to them.  
Banks Type Code Role City 
1 Conventional 
A1 Board Member Al-Ahsa 
A2 Senior Executive Vice President Riyadh 
2 Conventional 
B1 Board Member Al-Ahsa 
B2 Chief Compliance Officer Riyadh 
3 Conventional C1 General Manager - Legal & 
Corporate Secretary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Riyadh 
4 Conventional 
D1 Board Member Riyadh 
D2 Chief Compliance Officer Riyadh 
5 Conventional  
E1 Board Member Riyadh 
E2 Chief Compliance Officer Riyadh 
6 Conventional F1 Board Member Riyadh 
7 Conventional G1 General Manager Riyadh 
8 Islamic H1 General Manager Riyadh 
9 Islamic 
I1 Head of Legal Affairs Division &  
Corporate Secretary 
Riyadh 
I2 Consultation Department 
Manager 
Riyadh 
10 Islamic 
J1 Chairman Riyadh 
J2 Legal Group Head & Corporate 
Secretary 
Riyadh 
11 Islamic K1 Chief Compliance Officer Riyadh 
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6.2.2 Conducting the Interviews 
 
 
Twenty-two questions were used as a guide for the semi-structured interviews. These 
questions were based on recurrent themes in the extant literature and covered four 
areas, namely: (i) corporate governance; (ii) business ethics; (iii) accountability and 
(iv) accountability from an Islamic perspective35. The selection of these areas reflects 
the research questions outlined at the start of the thesis i.e. which explore 
understanding of the corporate governance notion, how this relates to the business 
ethics concept and the role of accountability, including Islamic accountability, in this 
context. After piloting the interview guide with PhD students and academics at the 
University of Dundee, the interview guide was translated into Arabic by the 
researcher36. The translated version was then piloted with PhD students at the School 
of Business in the University of Dundee whose first language was Arabic. Seventeen 
face-to-face interviews were conducted between 10th of March 2012 and 10th of June 
2012 in two major cities in Saudi Arabia: Riyadh (the capital) and Al-Ahsa (the 
researcher’s home city and the largest city in eastern Saudi Arabia)37. The majority of 
the interviews (fifteen) were conducted in Riyadh, while the other two were 
conducted in Al-Ahsa. Since Saudi Arabia is a sprawling country, the researcher had 
to travel many times from his city to Riyadh to conduct the interviews either by car or 
train, which was both time consuming and expensive. The researcher has long-
standing connections in the banking sector in Saudi Arabia and relied on these to 
establish primary contact with the interviewees; once established, the connections led 
to introductions with other qualified participants38. However, even with the good 
                                                 
35 These themes correspond to the sections included in Chapter 3. 
36 Appendices 6.1 provides a copy of the guide. 
37 See Table 6.1 for details.   
38 Establishing connections in this manner (‘Snowballing’) is quite common in accounting and finance 
research, particularly in developing countries like Saudi Arabia (Al-Harkan, 2005; Falgi, 2009). 
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connections, there were some difficulties in reaching particular interviewees.  Twelve 
of the interviewees preferred to meet at their bank while the five board members 
asked to meet at their own companies. Significantly, the interviews conducted in the 
banks were more comfortable, in-depth and detailed, while the interviews conducted 
with the board members in their private companies were short with their phones 
interrupting the interviews on a regular basis. All of the interviewes lasted between an 
hour and an hour and a half; before the commencement of each, the researcher 
highlighted the nature and purpose of the study and the interviewees were asked 
whether they were happy to grant their permission for the interview to be recorded. 
All of the interviewees agreed, although one of the board members asked for the 
recording to then be deleted for privacy purposes; however, as was the case at all 
interviews, detailed notes were also taken.  
 
The transcription of the interviews was undertaken immediately after returning from 
the empirical fieldtrip. Fifteen of the interviews had to be translated into English39, 
since these were conducted in Arabic, while the other two interviews were conducted 
in English. For analysis purposes, the researcher created a table under each question 
using Microsoft Word. The question was placed at the top of the table, which itself 
consisted of three columns for numbers, banks and answers, and 17 rows for the 
interviewees. This technique allowed the researcher to compare responses easily. In 
order to report the results, themes were developed from an analysis of the key 
literature. 
 
                                                 
39 The researcher translated the interviews into English and checked the results with some other PhD 
students who were fluent in Arabic.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.3 reports the results 
regarding corporate governance within Saudi banks while Section 6.4 deals with 
business ethics in Saudi banks and their relation with the corporate governance notion. 
Section 6.5 places accountability and its relation with corporate governance and 
dealing ethically at the centre of the analysis, before Section 6.6 concludes.   
 
6.3 Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
In order to examine the nature of corporate governance in Saudi Arabian banks, the 
interviewees were first asked about its definition, and also for their opinions regarding 
compliance with and achievement of high standards in corporate governance. 
6.3.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
 
 
There was a widely-held belief amongst the interviewees that corporate governance is 
an important concept, not just in banks but also in the financial sector in general. 
However, they held a variety of viewpoints regarding the manner and timing of the 
emergence of the notion in Saudi’s financial environment. For instance, the head of 
the legal affairs division and corporate secretary of an Islamic bank (I1) stated that: 
“Corporate governance is a new concept in the financial 
environment in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the issue of the 
separation of management from ownership was not common before 
the establishment of the corporate governance code by the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) in 2006”.    
 
 
Also, a consultation department manager of an Islamic bank (I2) added that, following 
the establishment of this code in 2006, people had a better understanding of corporate 
governance, and widespread awareness emerged from this point. On the other hand, 
some interviewees argued that the term ‘corporate governance’ predated the CMA 
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code, and each bank had its own version that detailed its relationship with its 
stakeholders. A senior executive vice-president of a conventional bank (A2) clarified 
this point as follows: 
“Corporate governance has existed in Saudi’s financial sector for a 
long time through the Saudi corporate system issued in 1965, but 
now corporate governance is collected, organised and detailed in a 
special code”.   
 
 
The interviewees suggested various definitions of ‘corporate governance’. Some 
interviewees expressed a broad view of corporate governance emphasising morality. 
For example, one board member of a conventional bank (B1) stated that: 
“Corporate governance means integrity and honesty in all activities 
in the bank”. 
 
 
While most of the interviewees defined corporate governance as the principles that 
organise and control the institution - and lead it to take ‘appropriate’ decisions - 
considerable conflict was evident between the stakeholder view and the shareholder 
view in some of the interviewees’ answers. From a stakeholder viewpoint, a chief 
compliance officer of a conventional bank (E2) provided the following definition:  
“Corporate governance is a comprehensive concept that not only 
separates management from ownership, but also means that the bank 
instructs the work in the interest of all stakeholders”. 
 
 
While interviewee (A2) stated that: 
“Corporate governance means responsible management and also 
balancing the requirements of the institution in line with the ethical 
foundations as well as the accountability of the institution towards 
all of its stakeholders”. 
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In contrast, from a shareholder viewpoint, a chief compliance officer of an Islamic 
bank (K1) stated that: 
“Corporate governance deals primarily with the principles that 
control the relationship between the institution and its shareholders”. 
 
 
According to the interviewees’ definitions, understanding of the related notion of 
accountability appears to be lacking, which gives the impression that it is absent. 
However, the stress on the consideration of shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests 
by most of interviewees in their definitions reflects some engagement with the 
principle of accountability. This consideration of accountability is in line with the role 
of accountability evident in most definitions of corporate governance offered in the 
extant literature. Elkelish (2007) argues that some variant of accountability is key in 
all definitions of corporate governance, although a difference exists between them 
relating to whom the accountability is due; some restrict accountability to the 
shareholders, while others adopt a wider standpoint, comprising all stakeholders 
(Elkelish, 2007). Accountability definitions are examined in more detail in Section 
6.5.   
      
6.3.2 Compliance and Corporate Governance Development 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a compulsory code for corporate governance was issued 
by the CMA in 2006 and all Saudi-listed companies including banks are required to 
implement this code or disclose if they do not.  
 
All of the interviewees acknowledged the importance of corporate governance for 
Saudi banks, and suggested that it played a key role in accountability. However, 
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significantly, they disagreed about the sufficiency of the code for banks. The majority 
of the interviewees (eleven out of the seventeen) believed that this code was sufficient 
for the banks and can provide a healthy environment for business. Specifically, a 
chief compliance officer of an Islamic bank, K1, suggested that the corporate 
governance code is strong, above all with regard to disclosure. The reason for this 
power was explained by a board member of a conventional bank (A1): 
“The code of corporate governance is more than sufficient. The 
monitoring and controlling by the CMA provides the code with the 
power and this concern by the CMA enhances the effectiveness of 
the code”.          
 
In contrast, the remaining six interviewees indicated that this code was insufficient. 
They argued that it has a role to play as a foundation document, but requires more 
detail to promote appropriate behaviour and accountability from the bank and in the 
financial sector in general. For example, the legal group head and corporate secretary 
of an Islamic bank (J2) asserted that: 
“No doubt, the corporate governance code is insufficient, but it is 
developing gradually. We have comments on some articles of it and, 
if we want to improve our behaviour and be more accountable to our 
stakeholders, we have to place our own details in this code and that 
is exactly what we do. The code needs to be more detailed in order 
to narrow down the different explanations because the generalities 
weaken the code”.      
 
 
Interestingly, a chief compliance officer of a conventional bank, B2, differentiated 
between rules and principles, stressing that the corporate governance code involved 
only the former; he stated that: 
“[A] Corporate governance code is insufficient unless it is part of 
corporate culture, and there is a problem with the current code 
which is based on rules not principles. If it is based on principles 
there will be a detailed explanation on how to achieve them”.          
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It was therefore evident that the interviewees had concerns about the suitability of the 
code as it stands. This issue which will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
The interviewees were questioned about the most important corporate governance 
issues for their banks and provided a variety of answers. Four of the interviewees 
stated that transparency was the most important issue for their institution. However, 
there was a difference between their answers regarding ‘transparency to whom’. For 
instance, interviewee B1 stated that the most important corporate governance issue 
for his bank was transparency towards its investors, whereas interviewee E2 pointed 
out that his bank saw transparency primarily being geared to regulators. Five other 
interviewees suggested that the other key corporate governance issue they focused on 
related to disclosure. Here, the general manager and corporate legal secretary of a 
conventional bank (C1) indicated that the reason for this was that disclosure is a 
continuing obligation and the bank therefore needs to deal with it throughout the year. 
Similarly, a chief compliance officer of an Islamic bank, K1, clarified that: 
“There is a concentration upon disclosure because of the bank’s 
belief that this is a fundamental standard and related to all of its 
actions”. 
 
 
The remaining interviewees were fairly non-committal, seeing various matters 
relating to corporate governance as equally important and emphasising that they dealt 
with these in a broadly similar way. Interviewee A2, a senior executive vice-
president, argued that: 
“In general, all of the articles of the corporate governance code are 
important; however, there is a difference between banks regarding 
which article is more important than others. Our bank treats the 
articles in a balanced manner and most of them are implemented by 
our bank before they become compulsory”.              
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Interviewee B2 agreed with this statement and, interestingly, highlighted this issue 
from an accountability perspective by distinguishing between banks’ purposes; he 
stated that: 
“Determining which articles of the corporate governance code are 
more important than others depends on the purpose of the bank. If 
the bank is working to maximise profit only, it will concentrate on 
articles at different levels which means a narrow accountability 
view. On the other hand, if the bank is working to be an effective 
and positive part of society, it will treat the articles at the same level. 
Because our bank feels accountable to the whole of society, it treats 
the code’s articles at the same level”.    
    
After this clarification about how important corporate governance is for these banks, 
the interviewees were asked how they meet the requirements of the corporate 
governance code. A number of different methods were employed by the banks to 
achieve these requirements and, unfortunately, there is no official or even suggested 
guidance from the CMA40 that can be followed by the banks.  
 
The majority of the participants indicated that the code of corporate governance was 
distributed across several departments, each of which supervised articles related to its 
concerns. In this context, Interviewee A2 claimed that: 
“The bank adopts the code of corporate governance from the highest 
authority in the bank, which is the board of directors, to the lowest 
level, and plants the importance of corporate governance in the 
hearts of the employees. The bank believes that, to have strong 
corporate governance, the articles should be distributed among 
specific departments, such as the board of directors, audit committee 
and executive management”. 
 
 
                                                 
40 The CMA code consists of articles, but does not provide listed companies with clarification 
regarding how to achieve the desired outcomes.    
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Interviewee E2 shared this perspective, but added that after distributing the articles 
across departments, they need to be supervised carefully by one of the latter. In his 
bank, the person responsible for all of the articles was the secretary of the board, 
whereas interviewee I1 stated that his compliance department was more effective in 
their supervision role than was the secretary of the board. While a general manager of 
a conventional bank, G1, believed that it is impossible for anyone department to 
supervise all the governance articles because of differences between them, six of the 
seventeen interviewees stated that the compliance department was solely responsible 
for overseeing fulfilment of the requirements of the corporate governance code. For 
example, a board member of a conventional bank, D1, stated that: 
“To have clear and comprehensive reports regarding the corporate 
governance code and to achieve the requirements of it through a 
clear path, one department should be responsible for this; the most 
related department to corporate governance issues is the compliance 
department”.          
 
 
Significantly, at the other end of spectrum, a general manager, and legal and corporate 
secretary of a conventional bank, C1, indicated that: 
“We undertake several actions to ensure that our bank meets the 
requirements of the corporate governance code, and the most 
effective action that we do is to provide an external consultant to 
monitor our path to achieving these requirements. This idea 
translates our belief that, to gain better results from our corporate 
governance code and to meet the interests of our stakeholders at all 
levels, the bank needs to monitor corporate governance issues by 
various methods”. 
 
 
This sort of statement creates the impression that the bank concerned feels 
accountable to stakeholders other than its owners. In this context, the benefits that the 
bank receives from external consultations are seen as more useful than internal ones.  
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In summary, this section has provided evidence regarding the interviewees’ 
understanding and interest in the issue of corporate governance and its role within 
their banks. This is essential in understanding the role that these matters play in a 
Saudi context and provides a framework for contextualising matters relating to 
business ethics that are explored later in the chapter.  
 
6.4 Business Ethics in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
The next part of the interviews discussed business ethics issues in the context of Saudi 
Arabian banks, highlighting the impact of the notion on practice and its relationship 
with corporate governance principles. The narrative in this section follows a similar 
structure to that used in section 6.3 focusing on detailing definitions of business ethics 
followed by describing its impact on practices, before linking business ethics to 
corporate governance. 
 
6.4.1 Defining and Understanding Business Ethics 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Bucheery (2001) defines business ethics as: 
“The application of theories of right and wrong to activity within 
and between commercial enterprises, and between commercial 
enterprises and their broader environment” (p. 9).    
 
 
Similarly, Sullivan (2008) argues that business ethics should be viewed as a set of 
values and principles by which a company identifies the nature of its mission and 
operations, influencing the behaviour of its board of directors, management and 
employees at all levels. It is about leadership’s commitment to adapting and 
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embodying the ethical values of the company in all of its decisions and operations. In 
the present study, half of the interviewees described business ethics along the lines of 
a set of standards or principles aimed at controlling employees’ behaviour and guiding 
company performance. For instance, interviewee I2 defined business ethics straight-
forwardly as: 
“A set of principles that describe how employees have to behave 
towards others whether inside or outside the company”.    
 
Specifically stressing the importance of accountability towards all stakeholders, 
interviewee K1 identified business ethics as: 
“Ethical principles that guide the bank to operate in the interest of 
all stakeholders, including the environment. We attempt to make 
these principles part of the culture of the bank. We present this bank 
as an Islamic bank so the bank has to adopt Islamic teachings which 
encourage us to have an ethical manner in all our life actions, 
including business”. 
   
This line of argument is in keeping with the Islamic perspective outlined by Abu-
Tapanjeh (2009) who explains that Islamic teachings relate directly to all aspects of 
life, including how to conduct commerce and trade. In particular, business in Islam 
must be operated in accordance with Sharia values and rules, e.g., to be honest, fair 
and just towards others (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009).  
 
As interviewee I1 noted, there is no official code for business ethics in Saudi Arabia, 
even for banks and other financial institutions. However, he suggested that if a bank 
wants to survive it needs to operate ethically towards others to protect and improve its 
reputation. This view is in keeping with the analysis of Joyner and Payne (2002) 
presented in Chapter 3, who pointed out a ‘basic truth’ that business cannot survive 
without society and that society cannot progress without business. Here, the 
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interviewees appeared convinced that business must acknowledge the existence of 
society, and the growth of society requires the implementation of more ethically 
responsible business practices. 
 
Holme (2008) observed that investors often decide whether or not to invest according 
to the organisation’s reputation for ethical behaviour in society. In line with this 
statement, a chief compliance officer of a conventional bank, interviewee D2, 
asserted that: 
“Business ethics are like the soul of our business and, without this 
soul, the bank loses its reputation; without a reputation, the bank 
loses everything”.  
 
Other interviewees viewed business ethics as being related to employees’ behaviour. 
For example, interviewee E2 stated that: 
“The most important issue for the bank is others’ confidence and, to 
protect and improve this confidence, the bank is required to deal 
ethically towards all of its stakeholders. As a result of feeling 
accountable to all of the stakeholders, the bank has introduced a 
detailed ethical code to meet this purpose”. 
 
The interviewees emphasised that ethical treatment of employees is a duty of 
corporations. This view is in line with the arguments of Ouchi (1981) and Ghosh et 
al. (2011) who suggest that profits are the reward for firms that treat employees well, 
provide genuine value to customers and behave responsibly as a corporate citizen. 
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6.4.2 The Impact of Business Ethics on Bank Practices 
  
There was widespread agreement among the interviewees that business ethics are an 
important determinant of a bank’s financial success. Consistent with this perception, 
each bank has its own compulsory ethical code that controls employees’ behaviour 
and which is aimed at enhancing clients’ confidence. Interviewee B2 confirmed that 
his bank had a compulsory ethical code, which the employees had to sign each year 
confirming that they have read it.  
 
The majority of the interviewees argued that their existing ethical code was sufficient 
but needed to be better monitored. However, four of those who took part indicated 
that their ethical code was incomplete. For example, the chairman of an Islamic bank, 
interviewee J1, stated that: 
“The bank has its own ethical code and this code is insufficient. It is 
good as a starting point but is not complete, so it needs to be audited 
and completed to place the bank at a high level of accountability 
towards its stakeholders”.  
 
 Another senior employee of this bank, (J2), argued similarly that: 
“The ethical code in the bank is insufficient even if it is 
comprehensive; the day will come when an employee can find a 
way to get round this code. So, the bank needs to strengthen 
individual values”.   
 
This view conflicts with that of Solomon (1997), who claimed that the culture of 
corporations is, given the enormous power of peer pressure in ethics, to set up a 
network of people and positions which helps shape the culture of the corporation by 
acting as the primary determinant of business ethics; individual values would 
therefore play less of a role.   
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As mentioned in the literature review, unethical behaviour is widely acknowledged as 
being costly for firms. In particular, employees’ and investors’ motivation to work 
hard and invest respectively will be enhanced as a result of good ethical practices 
(Stodder, 1998; Conroy and Emerson, 2004). However, Joyner and Payne (2002) 
argue that many businesses will engage in ethical practices simply because of a desire 
to do “the right thing”; many people who work in business also recognise their 
existence in a broader societal sense and acknowledge that their corporations must 
also perform in an appropriate manner (Joyner and Payne, 2002). 
 
In line with these agreements, there was a widespread belief among the interviewees 
that business ethics have a significant impact upon banks’ practices. The majority of 
the interviewees specifically acknowledged the influence of ethical matters on their 
banks’ practices; for instance, interviewee J2 stated that: 
“There is a significant impact of business ethics on the bank’s daily 
practices and the bank measures this impact by the policy of reward 
and punishment which ensures that employees remain committed to 
business ethics”. 
  
Interviewee B2 provided an example of such an impact where a client signs a contract 
with the bank. In this case the employee is not required by law to explain each point 
in the contract to the client, but the bank ensures its employees deal ethically by 
explaining each point of the contract to the clients. Such behaviour indicates a high 
level of accountability because of the intent to prevent any misunderstanding that may 
harm clients’ interests (Stewart, 1984). 
 
Moreover interviewee H1, the general manager of an Islamic bank, pointed out that, if 
the leaders of a bank are committed to ethical behaviour and practices, other 
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employees will, consequently, be more motivated. In line with this view, Smith 
(1997) argues that there is a widely-shared view that the leaders of corporations 
should actually lead, including speaking out more often on ethical matters and 
making appropriate pronouncements that take current priorities in the wider 
community and trends therein into account. Further, directors are expected to set an 
example to others by upholding the highest personal standards in terms of their 
conduct, giving priority to human values. However, three out of seventeen of the 
interviewees observed that, in practice, the impact of business ethics in their 
institutions is insufficient, and requires more improvement and monitoring. For 
example, interviewee D2 stated that: 
“We believe that there is an impact of business ethics and the bank 
offers courses on business ethics for its employees, but the 
practices are still insufficient”.   
 
 
A related issue involving the autonomy of individuals was raised by interviewee A2, 
a senior executive vice-president, who argued that: 
“There is an impact of business ethics on the bank’s practices, but 
this impact must be through a strong and comprehensive ethical 
code, not through society or individuals’ culture. The bank is not 
working in an angelic society. The behaviour of people is not 
symmetric and their practice of principles is different, so there must 
be an ethical code which controls employees’ behaviour”.                    
      
 
However, this statement raises an issue presented by interviewee I1: 
“Essentially, business ethics arise from individuals, whatever 
regulations the bank imposes to govern individuals’ behaviour. They 
will be governed inside the bank and continue their original 
behaviour outside the bank, which weakens the impact of the ethical 
code”.    
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6.4.3 Corporate Governance and Business Ethics 
 
 
As indicated in the literature, there is a widespread awareness of the need for reform 
in many areas of business activity, especially in the sphere of corporate governance 
(Smith, 1997). However, Bonn and Fisher (2005) claim that the indicators of success 
should not just be extensions of the financial reporting system of the organisation, but 
must also include non-financial measures such as community perceptions and the 
reputation of the organisation. In this context, the corporate governance notion not 
only relates to the system of institutions that govern and control the relationship 
between creditors, owners, investors and managers, but also operates as an incentive 
for reform in ethical practices including the operation of legal and regulatory 
frameworks (Potts and Matuszewski, 2004). 
 
Accordingly, the participants were questioned about the relationship between 
corporate governance and business ethics. While two out of the seventeen 
interviewees suggested that corporate governance and business ethics should be 
governed by two different set of regulations - even if they have the common purpose 
of “strong” and “proper” business - the majority admitted that there is a strong link 
between the notions, albeit with differences regarding how the relationship manifests 
itself. Seven of the participants believed that there is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and business ethics that results in a positive impact upon a 
bank’s practices. Despite the agreement that business ethics is a key issue in corporate 
governance as mentioned earlier, interviewee J2 noted that there is no ethical code 
included in his institution’s corporate governance code. To be accountable, an 
institution requires its own ethical code and more detail means more accountability if 
there is an effective monitoring system (Tricker, 1984). To emphasise the impact such 
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as omission might have on corporate governance outcomes, a senior executive vice-
president of a conventional bank, A2, stated that: 
“Corporate governance and business ethics cannot be separated 
from each other and there is no governance without business ethics. 
Business ethics must be a compulsory part of the corporate 
governance code”. 
 
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Bonn and Fisher (2005) suggest that while an 
organisation’s approach to ethics must be addressed within the framework of 
corporate governance, this is just the first step if the entity concerned is interested in 
seeing more effective governance principles and practices emerge41.  
 
The issue of the costs of ethical behaviour was raised by interviewee K1, a chief 
compliance officer, who indicated that: 
“Corporate governance is more comprehensive than business ethics, 
but an effective corporate governance code will influence ethical 
performance. There is a wide belief that concern about ethical 
aspects is costing the corporation. However, this bank believes that 
while there is a cost of ethical behaviour we also believe that the 
bank is operating for the long-term which means that the cost is 
effective”. 
 
 
In contrast to the view that good governance will lead to improved ethical 
performance, two of interviewees suggested that the notion of business ethics is 
broader than corporate governance because it is related to all of the bank’s actions. 
For instance, interviewee G1 asserted that: 
                                                 
41Bonn and Fisher argue further that measures must be applied to ensure that the behaviour of the 
organisation is consistent with the ethical values adopted in the codes of conduct for all levels of the 
organisation (Bonn and Fisher, 2005).  
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“Corporate governance is a tool of business ethics and, to have 
sufficient business ethics, the bank must employ a sufficient code of 
corporate governance”.      
   
 
Other interviewees argued that business ethics relates to ‘how’ to perform corporate 
governance practices. Here, interviewee J1 stated that: 
“Corporate governance represents the procedure side and business 
ethics represents the performance method, so they are two sides of 
the same coin”. 
  
 
Interestingly, according to interviewee A1, the corporate governance code in Saudi 
Arabia is sufficient to ensure that the bank behaves ethically and no specific ethical 
code is needed. However, this interviewee expressed the opinion that the bank needs 
to reduce its commitments and paperwork as much as possible, suggesting that board 
members such as himself do not feel accountable towards other parties. In most 
formulations of ‘best’ governance practices, board members and managers are 
required to understand, encourage and communicate business ethics (Holme, 2008). 
Whilst the evidence here suggests room for Saudi practices, most of the rest of the 
interviewees emphasised that a code of corporate governance is insufficient to make a 
bank behave ethically and there needs to be a detailed ethical code in place as well as 
a sense of accountability within the bank. In this context interviewee B2 stated that: 
“No doubt, the corporate governance code is a foundation and 
supportive tool of ethical behaviour, but it is not sufficient”. 
 
 
The general manager of an Islamic bank, interviewee H1, believed that while the code 
of corporate governance is adequate for ensuring justice among the bank’s 
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stakeholders, a specific ethical code is also required. Similarly, interviewee G1 
asserted that: 
“The code of corporate governance is insufficient to employ ethical 
behaviour even if it covers the conflict of interest among the bank’s 
parties, which is the most important ethical aspect”. 
          
 
Most of the interviewees suggested that the bank’s stakeholders, including society as 
a whole, are related parties and that social responsibility more broadly is a feature of 
ethical dealing. These arguments are consistent with those of Ghosh et al. (2011), 
who argue that profits and social responsibility can be combined, and that ethics and 
profits are not inimical to each other. Ghosh et al. further contend that, at times, it 
may appear that an individual’s optimum choice conflicts with the social optimum, 
with the ends seeming to be mutually exclusive. In the case of conflict between these 
two objectives, one optimum has to be picked up in preference to the other, if the 
maximum good of the many is considered better than the maximum good of the one, 
the superior choice must be the maximum benefit to the many (Ghosh et al., 2011). 
 
Although nine of the participants stressed that banks must ensure ethical dealing with 
all stakeholders to maintain the trust that leads ultimately to financial success, two of 
the participants demonstrated a potential difficulty in this regard. In particular, 
interviewee I1 asserted that: 
“All interested and related parties are stakeholders of the bank, and 
social responsibility is linked to business ethics since there is no rule 
forcing corporations to contribute to society. Obviously, there is no 
corporation, including this bank, that carries out its social 
responsibilities sufficiently and, no doubt, this is a defect and major 
weakness in ethical behaviour”. 
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Four of the interviewees had very specific views regarding the identity of a bank’s 
stakeholders. For instance interviewee H1, a general manager in a bank in Riyadh, 
adopted a managerialist perspective when he asserted that the first and most important 
group of bank stakeholders is the clients (be these major or minor). The second group 
is the employees, the third is the shareholders and the fourth is society. In his view, 
the bank should deal ‘ethically’ with all of these groups. In contrast, interviewee J2 
indicated that: 
“All related groups are stakeholders for the bank, including society; 
however, the bank concentrates upon investor interests over those of 
other parties. The bank reviews its relationship with all of its 
stakeholders through the issues that arise from time to time to ensure 
a high level of ethical dealing”. 
  
    
Interestingly, interviewee D1 and interviewee D2, from the same bank, provided 
conflicting views regarding the definition and understanding of stakeholder groups. 
For interviewee D1, the most important concern of the bank should be maximising 
shareholders’ profits, although he viewed dealing ethically as a key tool to achieve 
this objective. In contrast, interviewee D2, the bank’s chief compliance officer, 
claimed that all interested and related parties, including society, are stakeholders and 
the bank needs to deal with them all in a balanced manner. However, this interviewee 
highlighted that in this regard in practice: 
“The services and concern provided by all of the banks in Saudi 
Arabia are extremely weak and not commensurate with their profits, 
and no rules assist and enhance this aspect”. 
      
 
Other intra-bank conflict arose with a board member of a conventional bank, E1, 
characterising related parties as all bank stakeholders, whereas that same bank’s chief 
160 
 
compliance officer, E2, argued that the shareholder group is most important with 
employees and clients in a second supplementary group.  
 
Conflicts between views of the interviewees in the same bank regarding such 
significant issues suggest that if banks in Saudi Arabia are to achieve meaningful 
levels of accountability, they must be required to clarify the relative importance of 
stakeholders to its employees and explain how each group interacts with the 
organisation.      
  
6.5 Accountability in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
The definition and understanding of accountability in Saudi Arabian banks and the 
relationship between accountability and acting in an ethical manner were the next 
issues explored. The role of Sharia and issues related to it - including the Islamic 
concept of accountability - were also investigated to assist in understanding the 
framework underpinning corporate accountability in the Kingdom.  
 
6.5.1 Defining and Understanding Accountability  
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the notion of accountability is usually stated in terms of 
the responsible party being required to provide an account to interested parties (Perks, 
1993). 
 
In line with this thinking, there was widespread agreement among the participants 
here about the definition of accountability, which they generally viewed as meaning 
that banks and their employees have specific obligations and responsibilities and that 
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those concerned are accountable for their actions in these contexts. For instance, 
interviewee D2, a chief compliance officer, stated that: 
“Accountability means that each individual has duties and 
responsibilities, and they are accountable for their actions. To ensure 
this, the responsibilities should be very clear for employees as this is 
a commitment by the bank towards its regulators”. 
     
   
In support of this view, Monks and Minow (2004) argue that accountability is not a 
choice of the company, but is instead a commitment to fulfil its responsibilities 
towards the society in which it operates. Accountability could therefore be fulfilled 
via a contract between the corporation and interested parties, enforced by rules such 
as company law, civil law, regulations, internal rules, professional standards, 
conventions, ethical codes and customs. Accountability on this basis should ensure 
that there is no misuse of organisational resources and prevent mismanagement that 
may harm the interests of others (Stewart, 1984). In contrast, two of the interviewees 
had a particularly narrow definition of accountability; for example, interviewee C1 
described it as a “punishment for mistakes”, suggesting that the term and its usual 
meaning were not clear and, consequently, institutional accountability practices will 
likely be deficient focusing as they do on accountability as a liability and a 
mechanism for assigning blame (Bovens, 2006).  
       
Accountability was considered by all of the interviewees to be an important element 
in corporate operations and they acknowledged that it plays a key role in stabilising 
banks, preventing any infringements of key internal control systems and providing an 
environment for sound business. In contrast, interviewee G1 highlighted the 
importance of ensuring that the employee has the appropriate ability and required 
162 
 
skills to complete assigned tasks. Task-oriented definitions of accountability that 
focus on an individuals’ relationship with an organisation are not new (Crawford et 
al., 2009). However, two of the seventeen interviewees argued that such 
accountability is weak in Saudi Arabian banks, and some responsibilities are not clear 
for individuals which in turn causes weakness in accountability further up the 
organasational hierarchy.   
According to five of the interviewees, banks are primarily accountable to regulators 
and shareholders. More specifically, they claimed that banks have an absolute 
commitment to follow published codes, so they are highly accountable to the 
regulators concerned. In addition, as the bank acts as a representative of the 
shareholders, it also has important accountability to them. Here, interviewee B1 
asserted that: 
“Primarily, the bank is accountable to the shareholders and, to 
achieve this responsibility, the codes issued by the regulators must 
be obeyed, which means accountability to the regulators also”. 
      
On the other hand, the majority of participants affirmed that the bank is accountable 
to all concerned parties and wider stakeholder groups and should therefore provide 
them with the services they expect including the supply of appropriate information, 
such as financial reports. For instance, interviewee D2, a chief compliance officer, 
stated that: 
“The bank is accountable to all of its stakeholders and concerned 
parties. Further, the bank must protect small groups from others 
especially when making decisions that have risk. This is a key 
governance aspect”. 
       
 
Consistent with this view, Gray and Jenkins (1993) argue that many stakeholders, 
including employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, society, the government, the 
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environment and others, are affected by the decisions and performance of the firm, so 
the management should be accountable to all and responsible for providing them with 
an appropriate vision of the status of the firm. Solomon (2010) also highlights the 
importance of corporate publications for a wide group of stakeholders by arguing that 
financial reports, environmental reports, corporate social reports, sustainability 
reports and others all represent contributions to accountability. In particular, these 
reports play a vital role in the communication process and therefore offer reassurance 
to all parties who deal with the company concerning matters of interest to them 
(Solomon, 2010). 
 
Some of the interviewees indicated that their bank actively monitors its discharge of 
accountability and promotes its integration with broader organisational culture; in 
some cases this involved encouraging employees to have a high level of personal 
accountability. However, such practices appeared not to be the norm yet in Saudi 
Arabia. For example, interviewee G1, the general manager of a bank in Riyadh, stated 
that this encouragement is still weak in practice, varying from one department to 
another and causing an imbalance in the performance of these responsibilities.  
 
Significantly, just three of the interviewees emphasised social responsibility in the 
context of accountability, whilst two believed that there is an extreme weakness in the 
practices of Saudi banks in this regard. Consistent with this perception, one 
interviewee, E1, had a very restricted view regarding boundaries of banks’ social 
responsibilities, pointing out that: 
 “Accountability is related to just the services provided by the bank 
which means that the bank is not responsible, for example, for 
participating in building a hospital”. 
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As noted in Chapter 4, Gamble and Kelly (2001) suggest that the debate on corporate 
governance has been marked by an argument about the rights of shareholders versus 
the rights of stakeholders; in this context the supporters of the stakeholder perspective 
argue that an expectation of corporate accountability is the legitimate right of 
constituencies such as employees or local communities. However, although some 
importance is attributed to the issue of accountability by the contemporary Western-
dominated debate, the discussions typically concentrate on the issue of how 
governance systems can best enhance economic efficiency and produce shareholder 
value. Giving the varying perceptions in the literature, the interviewees were 
questioned about the relationship between accountability and corporate governance, 
including whether banks require a strong corporate governance systems to achieve a 
high level of accountability.  
 
The majority of the interviewees stressed that the accountability concept requires the 
bank to adopt a strong corporate governance system. A strong corporate governance 
system should in turn provide an environment in which the directors and senior 
management of banks can discharge a meaningful level of accountability, since a 
robust governance structure provides a clear framework of responsibilities and 
authority; thus governance represents a sub-set of accountability (Cobb, 2008). 
Interviewee J1 observed in this regard that accountability is a “competitive point” 
whereby the bank needs to further develop its corporate governance system - even if 
it is strong enough to keep up with current needs - while interviewee B2, a chief 
compliance officer, stated that: 
“Accountability requires a strong corporate governance system, 
particularly towards the board, (and) when the board is placed at a 
high level of accountability other levels of the bank will be 
positively affected”. 
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In contrast interviewee H1, a general manager, indicated that a corporate governance 
system will only promote accountability if accountability is an intrinsic part of the 
culture of all levels even if the governance code is strong. 
As further evidence of the conflicting opinions in this area, two interviewees from the 
same bank held conflicting views. While interviewee E1 suggested that accountability 
requires a strong system of corporate governance, with clearly delineated 
responsibilities that do not allow any ground for conflict, interviewee E2 argued that 
accountability requires only a generalised governance framework. 
 
6.5.2 Accountability and Dealing Ethically 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, accountability can be viewed as an ethical order that 
involves a system of reciprocal obligations and rights (Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha, 
2010). In this conceptualisation, groups are often seen as being bound together in 
identifiable and narrow ways, but each one must meet the ethical and spiritual goals 
of the organisation in a broad fashion (Afifuddin and Siti-Nabiha, 2010). In this 
regard, Zadek (1998) and Shearer (2002) stress that corporations need to know the 
ethical views of stakeholders in order to be fully accountable to them, as well as 
monitoring how these views change over time. In addition, corporations need to 
reconsider the ethical dimensions of economic life, to explore anew the sufficiency of 
financial accountability (Shearer, 2002). 
 
In line with this type of reasoning, all of the interviewees suggested that there can be 
no meaningful accountability without a developed ethical framework. In addition, it 
was argued that dealing ethically is a key part of all banks’ behaviour, including 
being accountable to all concerned parties. However, the interviewees suggested 
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further that dealing ethically requires a clearly laid out framework of responsibilities, 
otherwise the bank’s reputation may suffer. This in turn requires the bank to 
implement an effective and functioning monitoring system. 
 
6.5.3 The Role of Sharia in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
As mentioned in the literature chapter, many authors (e.g. Hussain, 1999; Rice, 1999; 
Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009) point out that Islam relates directly to all aspects of modern life, 
including how to conduct commerce and trade. Business in Islam must be operated in 
accordance with Sharia values and rules, e.g., honesty, fairness and just treatment 
towards others. In this context, Alawneh (1998) argues that in Islam faith, or iman, is 
the fundamental motivating factor for believers. Hence, decisions regarding business 
transactions are guided by iman, which in practice means following the law of Sharia, 
and engaging in what is permitted (halal) and avoiding that which is forbidden 
(haram). Thus, the maker of business decisions has full discretion, but the principles 
of Sharia provide a framework for the proper exercise of that choice (Ali and Gibbs, 
1998). 
 
In line with these notions, all of the interviewees indicated that their banks are subject 
to Sharia principles, at a variety of different levels. All 11 banks have an independent 
Sharia supervisory board (SSB)42; however, as stated earlier, only four of them 
presented themselves as fully ‘Islamic’ banks43. Six of the seventeen interviewees 
were from the latter category of institution, and they all asserted that their banks 
operated in accordance with Sharia law, with every transaction supervised and 
                                                 
42 The interviewees said that this board is independent even if it receives regular rewards from the 
bank. 
43 See Table 6.2 for further detail.  
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controlled by a Sharia supervisory board. In contrast, in the other seven banks, the 
interviewees noted that although banks presented themselves as ‘conventional’, they 
each have specific products and contracts performing in line with Sharia and under 
the supervision of a Sharia supervisory board. Some of the interviewees argued that 
the purpose of these branches, products or contracts is to provide the bank’s clients 
with a variety of services according to Sharia. This might be understood as a response 
to the needs of society in which the bank operates, an issue raised by interviewee B1, 
who noted: 
“There are many branches of the bank operating in accordance with 
Sharia law but the problem in this regard is that there is no official 
party who works to regulate and develop the performance of a 
Sharia supervisory board and Islamic banks and branches in 
general. Sharia or Islamic law states that humans must be honest 
and trustworthy but, unfortunately, there are many contracts of the 
banks covered (in compliance with Sharia) but in reality there are 
no differences between them and other contracts”. 
 
   Table 6.2: Members of Sharia Supervisory Board of Sampled Saudi Banks 
       Note: This table details the size of the SSB for 11 sampled banks. 
 
Bank Type 
Number of Members of 
SSB 
A Conventional 3 
B Conventional 3 
C Conventional 3 
D Conventional 3 
E Conventional 3 
F Conventional 5 
G Conventional 3 
H Islamic 3 
I Islamic 6 
J Islamic 6 
K Islamic 5 
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The participants were questioned about the relationship between corporate 
governance and Sharia law and to assess if the SSB has had an impact on the 
governance system or ethical standards of the bank. There was widespread agreement 
among the interviewees that Sharia principles underpin every relationship within the 
bank, including those of a business nature. They also claimed that Sharia encourages 
individuals to perform in a ‘proper’ way and to take account of the interests of all 
concerned parties, in line with broad corporate governance notions. Fairness, honesty, 
truthfulness, excellence, integrity, probity and preserving the rights of all related 
parties were mentioned as fundamental aspects of corporate governance as well as 
Sharia law. In this context, the senior executive vice-president of a conventional 
bank, interviewee A1, stated that: 
“No doubt the concepts of corporate governance are found in all 
religions, and you do not find religion or nations glorifying treason 
or being proud of lying. Islam is one of these religions”. 
 
 
These arguments are in line with elements of the related literature; for instance, 
Hussain (1999) contends that the paramount rule in Islamic business is honesty and 
fair dealing, as Allah is the absolute owner of everything both on earth and in heaven, 
and we human beings are just His agents on the earth. As noted earlier, Muslims are 
supposed to conduct their business activities in accordance with Sharia law, but this 
specifically encourages being fair, just and honest to everyone involved in any aspect 
of one’s life. Muslim business people are hence required to adopt an elevated moral 
conduct, in order not to deceive, betray or exploit their fellow believers; critically 
Muslims should not undertake business activities with the sole aim of profit-making 
(Hussain, 1999).  
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Muslims are also encouraged to work hard and avoid unproductiveness and laziness. 
In the context of this reasoning, it is evident that any system without a moral climate 
and appropriate ethical focus is unlikely to promote a ‘proper’ system of governance 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). However, virtually all of the interviewees suggested that these 
principles do not exist as a practical system or via standards that can be employed and 
followed; they did, though, argue that if such a system was put in place by an official 
body, there would be no need for corporate governance. Specifically, the participants 
were asked about the impact of SSBs on corporate governance and ethical standards. 
Seven of the interviewees believed that SSBs have no impact in this regard as they 
concentrate on the functional tasks of controlling and monitoring Islamic products 
and contracts. However, the majority of the interviewees acknowledged that SSBs 
play a role in banks’ relationships with clients by keeping a close eye on products and 
contracts that claim to be ‘Islamic’. The boards typically monitor disclosures relating 
to such products including the details provided to clients, to ensure that their contracts 
are in line with their needs. As a result, the SSB will have a significant impact upon 
the day-to-day corporate governance system even if there is no formal role for the 
corporate governance code. Interviewee K1 asserted here that: 
“The function of the Sharia supervisory board is a sort of 
governance; for instance, in our bank, this board reviews our 
transactions and the extent of their compliance with the promises 
introduced by the bank. This is a sort of governance even if it is not 
part of the official code".   
 
 
Similarly, interviewee I1, the head of a legal affairs division, observed in this regard 
that the role of the SSB is to ensure that all transactions comply with Sharia law, 
arguing that this role positively affects the behaviour and ethical standards in the 
bank. 
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6.5.4 Islamic Accountability 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the term ‘Hesab’ is used in the Holy Quran to represent 
the notion of ‘accounting’ in its generic sense, relating to an obligation to account to 
Allah for all aspects of human endeavor. This principle is related to the notion that all 
resources available to individuals take the form of a trust; individuals are the trustees 
of what they have received from Allah in the form of goods, property and even 
intangible assets (Lewis, 2006). Sharia requires the agents, such as managers, to 
ensure that all of their actions favour the various groups influenced by their business. 
The extent to which individuals must use what is being entrusted to them is specified 
in Sharia, and individuals’ success in the hereafter depends upon their performance in 
life. So, in responsibility and accountability terms, Muslims believe that they will 
account for whatever they do in eternity (Lewis, 2006).  
 
Five of the 17 interviewees expressed opinions that were in line with this 
understanding of Islamic accountability, emphasising the importance of the Hesab 
concept as one of the key Sharia principles. In this context, they mentioned many 
specific phrases from the Holy Quran and Hadith (prophet’s saying (peace be upon 
him)) to clarify the importance and existence of accountability in the Islamic context. 
In addition, they argued that, according to Sharia, all employees from different levels 
in the banks are accountable for their actions to Allah as well as to all of the 
stakeholders of the bank. Although the religious dimension leaves an understanding 
of accountability that is more generalisable than most conceptualisations of 
accountability in a business context, there was a perceived lack of this sense of 
accountability among employees. Interviewee I1 stated here that: 
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“From an Islamic perspective, accountability is an important issue. 
All Muslims believe that, in the hereafter or on judgement day, they 
will be asked about all their actions in their life. This belief is 
supposed to place an extra pressure on them to do the right things 
and protect others’ rights. However, in practice, there is a weakness 
in this sense, so the bank needs to encourage its employees to 
develop a sufficient level of accountability”.    
       
Furthermore, several interviewees argued that, when the meaning of Islamic 
accountability is well understood, the impact of business ethics upon accountability 
will be more pronounced. However, they highlighted that in practice banks will not 
feel any effect unless they have robust control of detailed and unambiguous codes of 
accountability underpinned by business ethics.    
    
More generally, the majority of the interviewees argued that there is no difference 
between the concept of accountability in general and accountability from an Islamic 
perspective. Muslims believe that they will be accountable for whatever they do in 
their lives in the hereafter; specifically, in order to attain the promised eternal 
rewards, Muslims are accountable to Allah. Thus, every deed and word has to be in 
line with the teachings of Islam (Malekian and Daryaei, 2010). 
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, in Islamic society Hisba, like the institution of Shura44 , is a 
long standing tradition that can be seen to represent a core Islamic corporate 
governance notion. Gambling and Karim (1991) argue that Hisba represents a key 
source of Islamic principles including the outlawing of discrimination on the basis of 
class, race or gender. This notion includes obligations that ensure the prevention of 
monopolies and price controls, protect the natural environment and maintain public 
utilities and government resources. Abdul Rahman (1998) explains that the functions 
                                                 
44 See Chapter 4 for details. 
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of Hisba were ‘Islamised’ by emphasising obligations in the Holy Quran that 
encourage good behaviour and discourage bad behaviour; the muhtasib45 is 
responsible and accountable for enforcing Islamic behaviour in terms of activities in 
the market and community affairs in general, including honesty and accuracy in 
business dealings. 
 
The majority of the participants here agreed that Hisba has impacted upon corporate 
governance and accountability practices in their own bank. However, they provided 
different views regarding the precise nature of its influence. Three of the interviewees 
pointed to daily complaints from clients as an example of Hisba. In contrast, 
interviewee I2 noted that the consumer protection association might be the 
appropriate body to deal with this issue, but it does not fulfil its role as it should; he 
further claimed that, in Islamic banks the SSB is a manifestation of the Hisba 
concept. Remarkably, 3 of the 17 interviewees stated that the clearest example of the 
Hisba concept in a bank is “whistle blowing”, in the context of it representing a tool 
of corporate governance and accountability. However, several interviewees 
emphasised that the practical role of whistle-blowing is limited. For example, 
Interviewee D2 asserted that: 
“There is a form of Hisba concept in our bank which is called 
whistle blowing but, in fact, it faces difficulties in terms of 
implementation among the employees because of the dominant 
culture about spies and stirrers. As a result, we believe that trust is 
good but control is better”. 
  
 
There was widespread agreement among the interviewees that business ethics have an 
influence on both the Shura and Hisba concepts; several observed that there is a 
                                                 
45 Islam encourages every Muslim to be muhtasib, which means reflecting Hisba.  
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commitment to their bank’s ethical code and cultural encouragement for the 
institution to deal ethically in all of its actions, especially as regards decision-making 
and monitoring. It was noted in this context that when employees perform in the 
bank’s interest, they are required to consider ethical aspects and these should not only 
influence the bank’s actions but also control them. Interestingly, regarding the Shura 
concept, interviewee H1 stated that: 
“Business is not democratic and it cannot be democratic. This means 
the absence of real Shura or consultation in a broader sense which 
means weakness in this aspect as well as the ethical aspect”. 
     
 
This understanding might indicate weakness not just in relation to specific Islamic 
concepts, but also regarding accountability to all stakeholders, given that this 
weakness is centred on decision-making.     
                     
6.6 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has reported the results obtained from semi-structured interviews with 17 
individuals in 11 Saudi-listed banks. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and 
individually between March and June 2012 in two major cities in Saudi Arabia in 
order to explore views regarding the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in the context of accountability and Islamic principles. The main 
issues covered in the interviews were the understanding of corporate governance, the 
compliance with and achievement of corporate governance, the understanding of 
business ethics, the impact of business ethics on banks’ practices, corporate 
governance and business ethics, understanding the accountability concept, 
accountability and dealing ethically, and Islamic accountability.  
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The findings from the interviews reveal a widespread belief that corporate governance 
is one of the most important concepts not just for banks, but also in the financial 
sector in general. The interviewees emphasised that corporate governance plays a key 
role in accountability, a concern reflected in the definitions of corporate governance 
provided by most of those taking part.  
 
There was widespread agreement among the interviewees about the importance of 
business ethics in relation to a bank’s success. As a result, each bank has its own 
compulsory ethical code that controls employee’s behaviour with the aim of 
enhancing clients’ confidence in the business. However, some of the interviewees 
were dissatisfied with the ethical codes currently in place, while others believed that 
their code itself is sufficient, but requires more monitoring. 
 
According to the interviewees, there is a strong relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics in Saudi Arabian banks; however, views regarding 
how the notions are related to each other differed. In terms of the stakeholders of the 
bank, there were conflicting views regarding defining and understanding the role of 
stakeholders, even amongst interviewees who work at the same bank. Clearly, this 
lack of clarity is likely to be a negative factor and could be considered a weakness in 
terms of the discharge of accountability. 
 
However, accountability was considered a very important element in modern banking 
by all of the interviewees. The majority stressed that the accountability concept 
requires a bank to adopt a strong corporate governance system, one which will 
provide an environment in which the directors and high level management can be held 
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accountable. Here, a strong structure of corporate governance was seen as important 
in allocating clear responsibilities and the authority necessary for accountability to be 
achieved. All of the interviewees believed that there can be no meaningful 
accountability in a bank without it behaving in an ethical manner. Dealing ethically 
was seen as a key part of all banks’ behaviour, with accountability to all concerned 
parties part of this.  
 
Each interviewee’s bank employed Sharia principles to different degrees and all have 
an independent SSB. In terms of responsibility and accountability, Muslims believe 
that they will account for whatever they do in their lives in the hereafter. However, 
only 5 of the 17 interviewees displayed such an understanding of accountability. 
Some of the interviewees stated that when this meaning of accountability from the 
Islamic perspective becomes better understood, the impact of business ethics upon 
accountability will be more pronounced. In this context, somewhat surprisingly, the 
majority of the interviewees believed that there are no differences between 
accountability in general and accountability from an Islamic perspective. 
 
Finally, there was widespread agreement among the interviewees that business ethics 
have a strong influence on the Shura and Hisba concepts. They suggested that there is 
a commitment to the ethical code and cultural encouragement for the bank to deal 
ethically in all actions, especially with regard to these concepts in a decision-making 
and monitoring context. 
 
Having examined in detail the views of a relatively small number of individuals 
involved directly in bank activities, the next chapter broadens the scope of the 
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analysis by presenting the evidence from a questionnaire survey administrated to a 
larger and wider sample of stakeholders affected by and interested in Saudi banks’ 
activities.    
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Chapter 7: Questionnaire Survey 
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Questionnaire Survey 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter provided a detailed analysis of interviews conducted with senior 
employees of listed Saudi banks. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the second method 
employed in this research is the questionnaire survey. The main purpose of using this 
method is to explore the views of a wider range of parties with regard to the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi banks; the 
most significant issues regarding the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics that were evident in the literature and the interview findings were 
incorporated. The remainder of the chapter consists of four sections. The next section 
outlines how the questionnaire survey was conducted and reports the demographical 
information provided by the participants. Section 7.3 details the respondents’ views 
relating to corporate governance issues in Saudi banks, such as definitions, familiarity 
with the current corporate governance code, and the importance and awareness of 
such a code. Issues related to business ethics in Saudi banks are reported in the fourth 
section; these include, practices relating to business ethics and the relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi banks. Section 7.5 reports 
the respondents’ views regarding the accountability of Saudi banks, both in general 
and from an Islamic perspective, before Section 7.6 concludes.        
 
7.2 Conducting the Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
After reflecting on the interview results reported in Chapter 6, and linking them with 
the literature review in the light of the research questions and the study’s 
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accountability framework, it was clear that the most significant issues in Saudi 
Arabian-listed banks relate to the complexities of the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics. As stated in Chapter 5, an online self-completion 
survey method was employed for the study. Four questionnaires were developed to 
suit each of the different groups of stakeholders identified for study (Academics, 
Clients, Employees and Regulators)46. The differences between the four 
questionnaires were relatively minor, reflecting the role of each of the four groups47. 
A five-point Likert scale was used in most cases and the respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement by choosing the appropriate box, from 1 (= not 
at all) to 5 (= to a great extent). A few questions with a yes/no format were included 
as was space at the end of the questionnaires for the respondents to add information or 
comment on any of the issues raised, if they wished.  
 
One of the main challenges associated with self-completion questionnaires is the low 
response rate, which leads to a greater risk of biased findings (Bryman, 2004). In 
order to avoid this issue and achieve the research objectives, several procedures were 
adopted by the researcher. One of the key steps was to ensure that the questionnaires 
were well written, easy to read and answer, and not too long; clear instructions and an 
attractive design in general have been found to improve the response rate (Dillman, 
2000). The four questionnaires were created in English, then translated into Arabic in 
order to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguity. Both the English and Arabic 
versions of the questionnaires were piloted with some of the researcher’s colleagues 
on the PhD programme at the University of Dundee’s School of Business. The 
piloting of questionnaires is recognised as useful in terms of achieving internal 
                                                 
46 The choice of these four groups was based on the extant literature. See, for example, Alharkan 
(2005); Alajlan (2005); Falgi (2009); and Alkahtani (2013). 
47 See Appendices 7.1 for copies of each questionnaire.  
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consistency, clarity and relevance (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  The questionnaires 
included a covering letter introducing the researcher, his topic and his university 
department. The researcher’s appreciation regarding the respondents’ participation 
was noted at the end. All four versions of the questionnaire consisted of the following 
five sections: (i) demographic information (e.g. work experience and academic 
qualifications); (ii) corporate governance definitions and its importance; (iii) business 
ethics practices and their relationship with corporate governance; (iv) the 
accountability notion in the context of corporate governance and dealing ethically; 
and (v) accountability from an Islamic perspective.  
 
The four questionnaires were published on the Survey Monkey website, one of the 
most regularly employed and highly respected online survey websites (Bryman, 2004; 
Wright, 2005); links to them were sent to the four groups by email and social 
networks in July and August 2013. Follow-up emails and messages were sent to 
increase the response rate, and some individuals were also contacted by phone to 
encourage them to complete the questionnaire. The researcher attempted to further 
increase the response rate by taking advantage of personal contacts, especially for the 
Academics, Clients and Employees groups. The researcher had limited access to the 
Regulator group, but further contacts were made48 to increase the response rate (see 
Table 7.1 for details). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 By contacting friends working at the regulatory bodies. 
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Table 7.1: Questionnaire Response Rate by Category of Respondent 
Note: This table shows the four groups of questionnaire respondents, the number of distributed 
questionnaires, the number of returned questionnaires and the respective response rate. 
 
Inspection of the table reveals an overall response rate of 42%, high relative to most 
of the relevant literature reviewed earlier50. The rate exceeded 30% for all four 
groups, with the highest figure (64%) occurring for regulators.   
 
In order to analyse the data obtained from the questionnaire surveys, the responses 
from each individual were entered into a table using Microsoft Excel; the data were 
then transferred to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Since most 
of the questions were based on a linear five-point Likert scale, the descriptive 
statistical mean and standard deviation are employed to assess the general pattern in 
responses, but with non-parametric significance testing. Reliability and validity tests 
are essential prerequisites for high quality analysis of survey instrument results 
(Oppenheim, 1992). The most popular approach to testing the reliability of a 
questionnaire is Cronbach’s Alpha; in terms of consistency and reliability, a score of 
0.7 or above for this measure is acceptable in general (Field, 2009). Table 7.2 shows 
the results of the Cronbach’s Alpha test for Academics, Clients, Employees and 
Regulators, indicating that in all four cases an acceptable level of internal consistency 
is present as they are all over 0.8.  
 
                                                 
49 Clients mean individual customers who are not Academics, Employees or Regulators. 
50 For example, the overall response rate reported in Falgi (2009) is 23%. 
Respondent groups Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires 
Response Rate 
Academics 94 37 39% 
Clients49  140 47 34% 
Employees  56 30 54% 
Regulators  33 21 64% 
Total 323 135 42% 
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The validity concept employed in this questionnaire survey was fulfilled by the pilot 
study discussed earlier in this chapter. Participants argued that the document covers 
significant issues relating to the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in the financial sector. However, minor changes were suggested and 
applied. Given this outcome, a sufficient level of validity was assumed.   
 
Table 7.2: Reliability Test 
Note: This table reports the result of the Cronbach’s Alpha test for reliability. N = number of 
responses. 
 
As noted earlier, since the questionnaire responses comprised ordinal rather than 
interval (i.e. non-parametric) data, Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) and Mann-Whitney (M-W) 
tests were employed. The K-W test was used to determine whether a difference 
existed between the averages across three or more groups and the M-W test to 
examine whether a difference existed between particular pairs (Anderson et al., 2009).  
 
The first section of the questionnaires asked for basic non-identifying background 
information about the respondents. Table 7.3 shows that most of respondents in all 
four groups were below 40 years of age, with a wide range of work experience, from 
less than 5 years to more than 15 years. Finally, the table shows that all of the 
respondents were well-educated, with only three (all members of the Clients group) 
not having at least a bachelor’s degree.  
Group N Cronbach’s Alpha 
Academics 37 0.836 
Clients 47 0.888 
Employees 30 0.827 
Regulators 21 0.837 
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Table 7.3: Demographical Information relating to the Respondents  
Note: This table summarises demographical information about the respondents.  
 
7.3 Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
This section describes the results relating to various aspects of corporate governance 
in the context of Saudi Arabian banks’ operations. These include: definitions, 
familiarity with the code and the importance and awareness of the latter. 
 
7.3.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
 
The first question of substance on the questionnaire survey, explored the definitions of 
corporate governance adopted by the four groups of respondents. Five possible 
definitions of corporate governance drawn from literature were provided in the 
Variables Categories 
Number of Respondents 
Total 
Academics Clients Employees Regulators 
Age 
Less than 30  18 20 10 7 55 
30 to 40  16 20 19 10 65 
41 to 50  3 3 1 4 11 
51 to 60  0 3 0 0 3 
More than 60  0 1 0 0 1 
Work 
experience 
Less than 5 
years 
21 10 9 5 45 
5 to 10 years 11 17 13 10 51 
10 to 15 years 4 11 5 2 22 
More than 15 
years 
1 9 3 4 17 
Level of 
education 
Less than 
bachelor’s 
degree 
0 3 0 0 3 
Undergraduate 
degree 
6 25 25 3 59 
Master’s 
degree 
22 15 5 14 56 
PhD 9 4 0 4 17 
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questionnaire (see Table 7.4). All of the statements generated average responses 
above 3 and below 4, suggesting recognition of several formulations, without any one 
dominating. The Cadbury definition of corporate governance (“the system by which 
institutions are directed and controlled”) achieved the highest level of agreement 
(mean value of 3.90) among the four groups of stakeholders as a whole. This was 
followed by the definition which refers to the broader stakeholder perspective (“the 
principles that relate to the relationship between the company and all stakeholders 
who affect, or who are affected by, the decisions and activities of the institution”), 
with a mean response of 3.86. The definition of corporate governance according to 
broader accountability and ethical foundations (“responsible management with ethical 
foundations and recognition of the accountability of the institution towards all of its 
stakeholders”) came third, with a mean value of 3.78. Definition c, which refers to a 
narrow agency view and b (dealing with honesty and integrity) gained mean responses 
of 3.76 and 3.50, respectively. The group mean values presented in Table 7.4 show 
that all four groups prioritised the Cadbury definition of corporate governance.  
 
Interestingly, academics and regulators generated the same (highest) mean value for 
two definitions (a and d), with the regulator group also generating the same highest 
mean value of 4.00 for definition c. This pattern is somewhat surprising because it 
involves the regulator group producing the same highest mean value for three 
definitions of corporate governance, two of which (c and d) adopt opposing 
theoretical perspectives. This evidence points to the importance of large sample 
survey research in highlighting areas where apparently clear evidence needs to be 
treated with caution. It is apparent from these responses that in Saudi Arabia, some 
conflicting understandings of the governance concept remain.   
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Table 7.4 also illustrates the lack of significant simultaneous or pair-wise responses 
across the four sub-groups. This evidence, taken together with the other findings in 
the table and the interview results suggest that no single definition of “corporate 
governance” yet dominates in Saudi Arabia, either generally or amongst particular 
stakeholder groups.   
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Table 7.4: Definitions of Corporate Governance 
Note: This table reports the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding the most popular definitions of corporate governance mentioned in 
Chapters 3 and 6. The responses are based upon a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great 
extent. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator.                                                                                                 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q4a. The system by which 
institutions are controlled and 
directed 
135 3.90 0.897 3.94 3.72 4.07 4.00 0.501 0.367 0.606 0.875 0.139 0.360 0.755 
Q4b. Integrity and honesty in all 
activities in an institution 
135 3.50 0.999 3.65 3.25 3.47 3.81 0.158 0.099 0.478 0.496 0.356 0.054 0.187 
Q4c. The principles that relate to the 
relationship between the institution 
and its shareholders. 
135 3.76 0.891 3.92 3.59 3.67 4.00 0.284 0.126 0.234 0.893 0.815 0.147 0.245 
Q4d. The principles that relate to the 
relationship between the company 
and all stakeholders who affect, or 
who are affected by, the decisions 
and activities of the institution 
135 3.86 0.874 3.94 3.70 3.90 4.00 0.687 0.293 0.741 0.903 0.157 0.350 0.722 
Q4e. Responsible management with 
ethical foundations and recognition 
of the accountability of the 
institution towards all of its 
stakeholders 
135 3.78 0.878 3.89 3.70 3.77 3.76 0.840 0.416 0.505 0.516 0.855 0.928 0.808 
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7.3.2 Familiarity with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code 
 
 
The next section of the questionnaire explored levels of awareness and familiarity 
with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code. Question 5 asked the 
participants about their familiarity with the code and the inspection of Table 7.5 
reveals that the overall mean score was 3.11, suggesting some familiarity but not 
overwhelming amount. However, Table 7.5 also shows that the group means ranged 
between 2.87 and 3.81 with (as expected, given their background) regulators the most 
familiar (mean = 3.81). In contrast, the lowest level of familiarity amongst the 
surveyed groups was found amongst employees with a mean of just 2.87. This reveals 
a surprising lack of knowledge among bank workers that conflicts with the 
importance of the corporate governance code amongst Saudi banks (and their 
compliance with it) that was mentioned by the majority of the interviewees in Chapter 
6. Table 7.5 also reveals significant differences among the respondents’ levels of 
familiarity with the Saudi code, with the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test 
equalling 0.020. The results of the Mann-Whitney (M-W) test show that the former 
result was driven by the high regulator figure; this was significantly greater than each 
of the other sub-group means.  
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Table 7.5: Importance and Awareness of the Corporate Governance Code 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding their familiarity with the corporate governance code. Also, it reports the 
importance and awareness of the corporate governance code. The responses are based upon a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= 
neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. Also, the table provides the means for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator. 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-
value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q5. Familiarity with Saudi Arabian Corporate 
Governance  
135 3.111 1.130 2.94 3.08 2.87 3.81 0.020* 0.678 0.730 0.019* 0.340 0.012* 0.002* 
Q6a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi banks 135 4.07 0.982 4.11 3.74 4.30 4.43 0.056 0.157 0.672 0.203 0.054 0.015* 0.297 
Q6b. The corporate governance practices in Saudi banks 
are satisfactory 
135 2.84 0.888 2.70 2.74 2.97 3.14 0.144 0.604 0.204 0.022* 0.329 0.073 0.559 
Q6c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the Saudi banking sector 
135 2.57 0.885 2.35 2.62 2.47 3.00 0.606 0.275 0.968 0.007* 0.364 0.074 0.041* 
Q6d. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance code is 
adequate and effective 
135 2.72 0.843 2.73 2.77 2.47 2.95 0.164 0.977 0.113 0.356 0.136 0.369 0.031* 
Q6e. Saudi banks comply with the majority of the 
corporate governance code rules 
135 2.78 0.887 2.65 2.66 2.80 3.24 0.078 0.941 0.799 0.010* 0.783 0.017* 0.084 
Q6f. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code 
should be compulsory for all listed banks 
135 4.05 1.032 4.13 3.83 4.10 4.33 0.413 0.209 0.881 0.777 0.302 0.138 0.688 
Q6g. There should be penalties for non-compliance by 
banks with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code 
135 4.27 0.934 4.43 3.98 4.43 4.43 0.150 0.062 0.920 0.643 0.067 0.196 0.552 
Q6h. It is important for students who might work in the 
banking sector in the future to be educated about the 
importance of corporate governance 
37 N/A N/A 4.24 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q6i. Corporate governance is a key part of our 
curriculum   
37 N/A N/A 2.78 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q6j.  Corporate governance practices influence my 
decision regarding which banks to use   
47 N/A N/A N/A 3.53 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q6k.  Bank employees are aware of their firm’s corporate 
governance policies and procedures 
30 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.67 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q6l.  Ensuring high corporate governance standards 
should be a priority for the regulators of the Saudi 
Arabian banking sector 
21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.86 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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7.3.3 The Importance and Awareness of the Corporate Governance Code 
 
 
The twelve statements in Question 6 were designed to explore the participants’ 
perceptions of the importance, practices and awareness of corporate governance, as 
well as the effectiveness of and compliance with the Saudi code. The results in Table 
7.5 show that all of the groups strongly believed that corporate governance is 
important for Saudi banks, with an overall mean of 4.07, suggesting this wider group 
of stakeholders share the beliefs of the interviewees reported earlier. The regulators 
generated the highest level of agreement with a mean score of 4.43; with employees, 
academics and clients producing figures of 4.30, 4.11 and 3.74 respectively. 
According to the K-W test shown in the table, there was no overall difference between 
the participants’ views, with all p-values greater than 0.05. The M-W results for the 
same statement (Q6a) reports one significant difference, with regulators generating a 
significantly higher level of agreement than clients, which might reflect that the 
importance of corporate governance is particularly well understood by regulators.  
 
In contrast, the participants were dissatisfied with corporate governance practices, 
with an overall mean of 2.84 suggesting that Saudi banks may not be doing enough to 
adopt good practices with regard to the code. This result appears to conflict with the 
claim made by the majority of the interviewees that the CMA gives the code power 
and promotes its effectiveness. The group means show that academics, clients and 
employees were the least satisfied with corporate governance practices, all generating 
means less than 3, with regulators the most satisfied, with a mean of 3.14. There was 
only one significant difference between the M-W results, for academics and regulators 
groups, reflecting academics’ greater concern over this issue.  
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There is limited awareness of corporate governance in the Saudi banking sector 
according to the responses, with an overall mean of 2.57 being generated for Q6 (c). 
The M-W test for this question revealed two significant differences between the 
groups, both of which were driven by the highest mean (3) for regulators then other 
groups, with academics only generating 2.35. The latter finding, combined with the 
results for Q6 (b), suggests serious academic concern with governance arrangements 
in Saudi banks that authorities might wish to explore. Given this evidence, it is not 
surprising that the means shown in Table 7.5 indicate each group’s disagreement with 
the statement that the Saudi corporate governance code is adequate and effective, with 
means ranging between 2.47 and 2.95. There is only one significant difference 
between the groups regarding this statement, with regulators generating a higher mean 
than employees. However, this perceived lack of an adequate, and effective corporate 
governance code across all stakeholders implies poor corporate governance practices 
and weak accountability in the Saudi banking sector. This impression is strengthened 
by the overall mean of just 2.78 for Q6 (e). Again, but worryingly perhaps, the 
regulators were more in agreement (in this case with the degree of compliance with 
the corporate governance code) than the other groups. This pattern was repeated for 
Q6 (f) where the notion that the code of corporate governance should be compulsory 
for all listed banks, produced a mean score of 4.05. Although there were no significant 
differences, the regulators again expressed the strongest agreement. In relation to the 
penalties that should be imposed on banks that fail to comply with the Saudi Arabian 
corporate governance code (Q6g), all groups agreed with such an idea, with an overall 
mean of 4.27. Three groups (academics, employees and regulators) generated the 
same mean score (4.43), while clients had a mean of 3.98. Although there were again 
no significant differences across the groups’ responses, the high overall means for 
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statements Q6 (f) and Q6 (g) reflect the participants’ clear belief that Saudi banks 
should have a high level of accountability. When considered in the context of the 
earlier questions in Table 7.5, it is equally evident that current practices are not seen 
as achieving this.  
 
Table 7.5 also summarises responses when each group was questioned about specific 
issues relating to their position. The academic group agreed (mean = 4.24) that it is 
important that students who might work in the banking sector in the future be 
educated about the importance of corporate governance (Q6 (h)). However, when this 
group was asked (in Q6 (i)) if corporate governance was a key part of their 
curriculum, they generated a mean of only 2.78, suggesting a need for change in the 
relevant programmes. The clients agreed, as per Q6 (j) that corporate governance 
practices influence their decisions about which bank to use, although with a mean of 
only 3.53 suggesting a lack of widespread conviction on the issue. More significantly, 
the employees’ group generated a mean score of just 2.67 when asked about their 
awareness of the firm’s corporate governance policies and procedures. This latter 
result again suggests weakness regarding accountability frameworks in Saudi banks, 
as the employees seem to be somewhat unaware of these important policies and 
procedures. Finally, the regulator group produced a mean of 3.86 for the statement: 
“ensuring high corporate governance standards should be a priority for the regulators 
of the Saudi Arabian banking sector”, consistent with their views expressed in Q6 (a).     
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7.4 Business Ethics in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
The next section of the questionnaire attempted to shed light on participants’ views 
about the key issues related to business ethics in Saudi Arabian banks, such as 
defining and understanding the notion, as well as exploring its importance and its 
relationship with corporate governance. 
 
7.4.1 Defining and Understanding Business Ethics 
 
 
Question 7 was designed to explore perceived definitions of business ethics among 
the four stakeholder groups. Table 7.6 lists the four definitions of business ethics that 
were included in the questionnaire in this regard. The results reveal that no one 
definition dominated participants’ minds, with all the means falling between 3.70 and 
4.00. The conceptualisation of business ethics as “the behaviour of employees within 
an institution” achieved the highest level of agreement among the sample as a whole. 
Given that this is the narrowest of the four definitions suggested, it indicates that 
broader notions of ethical behaviour in a business context are not yet well understood 
in the Saudi banking context, with consequent effects on practices. Phrase (b), which 
provided the next narrowest perspective, defining business ethics as “the principles 
that control the relationship between the institution and others”, scored the second 
highest overall mean of 3.94. The definition that proved most popular among 
interviewees51: “a set of principles describing how employees should behave towards 
others, whether inside or outside the institution” came third, with a mean score of 
3.74. Interestingly, the broadest definition of business ethics: “an application of 
theories of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to activity within and between institutions, and 
                                                 
51 See Chapter 6. 
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between institutions and their broader environment”, provided by Bucheery (2001), 
produced the lowest mean value. The figures for each group, presented in Table 7.6, 
reveal that while three (Clients, Employees and Regulators) preferred phrase (a), 
academics preferred the less narrow view of business ethics in (b). This result 
suggests that broader notions of ethics that now dominate academic literature have not 
yet penetrated the thinking of other groups in Saudi Arabia. If this is to change, 
academics may need to take the initiative in spreading understanding of the issues 
concerned. 
 
Inspection of Table 7.6 reveals no significant differences between all the groups, as 
indicated by the p-values of the K-W test, but the M-W indicates variation between 
academics and clients and academics and regulators, in relation to phrase (b), driven 
by academics attaching the highest mean value to this phrase. Significant differences 
also exist between Academics and Clients and Clients and Employees regarding 
phrases (c) and (d). These findings primarily reflect Clients attaching the lowest mean 
value to all four definitions, including these phrases, indicating a related lack of 
engagement with the concept. 
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Table 7.6: Definitions of Business Ethics  
Note: This table reports the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding the most popular definitions of business ethics mentioned in Chapters 3 and 
6. The responses are based upon a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= strongly agree to a great extent. Also, the 
table provides the mean for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. A = Academic; C = Client; E = 
Employee; R = Regulator. 
 
 
 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q7a. The behaviour of employees 
within an institution 
135 4.00 0.889 4.08 3.83 4.20 3.95 0.319 0.259 0.511 0.439 0.097 0.808 0.201 
Q7b. The principles that control the 
relationship between the institution and 
others 
135 3.94 0.983 4.30 3.72 3.97 3.76 0.107 0.033* 0.328 0.026* 0.367 0.916 0.304 
Q7c. A set of principles describing how 
employees should behave towards 
others,  whether inside or outside the 
institution 
135 3.74 0.969 3.92 3.47 4.03 3.62 0.051 0.034* 0.861 0.228 0.015* 0.702 0.119 
Q7d. An application of theories of 
“right” and “wrong” to activity within 
and between institutions, and between 
institutions and their broader 
environment   
135 3.70 0.987 3.84 3.38 3.90 3.86 0.061 0.042* 0.612 0.993 0.024* 0.079 0.655 
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7.4.2 Importance and Practice of Business Ethics 
 
 
The next question in the survey, Question 8 provided ten statements relating to the 
importance and practice of business ethics in Saudi Arabian banks, and invited the 
participants to express the extent of their agreement with each one. The results, shown 
in Table 7.7, reveal a high level of agreement among all four groups of stakeholders 
that business ethics concerns are important for Saudi banks. Employees provided 
strongest support for the statement (mean = 4.77) although there were no significant 
inter-group differences. The importance of business ethics reported here is in line with 
statements made by some of the interviewees, who argued that if Saudi banks want to 
survive, they must operate ethically towards others in order to protect and improve 
their reputation. This finding is also consistent the views of Joyner and Payne (2002) 
mentioned in Chapter 3, who argued that a business cannot survive without society 
and that society cannot progress without business, so business must acknowledge the 
existence of society and implement more ethically responsible practices.  
 
The majority of the interviewees agreed that business ethics concerns influence their 
banks’ practices. However, the questionnaire participants generated a low mean (2.85) 
for the statement that “the practice of business ethics in Saudi banks is satisfactory”, 
suggesting some dissatisfaction with behaviour in the Saudi banking sector. This was 
evident among all groups, as the means ranged from 3.00 (for employees) and 2.77 
(for clients); none of the differences were significant. Of equal concern is the 
statement “there is an adequate awareness of the principles of business ethics in the 
Saudi banking sector” also attracting a low level of agreement (mean = 2.80). All 
groups generated means below 3, suggesting widespread concern regarding this 
statement, with no significant differences between. Given these views, it is not 
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surprising that there was strong agreement among the participants that “there should 
be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi banks issued by a regulatory body” (Q8 (d)), 
with a mean level of 4.27. Inspection of the group means for this question reveal that 
academics and employees generated the highest mean values (4.43 in each case), 
while regulators and clients expressed slightly less agreement (with mean values of 
4.14 and 4.11 respectively). Again, however, the K-W and M-W test results suggest 
that there were no significant differences between groups’ responses. Likewise, the 
statement in Q8 (e) that “if there is an official code of business ethics, there should be 
penalties for non-compliance with it” also attracted a high level of agreement among 
the respondents with a mean value of 4.24. The group means lay within a narrow 
range (from 4.27 to 4.21), indicating that all four groups shared similar views in this 
regard.  
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 Table 7.7: The Importance and Practice of Business Ethics 
Note: This table reports the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding the importance and practices of business ethics. The responses are 
based upon a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. Also, the table provides the 
means for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator.  
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q8a. Business ethics are important for 
Saudi banks 
135 4.55 0.770 4.51 4.38 4.77 4.67 0.184 0.565 0.172 0.301 0.057 0.141 0.897 
Q8b. The practice of business ethics in 
Saudi banks is satisfactory 
135 2.85 0.989 2.78 2.77 3.00 2.95 0.635 0.989 0.351 0.450 0.286 0.393 0.850 
Q8c. There is an adequate awareness of the 
principles of business ethics in the Saudi 
banking sector 
135 2.80 1.057 2.92 2.68 2.77 2.90 0.832 0.395 0.640 0.926 0.724 0.535 0.741 
Q8d. There should be a compulsory ethical 
code for Saudi banks issued by the 
regulatory body 
135 4.27 0.859 4.43 4.11 4.43 4.14 0.320 0.199 0.921 0.129 0.258 0.754 0.175 
Q8e. If there is an official code of business 
ethics, there should be penalties for non-
compliance with it 
135 4.24 0.885 4.27 4.21 4.27 4.23 0.968 0.761 0.847 0.859 0.900 0.644 0.721 
Q8f. It is important for students who might 
work in the banking sector in the future to 
be educated about the importance of 
business ethics 
37 N/A N/A 4.43 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q8g. Business ethics is a key part of our 
curriculum 
37 N/A N/A 3.11 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q8h. Ethical practices influence my 
decision about which banks to use 
47 N/A N/A N/A 3.94 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q8i.  Bank employees are aware of the need 
for high standards of ethical behaviour in 
their professional activities 
30 N/A N/A NA N/A 3.30 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Q8j.  Ensuring high ethical standards should 
be a priority for the regulators of the Saudi 
Arabian banking sector 
21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.90 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Each group was also questioned about issues relating to their specific positions and 
roles. Conroy and Emerson (2004) point out that in many surveys corporate leaders 
have recognised that ethical standards-promoting bodies, such as the AACSB52, 
should be encouraged to include ethical considerations within their body of required 
knowledge for students. The related statement, “it is important for students who might 
work in the banking sector in the future to be educated about the importance of 
business ethics” generated significant support among the academics, with a mean of 
4.43 resulting. However, they did not provide the same high level of agreement for the 
statement “business ethics is a key part of our curriculum”, (mean = 3.11) suggesting 
that in practical terms, a substantive gap exists between desired best practice and the 
current academic experience for Saudi students. Clients broadly agreed with the 
statement that “ethical practices influence my decision about which banks to use”, 
generating a mean of 3.94, which is in line with the importance attached to the notion 
of business ethics earlier. This group of clients’ views are consistent with the 
observation of Holme (2008), who stated that as organisations operate in 
communities, they have to recognise that those who provide funds can impose ethical 
demands, irrespective of the firm’s own attitude. Employees were asked for their 
views regarding the notion that “bank employees are aware of the need for high 
standards of ethical behaviour in their professional activities”. The resultant mean of 
3.30 suggests mild support at best. Finally, regulators produced a mean of 3.90 when 
asked whether “ensuring high ethical standards should be a priority for the regulators 
of the Saudi Arabian banking sector”. This suggests that ethics are seen as an 
important issue by Saudi regulators, but not overwhelmingly so. 
                                                 
52 The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business  
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Table 7.8: Corporate Governance and Business Ethics 
Note: This table presents the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding the relationship between corporate governance and business 
ethics. The responses are based on a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. Also, 
the table provides the means for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q8k. There is a relationship between 
corporate governance and business 
ethics 
135 3.84 0.812 3.84 3.70 4.03 3.86 0.404 0.611 0.241 0.833 0.098 0.525 0.350 
Q8l. The existing Saudi Arabian 
Corporate Governance Code is 
sufficient to ensure that the banks 
behave ethically 
135 2.86 0.865 2.67 2.89 2.90 3.05 0.332 0.165 0.241 0.090 0.996 0.528 0.574 
Q8m. A strong code of business 
ethics would enhance corporate 
governance practices in Saudi banks 
135 3.56 0.951 3.70 3.42 3.60 3.57 0.693 0.255 0.910 0.822 0.406 0.522 0.887 
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7.4.3 Corporate Governance and Business Ethics 
 
 
A common theme in the modern academic literature in the area is that an 
organisation’s approach to ethics must be viewed in a corporate governance context 
(Bonn and Fisher, 2005). This relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics was confirmed by the interviewees, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. For instance, interviewee (A2)53 asserted that: 
“Corporate governance and business ethics cannot be separated from each 
other and there is no governance without business ethics. Business ethics 
must be a compulsory part of the corporate governance code”. 
 
 
The next section of the questionnaire therefore concentrated upon issues raised by the 
literature and the interviews relating to the relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics in Saudi Arabian banks. As shown in Table 7.8, the participants 
broadly agreed regarding the existence of a relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics, with a recorded overall mean of 3.84. The highest 
group mean was 4.03, generated by employees, which might suggest that daily 
practices provide the opportunity for this type of relationship to manifest itself. The 
second highest group mean (3.86) was produced by the regulators group, with means 
of 3.84 and 3.70 recorded for academics and clients groups respectively. The p-values 
of the K-W and M-W test results reveal that there were no significant differences 
between all four groups together or between any pair. In relation to the corporate 
governance code in Saudi Arabia and the question of whether it is sufficient to ensure 
that the banks behave ethically, the overall mean of 2.86 suggests ambivalence at best 
among the participants in this regard, in line with the opinion of the majority of the 
interviewees outlined earlier in the thesis, whereby the existence of a code in itself 
                                                 
53 A Senior Executive Vice-President of a Conventional Bank  
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was thought unlikely to ensure best practice. The group means ranged between 3.05 
for regulators and 2.67 for academics; accordingly, there were no significant 
differences between the four groups’ responses. The final statement put to 
respondents in this part of the survey was that “a strong code of business ethics would 
enhance corporate governance practices in Saudi banks.” The participants broadly 
agreed with this statement, generating an overall mean of 3.56, indicating that the 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics was seen as important 
in terms of a bank’s success, but is not overwhelmingly critical. This evidence is 
again consistent with the interview findings where an effective corporate governance 
code was believed to influence ethical performance. Inspection of the group means 
reveal that the highest value was generated by academics (3.70) and the lowest by 
clients (3.42), with the employees and regulators groups attaining mean values of 3.60 
and 3.57 respectively. Reflecting this small range of group means values, the K-W 
and M-W test results affirm that there were no significant differences between the 
four groups or between any pair of them. Taken together, the evidence from the 
significance tests reported in Table 7.8 suggests consistency across stakeholder groups 
regarding the link between the notions of corporate governance and business ethics in 
Saudi Arabia.      
 
7.5 Accountability in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
 
The next section of the questionnaire concentrated on the participants’ perceptions 
regarding accountability, including issues such as to whom Saudi banks should be 
accountable, the current understanding and practice of accountability in the Kingdom, 
exploring how the accountability notion interacts with the concept of corporate 
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governance and dealing ethically, as well as the role of accountability in an Islamic 
framework. 
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Table 7.9: Accountability to Academics, Clients, Employees and Regulators  
Note: This table reports the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants in relation to the banks’ accountability to their academics, clients, employees 
and regulators. The responses are based on a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. 
Also, the table provides the means for each group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A * indicates significance at the 5% level; a ** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator.  
 
 
 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-
values 
M-W 
P-values 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q9a. Banks should be accountable to 
Academics 
135 2.71 1.043 2.81 2.74 2.73 2.43 0.670 0.903 0.958 0.282 0.922 0.255 0.315 
Q9b. Banks should be accountable 
to their Clients 
135 3.21 1.095 3.35 3.17 3.07 3.28 0.687 0.589 0.234 0.926 0.530 0.728 0.371 
Q9c. Banks should be accountable to 
their Employees 
135 3.25 1.020 3.32 3.32 2.93 3.43 0.398 0.996 0.188 0.777 0.151 0.770 0.149 
Q9d. Banks should be accountable 
to the Regulators 
135 3.58 0.917 3.43 3.59 3.43 4.05 0.042* 0.394 0.962 0.022* 0.293 0.060 0.003** 
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7.5.1 Accountability 
 
 
Question 9 sought the respondents’ views about the extent of their agreement with the 
statement that “Saudi banks should be accountable to academics, clients, employees 
and regulators”; Table 7.9 reports the results. The overall mean values presented in 
the table indicate that accountability to the regulators attracted the strongest support 
(mean = 3.58), suggesting that Saudi banks are seen as having a meaningful degree of 
accountability to those charged with overseeing the conduct of the organisations 
concerned. In contrast, the notion that Saudi banks should be accountable to 
academics attracted the lowest overall mean (2.71), indicating that some debate exists 
among the respondents regarding the accountability of Saudi banks to educators. The 
results also suggested some ambivalence among the participants regarding the view 
that Saudi banks should be accountable to their clients and employees, with overall 
means of 3.21 and 3.25 respectively. Surprisingly, the group means show that 
academics attached a mean of only 2.81 to the statement that banks should be 
accountable to academics, suggesting a lack of understanding of the notion of 
accountability and its specific relevance to Saudi banks and/or a degree of cynicism 
regarding the practical likelihood of substantive change. Similarly, both clients (mean 
= 3.17) and employees (mean= 2.93, the lowest of any group) were equivocal about 
their own accountability. In contrast, regulators generated the highest mean (4.05) 
anywhere in the table in their own case. Taken together, it appears that there is a 
substantial mis-match between Saudi regulators and other stakeholders regarding 
banks’ accountability, but in practice it is the former group that have the means to 
address this, ideally whilst educating others about the issues involved. The p-value for 
the K-W test is significant for Q9 (d) regarding Saudi banks’ accountability to the 
regulators. For the same question, the additional analysis of the differences between 
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the pairs (the M-W test) reveals that regulators generated a significantly higher 
average than both academics and employees.  
 
The participants’ perspectives on specific accountability issues in Saudi banks were 
then addressed. Inspection of the results, as shown in Table 7.10 suggests that, 
consistent with the indirect evidence from Table 7.9, the participants tended to 
disagree with the statement that accountability to all stakeholders is understood and 
fulfilled, with a mean of just 2.71 and no group means reaching 3.  
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Table 7.10: Accountability Practices 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants in relation to the bank’s accountability practices. The responses are based on a five-
point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. Also, the table provides the mean for each group and 
the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator. 
 
 
 
 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-value 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q10a. Accountability to all 
stakeholders is understood and fulfilled 
135 2.71 1.043 2.73 2.62 2.67 2.95 0.546 0.720 0.843 0.257 0.896 0.169 0.244 
Q10b. Saudi banks provide equal 
access to relevant information to all 
stakeholders 
135 2.73 1.073 2.94 2.51 2.77 2.81 0.356 0.094 0.596 0.774 0.276 0.264 0.897 
Q10c. Bank employees at all levels are 
accountable for their acts 
135 3.25 1.104 2.97 3.28 3.27 3.67 0.193 0.208 0.282 0.033* 0.996 0.238 0.274 
Q10d. To facilitate a high level of 
accountability, banks need to adopt a 
strong corporate governance system 
135 4.04 0.876 4.05 3.85 4.10 4.33 0.131 0.234 0.929 0.220 0.233 0.026* 0.156 
Q10e. Dealing ethically with all 
stakeholders is part of bank’s 
accountability 
135 3.84 0.905 3.89 3.79 3.77 4.00 0.799 0.837 0.484 0.569 0.760 0.532 0.317 
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Similarly, the participants also tended to disagree with the statement that “Saudi banks 
provide equal access to relevant information to all stakeholders”, with an overall mean 
value of 2.73, and all group means below the midpoint. These results once again point 
to significant widespread concern about accountability practices in Saudi banks. 
Given the close link between the accountability concept and the governance notion, it 
is not surprising that similar concerns appear to exist regarding both.  
 
In response to the statement in Q10 (c) that “bank employees at all levels are 
accountable for their acts” the respondents generated a mean of 3.25 suggesting some 
limited support. Although clients, employees and regulators produced means between 
3.27 and 3.67, the academics’ mean was just 2.97. The M-W test shown in the table 
indicates that the latter was significantly lower than the regulators equivalent of 3.67. 
 
In contrast, the participants agreed strongly with the notion that “to facilitate a high 
level of accountability, banks need to adopt a strong corporate governance system”, 
since the overall mean for the responses to Q10 (d) was 4.04. All four groups 
generated means of more than 4, except for clients (3.85). Regulators produced the 
highest mean (4.33) and the M-W test reported a significant difference between this 
group and the clients. Finally, the participants seemed to agree (with a mean of 3.84) 
with the statement in Q10 (e) that dealing ethically with all stakeholders is part of a 
bank’s accountability. The spread of means was narrow, from 4 (regulators) to 3.77 
(employees) and none of the differences proved significant. Taking the evidence in 
Table 7.10 as a whole, it is noticeable that in these cases regulators generated the 
highest means in four of five cases suggesting a strong degree of engagement with the 
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accountability notion on their part; this might be advantageous for the KSA in 
attempts to improve corporate behaviour in this area going forward.        
                      
7.5.2 Accountability from an Islamic Perspective 
 
 
In order to examine the participants’ views about the concept of accountability from 
an Islamic perspective, they were asked three yes/no questions relating to the conflict 
between: (i) Sharia and corporate governance; and (ii) business ethics and 
accountability. The respondents were also asked to rate their agreement level with 
eight specific statements relating to the issue. 
 
According to Islamic teaching, business must be performed in accordance with Sharia 
rules and values (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). In addition, decisions regarding business 
transactions are guided by iman (faith) which, in practice, means following the law of 
Sharia and engaging in only what is permitted. Consequently, question 11 in the 
survey was designed to establish whether any conflict is perceived between Sharia 
and the principles of corporate governance that could affect practices regarding the 
latter in the Saudi Arabian environment. Only one participant, an employee, believed 
that there is a conflict between Sharia and corporate governance principles, but he 
failed to comment further or explain this perceived conflict. For question 12, two 
respondents, again from the employee group, agreed that there is a conflict between 
Sharia and business ethics principles, but again they failed to explain this. Likewise, 
the responses to Q13 show that just one person, once again an employee, saw there 
being a conflict between Sharia and accountability. Overall, and notwithstanding the 
noted exceptions, it is clear that the majority of the participants believe that Sharia 
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does not conflict with corporate governance principles, business ethics principles or 
accountability.  
 
The responses to Q14 (a), summarised in Table 7.11, indicate some disagreement 
among the respondents regarding the statement that “Islamic banks and Islamic 
windows apply Sharia principles in all transactions”; the group means range from 
2.97 (for employees) to 2.71 (for regulators) with the overall average equalling 2.81. 
The K-W and M-W test results confirm similarity in group averages as there are no 
significant differences between all four or any pair. This result suggests some 
widespread dissatisfaction among the participants regarding the religious basis of 
Islamic banking and Islamic window transactions. In accountability terms, Muslims 
believe that they will account in the hereafter for whatever they do during their life 
(Lewis, 2006). Relating to this point, Q14 (b) asked whether employees apply the 
Islamic concept of accountability when dealing with their shareholders, but the mean 
of just 2.57 suggests concern in this regard as well. Question 14 (c) also attracted 
some disagreement (mean of 2.64) regarding whether employees apply the Islamic 
concept of accountability when dealing with all stakeholders. For these two questions, 
the lowest group means were generated by the academic group (2.32 for Q14 (b) and 
2.54 for Q14 (c)), although there were no significant differences between the groups 
regarding these two questions. However, the results report that the participants tended 
to agree that corporate governance practices are influenced by the Islamic conception 
of accountability (with a mean of 3.27 for Q14 (d)). The group means show that 
academics again produced the lowest mean value of 2.92, while those of clients, 
employees and regulators were above the midpoint (3.25, 3.3 and 3.52 respectively). 
The K-W and M-W tests for Q14 (d), indicate some significant differences among the 
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groups, with the academics’ mean significantly lower than the figures generated by 
employees and regulators. This suggests that the academic conceptualisation of 
accountability in an Islamic context has not spread more widely in Saudi Arabia.
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Table 7.11: Accountability from an Islamic Perspective 
Note: This table presents the means and standard deviation (StDv) for all participants regarding accountability from an Islamic perspective. The responses are based 
on a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree and 5= agree to a great extent. Also, the table provides the means for each 
group and the p-values for the K-W and M-W tests. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. A = Academic; C = Client; E = Employee; R = Regulator. 
Questions No Mean StDv 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-
values 
M-W 
P-values 
A C E R A-C A-E A-R C-E C-R E-R 
Q14a. Islamic banks and Islamic windows 
employ Sharia principles in all transactions 
135 2.81 0.956 2.78 2.79 2.97 2.71 0.746 0.992 0.465 0.681 0.428 0.673 0.284 
Q14b. Islamic banks ensure that their 
employees at all levels apply the Islamic 
concept of accountability in their dealings 
with their shareholders 
135 2.57 0.824 2.32 2.62 2.80 2.57 0.193 0.135 0.045* 0.195 0.399 0.874 0.515 
Q14c. Islamic banks ensure that their 
employees at all levels apply the Islamic 
concept of accountability in their dealings 
with all stakeholders 
135 2.64 0.910 2.54 2.70 2.63 2.71 0.797 0.455 0.730 0.335 0.749 0.702 0.629 
Q14d. Islamic banks ensure that corporate 
governance practices are influenced by the 
Islamic concept of accountability 
135 3.27 1.052 2.92 3.25 3.53 3.52 0.049* 0.210 0.022* 0.009* 0.264 0.214 0.781 
Q14e. Islamic banks offer all stakeholders 
the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process according to the 
concept of Shura 
135 2.87 1.111 2.76 2.83 2.90 3.09 0.668 0.700 0.749 0.200 0.940 0.296 0.507 
Q14f. Islamic banks follow the concept of 
Hisba  in their relationships with their 
employees 
135 2.90 1.081 2.70 2.91 3.37 2.52 0.031* 0.363 0.011* 0.655 0.071 0.238 
0.012
* 
Q14g. The concepts of Shura and Hisba 
affect the banks’ attitudes to ethics 
135 3.18 1.101 3.19 3.32 3.13 2.95 0.513 0.489 0.854 0.329 0.454 0.141 0.518 
Q14h. The Sharia Supervisory Board 
(SSB) affects and is affected by the banks’ 
attitude to ethics 
135 3.40 1.114 3.43 3.40 3.43 3.28 0.960 0.884 0.667 0.852 0.887 0.710 0.602 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, in Islamic society the concepts of Shura, Hisba and SSB 
are core elements of corporate governance and accountability from an Islamic 
perspective (Gambling and Karim, 1991; Al-Jirari, 1996). As a result, the participants 
were questioned about each of these three elements.  In relation to the statement in 
Q14 (e) that “Islamic banks offer all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in the 
decision making process according to the concept of Shura”, the participants 
produced a mean of just 2.87, suggesting that some dissatisfaction exists in this 
regard. The group means indicate only regulators (3.09) generated a mean higher than 
the mid-point, while academics - as with the three previous statements - produced the 
lowest (2.78). Although the differences were not significant, the low means generated 
in all cases by the academics clearly point to a miss-match between the views of 
educators and practitioners that Saudi authorities should be aware of and address. The 
overall means for Q14 (f) show that there was also disagreement with the statement 
that “Islamic banks follow the concept of Hisba in their relationships with their 
employees” with an overall mean of 2.90. Group means ranged from 3.37 
(employees) to 2.52 (regulators). The K-W test emphasised this variety by indicating 
significant differences across the groups. The M-W test results reveal two significant 
pairwise differences, between academics and employees and between employees and 
regulators, with, in this case, the relatively high figure for regulators driving the 
significant differences. Table 7.11 also reveals, however that respondents believe the 
concepts of Shura and Hisba affect Saudi banks’ attitudes to ethics. The overall mean 
for Q14 (g) is 3.18, above the mid-point, suggesting some agreement among the 
participants regarding this statement. There were no significant differences between 
the groups, but this result is in line with the broad agreement found among the 
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interviewees regarding the relationship between business ethics and the concepts of 
Shura and Hisba. 
 
Finally, the participants were asked whether the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), 
affects or is affected by banks’ attitude to ethics. The overall mean value (3.40) for 
Q14 (h) suggests that the respondents agreed to some extent with this statement, with 
all four groups generating figures above the mid-point on the likert scale. The 
similarity in group attitudes is affirmed by the K-W and M-W tests, since there are no 
significant differences between the groups. To conclude, the respondents agreed that 
Shura, Hisba and SSB, the three aspects of the Islamic concept of accountability, are 
relevant in an ethical context, but none of the overall or sub-group means exceeded 
3.5, suggesting some equivocality on the issue. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has reported the results of online questionnaire surveys that were 
distributed among four groups of Saudi banks’ stakeholders (Academics, Clients, 
Employees and Regulators) between July and August 2013. The results show that 
there is a high level of agreement among the respondents regarding the definitions of 
corporate governance, largely in line with the 1992 Cadbury report. The participants 
also appeared to be familiar to some extent with the Saudi code of corporate 
governance; taken together, these results suggest that the respondents were in a 
position to provide reasonably informed opinions of the issues central to the study. 
The findings suggest that the participants had strong beliefs about the importance of 
corporate governance, but were dissatisfied with both how it is being practiced by 
Saudi banks and the levels of awareness of corporate governance existing in the 
214 
 
Kingdom’s banking sector. Similarly, little satisfaction was evidenced regarding the 
extent of compliance by Saudi banks with the corporate governance code. As a result, 
the participants agreed that penalties should be imposed on banks that fail to comply 
with relevant regulations.  
 
In terms of business ethics issues, including their relationship with corporate 
governance, the respondents acknowledged several proposed definitions of the 
former, but, overall favoured a narrow definition focussing on employee behaviour. 
Whilst the results reveal a high level of agreement among the participants regarding 
the importance of business ethics in Saudi banks there was clear dissatisfaction among 
the respondents regarding the practice (and broader awareness) of ethics in the sector. 
Consequently, the participants strongly agreed with the suggestion that there should 
be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi banks imposed by a regulatory body. More 
generally, the participants acknowledged the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics, emphasising its importance with regard to Saudi 
banks’ success.  
 
There was agreement that the notion of accountability to all stakeholders is 
understood and taken seriously by banks. In general, it appears to be the view of Saudi 
banks’ stakeholders that high levels of accountability require a strong corporate 
governance system. The need to deal ethically when interacting with all stakeholders 
was also seen as part of banks’ accountability. Finally in terms of accountability from 
an Islamic perspective, one of the most significant findings in terms of problems with 
current practice is the disagreement among the respondents relating to employing 
Sharia principles in all Islamic banks or in Islamic window transactions, which might 
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indicate the existence of some dissatisfaction and misunderstandings of a key 
religious principle.  
 
In terms of differences amongst the four sub-groups, whilst on many occasions their 
views appear to converge, in many of the instances where this is not the case it is the 
academics that appear out of line. In addition to the business ethics definition case 
referred to above, academics had perspectives on employee accountability and, in 
particular, the role of Islamic principles in accountability that differed markedly from 
others’ views. Given that one of the key findings reported in this chapter is that Saudi 
bank stakeholders see major room for improvement in governance-related issues, 
divergence between academic leaders’ understanding of current practices and that of 
those more closely-involved on a day-to-day basis is concerning. 
 
Having presented empirical results in this and previous chapter, the thesis concludes 
in chapter 8 by reviewing the findings, discussing their implications and limitations, 
and making suggestions for further work in the area. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
217 
 
Conclusions, Contributions, Limitations and Future Research  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
The main objective of the current study was to begin to fill the gap in the literature 
regarding reforming and enhancing corporate governance in the Saudi Arabian 
financial sector by exploring the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in Saudi-listed banks. Using accountability as a theoretical lens, the 
perceptions of key stakeholder groups of Saudi-listed banks were targeted for 
investigation. The stakeholder groups ultimately included in the thesis were: 
Academics, Board Members, Clients, Employees, Managers and Regulators. To fulfil 
the objectives of the study and assess the perceptions of these individuals, two 
research methods were employed: face-to-face semi-structured interviews and a 
questionnaire survey. The semi-structured interviews took place between March and 
June 2012 with the board members and managers of Saudi listed banks. Subsequently, 
the perceptions of a wider group of Saudi banks’ stakeholders were explored using a 
questionnaire survey that was completed in August 2013.  
 
This chapter provides a general discussion of the empirical findings and their 
implications, as well as drawing together the conclusions about the relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi-listed banks that the 
evidence points to. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 presents a 
summary of the thesis before the major findings are discussed in Section 8.3. Section 
8.4 then highlights the research contributions and implications while Section 8.5 
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outlines the limitations of the research. Section 8.6 provides suggestions for further 
research in the area. Concluding thoughts to this study are presented in Section 8.7.   
 
8.2 Summary of the Thesis 
 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 outlined the significance of the 
research and presented the research questions. It also highlighted the research scope, 
limitations and structure. Chapter 2 shed some light on issues related to the study’s 
Saudi context, such as the legal system and financial regulatory bodies. Chapter 3 then 
reviewed the literature relating to corporate governance, including corporate social 
responsibility, business ethics in general and how business ethics are affected by 
religion, particularly Islam. In addition, the relationship between corporate 
governance and business ethics was described. Chapter 4 discussed the theoretical 
framework adopted in the thesis to interpret the research findings. The research was 
shown to employ accountability theory, in an Islamic context. Chapter 5 focused on 
the methodology and methods adopted in this study. An interpretive paradigm was 
highlighted as the methodological approach employed in order to provide an 
understanding of Saudi banks stakeholders’ perceptions. Semi-structured interviews 
and a questionnaire survey were explained as the two methods adopted in this study to 
obtain the primary data. The results of the 17 interviews with the board members and 
managers of Saudi listed banks were reported in Chapter 6. The interviewees’ 
perceptions about corporate governance practices and business ethics, and how these 
are inter-related, were analysed and linked to the prior literature, in the context of the 
accountability framework adopted. Chapter 7 presented and analysed the results of the 
questionnaire survey completed by 135 participants from four key groups of 
stakeholders: Academics, Clients, Employees and Regulators. The questionnaire 
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survey covered issues related to corporate governance, business ethics, accountability 
and accountability from an Islamic perspective.  
     
8.3 Research Findings 
 
 
This section sums up the key findings obtained from the empirical analysis and how 
they address in order the study’s central research questions, which are: 
 
1. What is the relationship between business ethics and corporate governance in 
the Saudi Arabian banking sector?  
 
2. What role does accountability, including Islamic accountability, play in this 
relationship?  
 
In relation to corporate governance, the findings suggest that there is a widespread 
belief amongst the participants that corporate governance is one of the most important 
concepts for banks and the financial sector in general. This reflects a good level of 
understanding of corporate governance’s importance. Furthermore, the interview 
findings indicate that there is a particular focus in terms of the definition of corporate 
governance on the interests of all stakeholders, which reflects some engagement with 
accountability. The questionnaire survey results confirmed this by impression 
revealing a high level of satisfaction among the participants with a definition that 
refers to the broad stakeholder perspective.  
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As mentioned earlier, a compulsory corporate governance code for Saudi-listed 
companies issued was issued by CMA in 2006; the majority of the interviewees 
believe that the code is sufficient. However, the participants in the subsequent 
questionnaire survey were dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance code, in line with some interviewees, they argued that the code is 
sufficient only as a foundation document, with more detail needed. Saudi-listed banks 
have different ways of complying with the corporate governance code; the majority of 
them distribute the code articles across several departments, depending on their 
specific concern. Nevertheless, there was a low degree of satisfaction amongst the 
participants with the compliance of the banks with the corporate governance code; 
perhaps as a result, they believed that penalties should be imposed on banks that fail 
to comply with the code.  
  
There is no official code for business ethics imposed by the regulatory bodies in Saudi 
Arabia, and Saudi banks are not required to adopt such a code. However, all listed 
banks have their own code for business ethics in order to protect and improve their 
reputation. This belief in the importance of a business ethics code was confirmed by 
the findings reported in Chapter 7. In contrast, there was some conflict between the 
interview and questionnaire results in relation to the influence of business ethics on 
banks’ practices. While the findings of Chapter 6 indicate interviewee beliefs that 
business ethics influence the practices of the banks (even if these need to be better 
monitored), Chapter 7 demonstrated a low level of acceptance among the larger 
sample of questionnaire respondents that this is the case. As a result, there was strong 
agreement that there should be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi banks.      
221 
 
In order to answer the research question concerning “the relationship between 
corporate governance and business ethics in Saudi banks”, this study explored the 
perspective of the participants regarding this relationship. The findings indicate a 
strong relationship between corporate governance and business ethics which is seen as 
having a positive impact on the banks’ practices. However, there is no ethical code 
included in the Saudi corporate governance code, and the latter alone was viewed as 
insufficient to ensure that the banks behave ethically. Enhancing corporate 
governance practices by applying a business ethics code was seen as practically 
important in terms of a bank’s success. Significantly, all parties related to Saudi banks 
appear to be considered as stakeholders, including society, and social responsibility is 
evidently regarded as a key aspect of ethical dealing.  
 
The importance of accountability for Saudi listed banks was clear in participants’ 
responses. It is seen as playing a key role in protecting banks, enhancing their 
reputation and providing an environment for sound business. The findings of Chapter 
6 show that banks were viewed by the interviewees as being accountable to all of the 
related parties and stakeholders’ groups and should provide them with appropriate 
services and information when required. However, Chapter 7 indicated that 
accountability to all stakeholders is neither well understood nor fulfilled; equally 
concerning, Saudi banks do not appear to provide equal access to information across 
all stakeholder groups. 
 
The findings of the empirical chapters suggest that Saudi banks need to adopt stronger 
corporate governance systems in order to facilitate meaningful levels of 
accountability, since a robust governance structure clearly defines the responsibilities 
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necessary for accountability to be achieved. Furthermore, dealing ethically is a key 
aspect of accountability for all stakeholders, so this cannot be neglected or waived if 
banks want to protect and promote their reputation and not cause dissatisfaction 
among concerned parties (Zadek, 1998).  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Sharia concept encourages individuals to act in a proper 
way and to perform in favour of all related parties, exactly in line with the broader 
corporate governance notion advanced by Solomon and others. In contrast, there was 
disagreement among the participants in Chapter 7 in relation to how Sharia principles 
are applied to Saudi banks’ transections in practice. In addition, there was 
dissatisfaction regarding the Shura concept, indicating that the banks are failing to 
offer each stakeholder an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. 
Significantly, while there was an agreement in Chapter 6 about the impact of the 
Hisba element upon corporate governance and accountability practices, Chapter 7 
suggested dissatisfaction in relation to such an impact.  
 
One form of the Hisba concept is “whistle blowing”, which is often cited as a tool of 
corporate governance and accountability systems (Al-Jirari, 1996), and this means 
that every employee should be responsible for any bank violations and should inform 
the management about it. More generally, the results show that business ethics are 
seen as affecting and being affected by both the Shura and Hisba concepts in the 
context of Saudi listed banks.   
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8.4 Contributions and Implications 
 
 
8.4.1 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
 
The present findings provide an important contribution to corporate governance 
debates in the large and growing Saudi Arabian financial sector and attendant 
concerns with business ethics. Since 2006, when the country’s first corporate 
governance code was issued, there have been several studies on the latter and its 
impact on Saudi firms. However, both before and since then, no studies have explored 
corporate governance’s relationship in the context of business ethics, despite this link 
now being part of most debates about modern business behaviour; the current study 
was deliberately intended to fill this gap. In particular, the current findings contribute 
to knowledge by examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
business ethics in the Saudi financial sector from an accountability perspective.  
 
As a result, the study is intended to fill a gap in the corporate governance literature 
relating to links among governance, ethics and accountability in an Islamic context. 
Certainly in so far as stakeholder perceptions are concerned, Figure 8.1 demonstrates 
that perceived links exist amongst all these concepts. In particular, governance is 
viewed as having a strong ethical context (arrow A) as well as reflecting the notions 
of both general and Islamic accountability (arrow B). However, the latter were also 
revealed by the research to play a direct role in the ethical construct, suggesting a 
third relationship, denoted in Figure 8.1 as arrow C. This characterisation fits with the 
work of Monks and Minow (2004) who specifically related the three concepts 
inherent in the present study (corporate governance, business ethics and accountability 
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in a developed country context). This thesis has, though, extended this notion into an 
Islamic context, which represents an important theoretical contribution.   
 
Figure 8.1 Links between Corporate Governance, Business Ethics and Accountability 
 
Note: this figure attempts to conceptualise the relationship between the three central 
components examined in this thesis.  
 
 
According to this researcher’s knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to 
explore links between corporate governance and accountability from an Islamic 
perspective. However, the evidence presented suggests that in the Saudi financial 
sector, links are also perceived between these notions and the concept of business 
ethics, suggesting a moral dimension that prior theoretical analyses have ignored.   
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The present study has developed our understanding of how corporate governance 
practices are perceived in the Saudi financial sector, including how the banks deal 
with the official code. Given how important this sector is to emerging nations 
generally, and the Middle East in particular (Krebat et al., 2013), such insights are 
likely to be highly-relevant to market regulators in the nations concerned.  
 
A specific major contribution of the study is the exploration of the impact of the 
business ethics concept in Saudi-listed banks from the point of view of several key 
stakeholder groups. In addition, the role of internal business ethics codes in each 
bank, including their limitations in practice and implications for banking practices 
have been highlighted.  
 
The thesis further contributes to knowledge as it constitutes the first attempt to 
explore the relationship between corporate governance and business ethics in the 
financial sector in Saudi Arabia. The evidence points to perception of a strong 
relationship between corporate governance and business ethics, with the view 
emerging that the Saudi corporate governance code needs to be enhanced by including 
a compulsory business ethics code and a change in approach where behaving ethically 
towards stakeholders in general is seen as something worthwhile.  Finally, the thesis 
had provided novel evidence that aids understanding of both broad accountability and, 
specifically, Islamic accountability frameworks and their impact on corporate 
governance and ethical standards in the Saudi financial sector.   
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8.4.2 Implications of the Findings  
 
 
In addition to providing theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge, the 
current study also has a number of policy implications. According to the empirical 
findings there is no dominant definition of corporate governance amongst Saudi bank 
stakeholders which might reflect a lack of understanding of the notion, despite its 
prevalence in academic articles for several decades. Perhaps reflecting this point, the 
CMA does not explain how its code should be employed or who in a corporation 
should be responsible for its implementation. As a result there was disparity among 
participants’ understanding and in banks’ performance, and a lack of awareness of the 
corporate governance code amongst employees. This evidence should encourage 
regulatory bodies such as the CMA to develop and monitor the code in order to 
enhance understanding and practice. Interestingly, academics expressed less 
satisfaction than did other groups in relation to corporate governance practices and the 
need for corporate governance to be taught in more depth at university level in Saudi 
Arabia is evident. Currently, corporate governance is not part of the mainstream 
curriculum, and the evidence here suggest that the issue requires an immediate 
response by integrating the notion and its importance into education, especially for 
students likely to follow careers in the financial sector.  
 
The findings of this study have revealed that there are internal ethical codes at each 
bank, but they clearly require external monitoring to be effective in practice. The 
evidence further suggests the need to integrate an ethical code that guides employees’ 
behaviour in their daily activities, but with strong monitoring of bank compliance 
being critical. Regarding this issue, academics, again admitted that the importance of 
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business ethics is absent from the curricula and change is needed. Significantly, this 
absence also exists in the literature on Saudi business in general.  
 
The findings of the current study highlight a further practical weakness in Saudi 
banks’ internal context systems in that the lack of official code, or bodies to regulate 
and monitor SSBs, was seen by participants as a problem. Such regulatory bodies 
should enhance the performance of SSBs in order to foster an effective corporate 
governance system and encourage Islamically-ethical business practices. This type of 
practical weakness in SSBs, - alongside the dissatisfaction evident among participants 
regarding the Shura concept and conflicting views in relation to the Hisba - suggest 
issues with all three key elements of accountability from an Islamic perspective. Saudi 
regulatory bodies may therefore need to take action to provide clarity and 
commonality regarding these matters if ethical behaviour that is consistent with the 
Kingdom’s Islamic foundations is to prevail.   
 
Finally, it was noticeable on several occasions that academics held different views to 
the rest of participants, generally in terms of having greater concern over current 
practices. This trend is worrying, and suggests that without action on behalf of Saudi 
authorities to bring educational and financial institutions together, the chances of 
leaders in both sectors working together effectively to bring about meaningful change 
is limited.   
 
8.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
 
Several important limitations to this study need to be acknowledged. The relitively 
small number of participants and respondents is the first limitation, since 17 
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interviews and 135 questionnaire surveys were conducted. Employing such methods 
might not reflect the perceptions about corporate governance and business ethics of all 
stakeholders in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the stakeholder groups who participated in 
this study represent some of the stakeholders but not all of them, as it was very 
difficult to include all theoretically-possible groups; generalisation of the results 
might be affected as a result. Furthermore, the interviews and questionnaire surveys 
were conducted in Arabic, before being translated by the researcher; this might cause 
changes in the participants’ views, although, the translated and original versions were 
reviewed by the researcher’s colleagues to ensure rigour in the translation process.  
 
In relation to the research methods, adopted semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaire surveys can be misleading in some contexts. For example, some 
interviewees might not wish to give a bad impression of their bank, and so give 
entirely honest answers. Also, participants in the questionnaire can lose focus when 
completing overly-long surveys. As a result, the document used here was kept 
relatively short, to try and avoid this problem.  
 
8.6 Future Research 
 
 
The current study, deliberately given its importance, only explores the relationship 
between corporate governance and business ethics the banking sector of the Saudi 
market. However, further research might usefully investigate this relationship in other 
sectors of the Saudi market. Moreover, a comparison between the financial sectors in 
Saudi Arabia and other countries in the GCC could be made.  
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Future research might also employ different methods, such as case studies of 
individual organisation practices, and the results compared with those of the current 
study. The case study method can provide significant insights in many context and 
investigating the practical relationship between corporate governance and business 
ethics might prove suitable.  
 
In terms of business ethics, future research might examine the effectiveness of bank 
codes in further detail. Furthermore, a comparison might be undertaken between 
conventional and Islamic banks in relation to the business ethics codes in operation. 
Finally, future research might consider developing business ethics principles that can 
be included in future drafts of the corporate governance code, either for the Saudi 
market as a whole or, given the sector’s importance, simply for the banking sector. 
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Appendices 2.1: 
 
Capital Market Authority 
Corporate Governance Regulations 
In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia 
 
Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority 
Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006 
                                  dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006) 
based on the Capital Market Law issued by 
Royal Decree No. M/30 
dated 2/6/1424AH 
 
Amended by Resolution of the Board 
of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-10-2010 
Dated 30/3/1431H corresponding to 16/3/2010G 
 
English Translation of the Official Arabic Text 
Arabic is the official language of the Capital Market Authority 
 
The current version of these Rules, as may be amended, can be found at on 
the CMA website: www.cma.org.sa 
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Part 1 
Preliminary Provisions 
 
Article 1: Preamble 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the management of 
joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure their compliance with the best 
governance practices that would ensure the protection of shareholders' rights as well 
as the rights of stakeholders. 
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies listed in the 
Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or resolutions of the Board of the 
Authority provide for the binding effect of some of the provisions herein contained. 
 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must disclose in the 
Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have been implemented and the 
provisions that have not been implemented as well as the reasons for not 
implementing them. 
 
Article 2: Definitions 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear in the 
Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in the regulations and 
the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless otherwise stated in these regulations. 
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b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following expressions and 
terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows unless the contrary intention 
appears: 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys complete 
independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute an infringement of 
such independence: 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the company or any of 
its group. 
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or more of the 
issued shares of the company or any of its group. 
3. he/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of the company 
or of any other company within that company's group. 
4. he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company or of any 
other company within that company's group. 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the company or of any 
other company within that company's group. 
6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the company which 
he is nominated to be a member of its board. 
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with an affiliate of 
the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, such as external auditors or 
main suppliers; or if he/she, during the preceding two years, had a controlling interest 
in any such party. 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not have a 
full-time management position at the company, or who does not receive monthly or 
yearly salary. 
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First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as shareholders, 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which gives each 
shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares he/she holds. He/she 
has the right to use them all for one nominee or to divide them between his/her 
selected nominees without any duplication of these votes. This method increases the 
chances of the minority shareholders to appoint their representatives in the board 
through the right to accumulate votes for one nominee. 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of shareholders 
that does not control the company and hence they are unable to influence the 
company. 
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Part 2 
Rights of Shareholders and the General Assembly 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in particular, the 
right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share of the company's assets 
upon liquidation; the right to attend the General Assembly and participate in 
deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the right of disposition with respect to 
shares; the right to supervise the Board of 
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; the right to 
inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the company's interests 
and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital Market Law and the 
Implementing Rules. 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to 
Information 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify the 
procedures and precautions that are necessary for the shareholders' exercise of all their 
lawful rights. 
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their rights shall be 
made available and such information shall be comprehensive and accurate; it must be 
provided and updated regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall 
use the most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No discrepancy 
shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation to providing information. 
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Article 554: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six months 
following the end of the company's financial year. 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to convene pursuant to a request 
of the auditor or a number of shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% 
of the equity share capital. 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and announced 
by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting; invitation for the meeting 
shall be published in the Exchange' website, the company's website and in two 
newspapers of voluminous distribution in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means 
shall be used in communicating with shareholders. 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively participate and vote in 
the General Assembly; they shall be informed about the rules governing the meetings 
and the voting procedure. 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the greatest number 
of shareholders in the General Assembly, including inter alia determination of the 
appropriate place and time. 
f) In preparing the General Assembly's agenda, the Board of Directors shall take into 
consideration matters shareholders require to be listed in that agenda; shareholders 
holding not less than 5% of the company's shares are entitled to add one or more items 
to the agenda. upon its preparation. 
                                                 
54 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 
17/2/1434H corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (i) and (j) of Article 5 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G. 
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g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of the General 
Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board members and to the external 
auditor. The Board of Directors or the external auditor shall answer the questions 
raised by shareholders in a manner that does not prejudice the company's interest. 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by sufficient 
information to enable shareholders to make decisions. 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General Assembly; the 
company shall provide the Authority with a copy of those minutes within 10 days of 
the convening date of any such meeting. 
j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the 
General Assembly. 
 
Article 6: Voting Rights 
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in 
any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any action which might hamper 
the use of the voting right; a shareholder must be afforded all possible assistance as 
may facilitate the exercise of such right. 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board members, the 
accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is not a board 
member and who is not an employee of the company to attend the General Assembly 
on his behalf. 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - e.g. investment 
funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their voting policies, actual voting, and 
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ways of dealing with any material conflict of interests that may affect the practice of 
the fundamental rights in relation to their investments. 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding dividends, in a 
manner that may realize the interests of shareholders and those of the company; 
shareholders shall be informed of that policy during the General Assembly and 
reference thereto shall be made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of distribution. 
These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares shall be given, as of right, to 
the shareholders who are listed in the records kept at the Securities Depository Center 
as they appear at the end of trading session on the day on which the General 
Assembly is convened. 
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Part 3 
Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Article 8: Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and supervisory rules 
related to disclosure, pursuant to law. 
 
Article 955: Disclosure in the Board of Directors' Report 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the content of 
the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the annual financial 
statements of the company, such report shall include the following: 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the provisions which 
have not been implemented, and the justifications for not implementing them. 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the company Board of 
Directors member acts as a member of its Board of directors. 
c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its members as follows: 
executive board member, non-executive board member, or independent board 
member. 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main committees 
such as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee; 
indicating their names, names of their chairmen, names of their members, and the 
aggregate of their respective meetings. 
                                                 
55 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 
12/11/1429H corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report 
issued by the company following the date of the Board of the Capital Market Authority resolution 
mentioned above. 
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e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the following: 
1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest compensation and 
remuneration from the company. The CEO and the chief finance officer shall be 
included if they are not within the top five. 
For the purpose of this paragraph, "compensation and remuneration" means salaries, 
allowances, profits and any of the same; annual and periodic bonuses related to 
performance; long or short- term incentive schemes; and any other rights in rem. 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the company by 
the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or judiciary body. 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control procedures of 
the company. 
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Part 4 
Board of Directors 
 
Article 1056: Main Functions of the Board of Directors 
Among the main functions of the Board is the following: 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and supervising 
their implementation; this includes: 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the main work plans and 
the policy related to risk management, reviewing and updating of such policy. 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the company, its strategies 
and financial objectives and approving its annual budgets. 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and acquisition/disposal of 
assets. 
4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and supervising the 
implementation thereof and the overall performance of the company. 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional structures of the 
company on a periodical basis. 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this includes: 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of interest and remedy 
any possible cases of conflict by members of the Board of Directors, executive 
management and shareholders. This includes misuse of the company's assets and 
facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from dealings with the related parties. 
                                                 
56 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-33-2011) Dated 
3/12/1432H corresponding to 30/10/2011G making paragraph (b) of Article 10 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2012. 
- The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 10 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 
30/6/2013G. 
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2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting procedures including 
procedures related to the preparation of the financial reports. 
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate for risk 
management by forecasting the risks that the company could encounter and disclosing 
them with transparency. 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control systems. 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not contradict 
the provisions of this regulation, supervising and monitoring in general the 
effectiveness of the code and amending it whenever necessary. 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for the 
membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them after they have been 
approved by the General Assembly. 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a 
view to protecting their respective rights; in particular, such policy must cover the 
following: 
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of contravening their rights 
under the law and their respective contracts. 
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might arise between the 
company and the stakeholders. 
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with customers and 
suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of information related to them. 
4. A code of conduct for the company's executives and employees compatible with the 
proper professional and ethical standards, and regulate their relationship with the 
stakeholders. The Board of Directors lays down procedures for supervising this code 
and ensuring compliance there with. 
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5. The Company's social contributions. 
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company's compliance with the laws 
and regulations and the company's obligation to disclose material information to 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. 
 
Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board 
a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the company's 
Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the company's 
management. The ultimate responsibility for the company rests with the Board even if 
it sets up committees or delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of 
Directors shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney. 
b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the 
company's Articles of Association. 
c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in good 
faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient information 
from the executive management, or from any other reliable source. 
d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he undertakes to 
carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the company, but not the interests 
of the group he represents or that which voted in favor of his appointment to the 
Board of Directors. 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to the executive 
management and the procedures for taking any action and the validity of such 
delegation. It shall also determine matters reserved for decision by the Board of 
Directors. The executive management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic 
reports on the exercise of the delegated powers. 
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f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for orienting the 
new board members of the company's business and, in particular, the financial and 
legal aspects, in addition to their training, where necessary. 
g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about the company 
is made available to all members of the Board of Directors, generally, and, in 
particular, to the non-executive members, to enable them to discharge their duties and 
responsibilities in an effective manner. 
h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which spans more 
than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate of the company, or drop the 
company's debts, unless it is authorized to do so by the company's Articles of 
Association. In the case where the company's Articles of Association includes no 
provisions to this respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the 
General Assembly, unless such acts fall within the normal scope of the company's 
business. 
 
Article 1257: Formation of the Board 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number of the Board 
of Directors members, provided that such number shall not be less than three and not 
more than eleven. 
                                                 
57 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 
12/11/1429H corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the 
Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
- The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraph (g) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G. 
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b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of Directors for the 
duration provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, provided that 
such duration shall not exceed three years. Unless otherwise provided for in the 
Articles of Association of the company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
c) The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be nonexecutive 
members. It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general manager. 
d) The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less than two 
members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. 
e) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner in which 
membership of the Board of Directors terminates.  
f) At all times, the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members of the 
Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association provide otherwise. 
g) On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways of 
termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and the Exchange and 
shall specify the reasons for such termination. 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the Board of 
Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same time. 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company's Articles of Association to 
appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not entitled to nomination vote of 
other members of the Board of Directors. 
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Article 13: Committees of the Board 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with the company's 
requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the Board of Directors to perform 
its duties in an effective manner. 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors shall be 
according to general procedures laid down by the Board, indicating the duties, the 
duration and the powers of each committee, and the manner in which the Board 
monitors its activities. The committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings 
or decisions with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities of such committees so as to ensure that the activities entrusted to those 
committees are duly performed. The Board shall approve the by-laws of all 
committees of the Board, including, inter alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee. 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors shall 
be appointed in committees that are concerned with activities that might involve a 
conflict of interest, such as ensuring the integrity of the financial and non-financial 
reports, reviewing the deals concluded by related parties, nomination to membership 
of the Board, appointment of executive directors, and determination of remuneration. 
 
Article 1458: Audit Committee 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the "Audit 
Committee". Its members shall not be less than three, including a specialist in 
                                                 
58 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 
12/11/1429H corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
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financial and accounting matters. Executive board members are not eligible for Audit 
Committee membership. 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation of the Board 
of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of the Audit Committee and 
define the term of their office and the procedure to be followed by the Committee. 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the following: 
1. To supervise the company's internal audit department to ensure its effectiveness in 
executing the activities and duties specified by the Board of Directors. 
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written report on such audit 
and its recommendations with respect to it. 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the implementation of the corrective 
measures in respect of the comments included in them. 
4. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment, dismissal and the 
Remuneration of external auditors; upon any such recommendation, regard must be 
made to their independence. 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve any activity beyond 
the scope of the audit work assigned to them during the performance of their duties. 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and make any comments 
thereon. 
7. To review the external auditor's comments on the financial statements and follow 
up the actions taken about them. 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to presentation to the 
Board of Directors; and to give opinion and recommendations with respect thereto. 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board of Directors of any 
recommendation regarding them. 
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Article 1559: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named "Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee". 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of Directors, 
issue rules for the appointment of the members of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee, terms of office and the procedure to be followed by such committee. 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
include the following: 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to membership of the Board in 
accordance with the approved policies and standards; the Committee shall ensure that 
no person who has been previously convicted of any offense affecting honor or 
honesty is nominated for such membership. 
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for membership of the Board of 
Directors and the preparation of a description of the required capabilities and 
qualifications for such membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board 
member should reserve for the activities of the Board. 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend changes. 
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of Directors and 
recommend remedies that are compatible with the company's interest. 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent members and the 
absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board member also acts as a member of 
the Board of Directors of another company. 
                                                 
59 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 
30/3/1431H corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2011G. 
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6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of the Board 
members and top executives; in laying down such policies, the standards related to 
performance shall be followed. 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board 
1. The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their responsibilities, 
including the preparation for the meetings of the Board and the permanent and ad hoc 
committees, and shall endeavor to attend such meetings. 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request by the 
Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen meeting upon a 
written request by two of its members. 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the Chairman 
should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. The agenda and other 
documentation should be sent to the members in a sufficient time prior to the meeting 
so that they may be able to consider such matters and prepare themselves for the 
meeting. Once convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the details of such objection shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. 
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the deliberations and 
the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in chapters for ease of reference. 
 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of remunerating 
the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a lump sum amount, 
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attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain percentage of the profits. Any two or 
more of these privileges may be conjoined. 
 
Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the General 
Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest (whether directly or indirectly) 
in the company's business and contracts. The activities to be performed through 
general bidding shall constitute an exception where a Board member is the best 
bidder. A Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal interest 
he/she may have in the business and contracts that are completed for the company's 
account. Such notification shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board 
member who is an interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be 
adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the Board of Directors. 
The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when 
convened, of the activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member may 
have a personal interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared 
by the company's auditor. 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the General Assembly, 
to be renewed annually, participate in any activity which may likely compete with the 
activities of the company, or trade in any branch of the activities carried out by the 
company. 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board members or 
render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a Board member with third 
parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary companies. 
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Part 5 
Closing Provisions 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication. 
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Appendices 6.1: Interviewes Questions 
 
A. CG Definition 
 
1.  What do you understand by the term corporate governance? How important 
do you think it is for businesses in general and for your bank in particular? 
 
2. Do you think compliance with Corporate Governance Code in Saudi Arabia is 
sufficient to ensure a high standard of corporate governance? 
 
3. What are the most important corporate governance issues for your bank? 
4. What does your bank do to achieve its corporate governance goals and assess 
their achievement?  
 
 
B. Business Ethics 
 
5. What is your definition and understanding of the concept of business ethics? 
Are business ethics important for your bank? If so, why? If not, why not? 
 
6. Does your bank have an ethical code? If so why? If not, why not?  
 
7. Do you think business ethics have an impact on your bank’s practices? If so, 
how? If not why not? 
 
8. How, if at all, are corporate governance and business ethics related? 
 
9. Do you think adherence to the Corporate Governance Code in Saudi Arabia is 
sufficient to ensure your bank behaves ethically, or is a specific ethical code 
needed? 
 
10. How your bank define stakeholders (e.g. clients, investors, employees, 
shareholders and community)? Does your bank attempt to ensure that they are 
dealt with ethically?       
 
 
C. Accountability 
 
11. How do you define and understand the accountability concept? 
 
12. Which stakeholders do you believe that your bank is accountable to? How is 
this accountability fulfilled?  
 
13. Do you think that accountability requires a strong corporate governance 
system? 
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14. Do you think that dealing ethically is part of being accountable to your 
stakeholders? 
 
 
D. Accountability in Islam 
 
15. To what extent is your bank subject to Sharia law (Islamic Law)? 
 
16. Are there any implications for corporate governance in Sharia law? 
 
17. How do you define accountability from an Islamic perspective? 
 
18. To what extent does the Islamic concept of accountability (Hisba) influence 
your corporate governance practices? If so, how? If not why not? 
 
19.  To what extent is the Islamic concept of accountability influenced by business 
ethics?  
 
20. Do you think business ethics have an influence on Shura and Hisba practices? 
If so, how? If not why not?  
 
21. Does your bank have a Sharia supervisory board? If so, how many members 
does it have? 
 
22. Does the Sharia supervisory board impact on the bank’s corporate governance 
system or ethical standards?  
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Appendices 7.1: Questionnaire surveys Questions 
 (Academics Version) 
 
Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
 
A: Demographic Information 
 
1. How many years of work experience do you have: 
 
Less than 5 years  
Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 10 and 15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
 
2. What is your highest level of academic qualification (Please choose one) 
 
PhD  
Master  
Undergraduate degree  
Other (please specify)  
  
 
3. Please specify your age group 
 
30 years or less  
31 – 40 years  
41 – 50 years  
51 – 60 years  
More than 60 years  
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For questions 4, 6-10 and 14 please respond by ticking the appropriate box [where 1 = 
Not at all, 5 = To a great extent] 
 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
  
4. To what extent do you agree that the term Corporate Governance term refers 
to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which institutions are controlled and 
directed 
     
b. Integrity and honesty in all activities in an institution      
c. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the institution and its shareholders. 
     
d. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the company and all stakeholders who affect, or who are 
affected by, the decisions and activities of the institution 
     
e. Responsible management with ethical foundations and 
recognition of the accountability of the institution 
towards all of its stakeholders 
     
 
 
5. A. How familiar you are with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
B. Were you consulted on it: 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
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6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi banks      
b. Practices of corporate governance in Saudi banks are 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance code is 
adequate and effective 
     
e. Saudi banks comply with most of the corporate 
governance code rules 
     
f. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code should 
be compulsory for all listed banks 
     
g.  There should be penalties for non-compliance by 
banks with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code 
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C: Business Ethics 
 
7. In the context of the Saudi Arabian banking sector, to what extent do you agree 
that the term “Business Ethics” refers to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The behaviour of employees within an institution      
b. The principles that control the relationship between the 
institution and others 
     
c.  A set of principles describing how employees should 
behave towards others,  whether inside or outside the 
institution  
     
d. An application of theories of “right” and “wrong” to 
activity within and between institutions, and between 
institutions and their broader environment   
     
 
8. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Business ethics are important for Saudi banks      
b. The practice of business ethics in Saudi banks is 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of the principles of 
business ethics in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. There should be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi 
banks issued by the regulatory body 
     
e. If there is an official code of business ethics, there 
should be penalties for non-compliance with it 
     
f. There is a relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics 
     
g. The existing Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code is sufficient to ensure that banks behave ethically 
     
h. A strong code of business ethics would enhance 
corporate governance practices in Saudi banks 
     
i. It is important for student who might work in the 
banking sector in the future to be educated about the 
importance of business ethics  
     
j. It is important for student who might work in the 
banking sector in the future to be educated about the 
importance of corporate governance 
     
k. Business ethics is a key part of our curriculum       
l. Corporate governance is a key part of our curriculum      
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D: Accountability 
 
9. To what extent do you agree that Saudi banks should be accountable to the 
following stakeholders: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a.  Academics       
c.  Clients      
d.  Employees      
g.  Regulators      
 
 
10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi 
Arabian banks: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Accountability to all stakeholders is understood and 
fulfilled  
     
b. Saudi banks provide equal access to relevant 
information to all stakeholders 
     
c. Banks’ employees at all different levels are 
accountable for their acts 
     
d. To facilitate a high level of accountability, banks need 
to adopt a strong corporate governance system 
     
e. Dealing ethically with all stakeholders is part of banks’ 
accountability  
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E: Accountability in Islam 
 
11. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of good corporate 
governance? 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
12. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of business ethics? 
 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
13. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with accountability 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi banks: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. Islamic banks and Islamic windows employ Sharia 
principles in all transactions 
     
b. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with 
shareholders 
     
c. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with all 
stakeholders  
     
d. Ensure that corporate governance practices are influenced 
by the Islamic conception of accountability 
     
e.  Offer all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes according to the Shura  concept 
     
f. Banks follow the Hisba concept in its relationship with its 
employees 
     
g. The Shura and Hisba concepts affect banks’ attitude to 
ethics 
     
h. The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) affects and is 
affected by banks’ attitude to ethics 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you would like to make any 
further comments please do so below: 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
If you would like a copy of the result, please contact: 
 
I.A.ALSHEKMUBARAK@DUNDEE.AC.UK 
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(Clients Version) 
 
Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
 
A: Demographic Information 
 
1. How many years of work experience do you have: 
 
Less than 5 years  
Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 10 and 15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
 
2. What is your highest level of academic qualification (Please choose one) 
 
PhD  
Master  
Undergraduate degree  
Other (please specify)  
  
 
3. Please specify your age group 
 
30 years or less  
31 – 40 years  
41 – 50 years  
51 – 60 years  
More than 60 years  
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For questions 4, 6-10 and 14 please respond by ticking the appropriate box [where 1 = 
Not at all, 5 = To a great extent] 
 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
  
4. To what extent do you agree that the term Corporate Governance term refers 
to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which institutions are controlled and 
directed 
     
b. Integrity and honesty in all activities in an institution      
c. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the institution and its shareholders. 
     
d. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the company and all stakeholders who affect, or who are 
affected by, the decisions and activities of the institution 
     
e. Responsible management with ethical foundations and 
recognition of the accountability of the institution 
towards all of its stakeholders 
     
 
 
5. A. How familiar you are with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
B. Were you consulted on it: 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
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6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi banks      
b. Practices of corporate governance in Saudi banks are 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance code is 
adequate and effective 
     
e. Saudi banks comply with most of the corporate 
governance code rules 
     
f. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code should 
be compulsory for all listed banks 
     
g.  There should be penalties for non-compliance by 
banks with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code 
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C: Business Ethics 
 
7. In the context of the Saudi Arabian banking sector, to what extent do you agree 
that the term “Business Ethics” refers to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The behaviour of employees within an institution      
b. The principles that control the relationship between the 
institution and others 
     
c.  A set of principles describing how employees should 
behave towards others,  whether inside or outside the 
institution  
     
d. An application of theories of “right” and “wrong” to 
activity within and between institutions, and between 
institutions and their broader environment   
     
 
 
8. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Business ethics are important for Saudi banks      
b. The practice of business ethics in Saudi banks is 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of the principles of 
business ethics in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. There should be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi 
banks issued by the regulatory body 
     
e. If there is an official code of business ethics, there 
should be penalties for non-compliance with it 
     
f. There is a relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics  
     
g. The existing Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code is sufficient to ensure that banks behave ethically 
     
h. A strong code of business ethics would enhance 
corporate governance practices in Saudi banks 
     
i. Ethical practices influence my decision on which banks 
to use   
     
j. Corporate governance practices influence my decision 
on which banks to use   
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D: Accountability 
 
9. To what extent do you agree that Saudi banks should be accountable to the 
following stakeholders: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a.  Academics       
c.  Clients      
d.  Employees      
g.  Regulators      
 
 
10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi 
Arabian banks: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Accountability to all stakeholders is understood and 
fulfilled  
     
b. Saudi banks provide equal access to relevant 
information to all stakeholders 
     
c. Banks’ employees at all different levels are 
accountable for their acts 
     
d. To facilitate a high level of accountability, banks need 
to adopt a strong corporate governance system 
     
e. Dealing ethically with all stakeholders is part of banks’ 
accountability  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
E: Accountability in Islam 
 
11. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of good corporate 
governance? 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
12. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of business ethics? 
 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
13. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with accountability 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi banks: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. Islamic banks and Islamic windows employ Sharia 
principles in all transactions 
     
b. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with 
shareholders 
     
c. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with all 
stakeholders  
     
d. Ensure that corporate governance practices are influenced 
by the Islamic conception of accountability 
     
e.  Offer all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes according to the Shura  concept 
     
f. Banks follow the Hisba concept in its relationship with its 
employees 
     
g. The Shura and Hisba concepts affect banks’ attitude to 
ethics 
     
h. The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) affects and is affected 
by banks’ attitude to ethics 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you would like to make any 
further comments please do so below: 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
If you would like a copy of the result, please contact: 
 
I.A.ALSHEKMUBARAK@DUNDEE.AC.UK 
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(Employees Version) 
 
Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
 
A: Demographic Information 
1. How many years of work experience do you have: 
 
Less than 5 years  
Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 10 and 15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
 
2. What is your highest level of academic qualification (Please choose one) 
 
PhD  
Master  
Undergraduate degree  
Other (please specify)  
  
 
3. Please specify your age group 
 
30 years or less  
31 – 40 years  
41 – 50 years  
51 – 60 years  
More than 60 years  
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For questions 4, 6-10 and 14 please respond by ticking the appropriate box 
[where 1 = Not at all, 5 = To a great extent] 
 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
  
4. To what extent do you agree that the term Corporate Governance term refers 
to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which institutions are controlled and 
directed 
     
b. Integrity and honesty in all activities in an institution      
c. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the institution and its shareholders. 
     
d. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the company and all stakeholders who affect, or who are 
affected by, the decisions and activities of the institution 
     
e. Responsible management with ethical foundations and 
recognition of the accountability of the institution 
towards all of its stakeholders 
     
 
 
5. How familiar you are with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
 
6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi banks      
b. Practices of corporate governance in Saudi banks are 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance code is 
adequate and effective 
     
e. Saudi banks comply with most of the corporate 
governance code rules 
     
f. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code should 
be compulsory for all listed banks 
     
g.  There should be penalties for non-compliance by 
banks with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code 
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C: Business Ethics 
 
7. In the context of the Saudi Arabian banking sector, to what extent do you agree 
that the term “Business Ethics” refers to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The behaviour of employees within an institution      
b. The principles that control the relationship between the 
institution and others 
     
c.  A set of principles describing how employees should 
behave towards others,  whether inside or outside the 
institution  
     
d. An application of theories of “right” and “wrong” to 
activity within and between institutions, and between 
institutions and their broader environment   
     
 
8. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Business ethics are important for Saudi banks      
b. The practice of business ethics in Saudi banks is 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of the principles of 
business ethics in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. There should be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi 
banks issued by the regulatory body 
     
e. If there is an official code of business ethics, there 
should be penalties for non-compliance with it 
     
f. There is a relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics  
     
g. The existing Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code is sufficient to ensure that banks behave ethically 
     
h. A strong code of business ethics would enhance 
corporate governance practices in Saudi banks 
     
i. Bank employees are aware of the need for high 
standards of ethical behaviour in their professional 
activities 
     
j. Bank employees are aware of the firm’s corporate 
governance policies and procedures 
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D: Accountability 
 
9. To what extent do you agree that Saudi banks should be accountable to the 
following stakeholders: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a.  Academics       
c.  Clients      
d.  Employees      
g.  Regulators      
 
 
10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi 
Arabian banks: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Accountability to all stakeholders is understood and 
fulfilled  
     
b. Saudi banks provide equal access to relevant 
information to all stakeholders 
     
c. Banks’ employees at all different levels are 
accountable for their acts 
     
d. To facilitate a high level of accountability, banks need 
to adopt a strong corporate governance system 
     
e. Dealing ethically with all stakeholders is part of banks’ 
accountability  
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E: Accountability in Islam 
 
11. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of good corporate 
governance? 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
12. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of business ethics? 
 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
13. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with accountability 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi banks: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. Islamic banks and Islamic windows employ Sharia 
principles in all transactions 
     
b. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with 
shareholders 
     
c. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with all 
stakeholders  
     
d. Ensure that corporate governance practices are influenced 
by the Islamic conception of accountability 
     
e.  Offer all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes according to the Shura  concept 
     
f. Banks follow the Hisba concept in its relationship with its 
employees 
     
g. The Shura and Hisba concepts affect banks’ attitude to 
ethics 
     
h. The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) affects and is affected 
by banks’ attitude to ethics 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you would like to make any 
further comments please do so below: 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
If you would like a copy of the result, please contact: 
 
I.A.ALSHEKMUBARAK@DUNDEE.AC.UK 
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(Regulators Version) 
 
Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
 
A: Demographic Information 
 
1. How many years of work experience do you have: 
 
Less than 5 years  
Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 10 and 15 years  
More than 15 years  
 
 
2. What is your highest level of academic qualification (Please choose one) 
 
PhD  
Master  
Undergraduate degree  
Other (please specify)  
  
 
3. Please specify your age group 
 
30 years or less  
31 – 40 years  
41 – 50 years  
51 – 60 years  
More than 60 years  
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For questions 4, 6-10 and 14 please respond by ticking the appropriate box 
[where 1 = Not at all, 5 = To a great extent] 
 
 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
  
4. To what extent do you agree that the term Corporate Governance term refers 
to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which institutions are controlled and 
directed 
     
b. Integrity and honesty in all activities in an institution      
c. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the institution and its shareholders. 
     
d. The principles that relate to the relationship between 
the company and all stakeholders who affect, or who are 
affected by, the decisions and activities of the institution 
     
e. Responsible management with ethical foundations and 
recognition of the accountability of the institution 
towards all of its stakeholders 
     
 
5. Were you involved in creating the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance cod:  
Yes  
No  
If yes out line your involvement: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _    
 
6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi banks      
b. Practices of corporate governance in Saudi banks are 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance code is 
adequate and effective 
     
e. Saudi banks comply with most of the corporate 
governance code rules 
     
f. The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Code should 
be compulsory for all listed banks 
     
g.  There should be penalties for non-compliance by 
banks with the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code 
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C: Business Ethics 
 
7. In the context of the Saudi Arabian banking sector, to what extent do you agree 
that the term “Business Ethics” refers to: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The behaviour of employees within an institution      
b. The principles that control the relationship between the 
institution and others 
     
c.  A set of principles describing how employees should 
behave towards others,  whether inside or outside the 
institution  
     
d. An application of theories of “right” and “wrong” to 
activity within and between institutions, and between 
institutions and their broader environment   
     
 
8. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Business ethics are important for Saudi banks      
b. The practice of business ethics in Saudi banks is 
satisfactory 
     
c. There is an adequate awareness of the principles of 
business ethics in the Saudi banking sector 
     
d. There should be a compulsory ethical code for Saudi 
banks issued by the regulatory body 
     
e. If there is an official code of business ethics, there 
should be penalties for non-compliance with it 
     
f. There is a relationship between corporate governance 
and business ethics 
     
g. The existing Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Code is sufficient to ensure that banks behave ethically 
     
h. A strong code of business ethics would enhance 
corporate governance practices in Saudi banks 
     
i. Ensuring high ethical standards should be a priority for 
regulators of the Saudi Arabian banking sector  
     
j. Ensuring high corporate governance standards should 
be a priority for regulators of the Saudi Arabian banking 
sector 
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D: Accountability 
 
9. To what extent do you agree that Saudi banks should be accountable to the 
following stakeholders: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a.  Academics       
c.  Clients      
d.  Employees      
g.  Regulators      
 
 
10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi 
Arabian banks: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Accountability to all stakeholders is understood and 
fulfilled  
     
b. Saudi banks provide equal access to relevant 
information to all stakeholders 
     
c. Banks’ employees at all different levels are 
accountable for their acts 
     
d. To facilitate a high level of accountability, banks need 
to adopt a strong corporate governance system 
     
e. Dealing ethically with all stakeholders is part of banks’ 
accountability  
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E: Accountability in Islam 
 
11. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of good corporate 
governance? 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
12. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with any principles of business ethics? 
 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
13. In your opinion does Sharia conflict with accountability 
Yes No 
  
 
(If yes please explain) ………………………………………………………. 
 
 
14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Saudi banks: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Islamic banks and Islamic windows employ Sharia 
principles in all transactions 
     
b. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with 
shareholders 
     
c. Ensure that employees at all levels employ the Islamic 
conception of accountability in their dealings with all 
stakeholders  
     
d. Ensure that corporate governance practices are influenced 
by the Islamic conception of accountability 
     
e.  Offer all stakeholders the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes according to the Shura  concept 
     
f. Banks follow the Hisba concept in its relationship with its 
employees 
     
g. The Shura and Hisba concepts affect banks’ attitude to 
ethics 
     
h. The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) affects and is affected 
by banks’ attitude to ethics 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire. If you would like to make any 
further comments please do so below: 
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
If you would like a copy of the result, please contact: 
 
I.A.ALSHEKMUBARAK@DUNDEE.AC.UK 
 
